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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
China has encouraged its companies and citizens to invest in Africa at a record pace. In 
Rwanda, Chinese companies have paved more than 80% of the main roads, while in 
Kenya and Sudan, they have built roads and bridges.1 In Zambia, Chinese companies own 
one of its largest copper mines, and also run a handful of textile companies in Lesotho.2 
In more than a dozen African states, Chinese firms are searching for oil and building 
power plants and other infrastructure projects.3  
 
On the premise of the foregoing, the Afro – China relationship has greatly increased, thus 
bringing about benefits as well as possible future legal and policy challenges to Africa. 
 
Three challenges lend themselves for analysis in this mini thesis. First, states are driven 
by their national interest (survival, security, pursuit of wealth and economic growth and 
power). In this regard, the more powerful4 a state is, the easier it is for it to impose its 
interests vis-à-vis weaker states. This is why in the Afro-Chinese investment relations the 
interests5 of China seem to reign supreme over those of the African states. The study will, 
therefore, explore the relationship between Africa’s weak bargaining power in 
negotiating agreements and the resultant unequal returns on investment.  
 
Secondly, the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) negotiated between African States and 
China result in the former making concessions that they would otherwise not have made.6 
                                                 
1Zhiqun Z. ‘China’s new diplomacy in Africa and its implications’. (2007).Available at: 
www.sloc.cafe24.com/upload/publication01/2007B06.pdf (accessed on 12/10/2008) at p 21. 
2Elling N. ‘China in Africa. Implications for Norwegian foreign and development policies’. (2006)15. Chr. 
Michelsen Institute. Available at: www.cmi.no/publications  (accessed on 2/2/2009). 
3Elling (2006) p 17. 
4In this study power is defined as “…being able to get people to do things, to act as they might not 
otherwise have acted” (Paulson S. and Litschewski B. (1999) Normative and norms:Critical perspective on 
Kelsenian themes). 
5That is, economic development and long term strategic interest aimed at increasing its international status, 
hence its international influence. See also Wenping H. ‘The balancing act of China’s Africa policy’. 
Available at: www.wsichina.org/cs7_2.pdf.    (accessed on 2/2/2009) at pp 25 and 26.  
6See definition of power in fn4 above. 
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This has led to a legal “mis-engineering”7 of BITs as they are drafted without integrating 
the African development goals8, thus denying host African states policy space. This study 
will, therefore, examine BITs entered into by China with Uganda, Djibouti and Germany. 
The intention here is to identify the specific elements of mis-engineering in the African 
states’ BITs with China. Moreover, this thesis will examine how the legal mis-
engineering has contributed to the unequal returns on investment. 
 
Lastly, many African states are characterised by weak institutional frameworks. 
Corruptible and elite serving institutions result in the uncritical implementation of the 
BITs, hence hindering the realisation of the benefits of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 
from China.9 This thesis will examine how mis-engineered BITs, operating in an 
environment of rigid and corrupt institutions result in unequal returns on investment  
 
1.2 HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis has a major and a minor hypothesis. 
Major hypothesis:  The unequal return on investments between China and Africa is a 
consequence of legal mis-engineering of BITs, and weak       
institutions existing in most African states.  
Minor hypothesis: The legal mis-engineering of BITs is a consequence of Africa’s 
weak bargaining power. 
                                                 
7In this study, “mis-engineering” means drafting of BITs without giving due regard to the development 
goals of African states and their policy space.  
The word “mis-engineering” shall henceforth be written without quotation marks.  
8African development goals are underpinned by a number of strategic tenets: Poverty reduction, access to 
technology and global markets, creation and maintenance of social peace, the establishment of 
environmental standards, transparent bidding and institutions, promotion of governance and sound 
economic management, transparency in aid giving, the maximization of revenues for African governments 
and electorates, and maximizing the effect of local conflict resolution and peacekeeping. See The 
Brenthurst foundation. ‘Africa-China-U.S. Trilateral dialogue’. (2007) summary report. Available at: 
http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/documents/ChinaAfricaUSTrilateralDialogueSummaryReport.pd
f (accessed on 6/2/09). 
9Anonymous ‘Competition or partnership? China, United States and Africa – An African view’. Available 
at: 
www.thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/Trilateral%20Dialogue/documents/ChinaUSAfricaCompetitionorPartn
ershipCOMFNL.pdf (accessed on 6/2/09). 
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The theoretical framework that shall be used is the FDI dependency theory, which states 
that FDI is a conduit through which the centre (developed and industrialised countries) 
exploits the periphery (developing and least developed countries) and perpetuates the 
latter's state of underdevelopment and dependence.10 
Three tenets of this theory will be used for analysis: 
1. Excessive dependence on the centre weakens the periphery’s bargaining power 
and restricts its range of options for internal policies in order to accommodate the 
needs and requests of the centre.11 
2. With the vast increase in capital mobility12 the economies of the periphery 
become perpetually dependent on foreign capital and finance (loans or aids) thus 
substantially reducing its scope for independent economic policies. 13 
3. Dependency leads to unequal returns on investment, hence underdevelopment of 
the periphery.14 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The main objective of this thesis is to establish a robust causal relationship between the 
unequal returns on investment and the mis-engineered BITs between African states and 
China.15 
 
                                                 
10Kebonang Z. ‘NEPAD: Drawing lessons from theories of foreign direct investment’. (December 2006). 
Indian Journal of Economics and Business. Available at: 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1TSD/is_2_5/ai_n25012650/?tag=content;col1(accessed on 
2/2/2009). See also Hyman and Michael R. ‘Dependency theory and the effects of advertising by foreign-
based multinational corporations’. (1994). Journal of Advertising .Available at: 
http://www.allbusiness.com/marketing-advertising/advertising/443838-1.html (accessed on 17/2/09). 
11Crandall R. et al. (2005) Mexico’s democracy at work: Political and economic dynamics at pp 134-137 
See also Khan M. ‘Foreign direct investment and growth: The role of the domestic financial sector’. 
Available at: http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Seminar/FDI-Presentation.pdf (accessed on 12/2/09). 
12Capital mobility occurs when the centre repatriates profits and royalties and does not re-invest, causing a 
significant reduction in funds which would have been used for domestic investments. See also Rojas R. 
‘International capital: A threat to human dignity and life on planet earth’. (2001). Available at: 
http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:70JMCEJXVO0J:www.rrojasdatabank.org/Globalss.doc+Rojas+R.+
(2001)+International+capital:+A+threat+to+human+dignity+and+life+on+planet+earth&cd=1&hl=en&ct=
clnk&gl=za (accessed on 17/2/09). 
13Rojas (2001). 
14Kebonang (2006). See also Hyman (1994). 
15Rojas (2001).  
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Specifically, the study undertakes to: 
1) Explore the relationship between Africa’s weak bargaining power in negotiating 
agreements and the resultant unequal returns on investment;  
2) Identify the specific elements of mis-engineering in the BITs with China and examine 
how the legal mis-engineering has contributed to the unequal returns on investment; 
3) Examine how rigid and corrupt institutions hinder the critical implementation of the 
BITs, hence unequal returns on investment.  
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This study has both an academic and a policy justification. At the academic level, it is 
argued that the rapid economic growth in China has led to increased Chinese investments 
in Africa in natural resources, oil and the manufacturing sector.16The kind of policy, legal 
and institutional frameworks that exist in most African states hinder the Chinese 
investments from contributing positively to the host country’s economic development, 
hence unequal returns on investment.17 
 
The current literature existing with regards to Afro-Chinese investment focuses on inter 
alia:  China as the new formidable competitor of the West and the lessons that Africa can 
learn from China;18  FDI policies and challenges China is facing in Africa;19 direct and 
indirect economic and development benefits to Africa;20  China’s sovereignty and non-
interference policy with regards to its investment in Africa;21 favourable aid and debt 
relief programmes;22 China as an alternative to Africa, hence the need for Africa to act 
                                                 
16Broadman H. and Gozde I. (2007)  Africa’s silk road. China and India’s new economic frontier.  
See also Shinn D. ‘An opportunistic ally. China’s increasing involvement in Africa’. (2007).Harvard 
International Business Review, summer. Available at: 
http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-government/5504463-1.html (accessed 
on 20/10/2008). 
17Kebonang (2006).  
18Dollar D.  ‘Lessons from China for Africa’. (2008). World Bank Policy Research Paper ref. no. 
WPS4531. 
19Anshan L. ‘China and Africa. Policy and challenges’. (2007)3. China Security, World Security Institute at 
pp 69-93.  
20Shinn (2007).Also see Goldstein A. et al. (2007) The rise of China and India: What’s in it for Africa. 
Available at:  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/62/36905545.pdf (accessed on 10/10/08). 
21Meidan M. ‘China’s Africa policy: Business now politics later’. (2006)30. Asian perspective Availabe at: 
http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v30n4-d.pdf (accessed on: 12/2/09) at pp 69-93. 
22Goldstein (2007). 
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fast to reap the benefits;23 and the environmental and labour issues surrounding Chinese 
investments in Africa.24 
 
There is no literature examining whether the unequal return on investments between 
China and Africa is a consequence of legal mis-engineering of the BITs. This study is 
significant, therefore, for two reasons. One, it provides a textual analysis of BITs and 
argues that they are deliberately mis-engineered to benefit China. This kind of analysis is 
absent in literature on FDI. Two, it links the political and social economic dimensions of 
Afro-Chinese investment with the legal dimension with the aim of establishing how they 
interact to contribute to the mis-engineering of the BITs, and therefore unequal returns on 
investments.  
 
At the policy level, it is argued that Chinese investments do not integrate Africa’s and the 
host country’s development goals and this results in unequal returns on investment. Thus 
Africa thus needs to come up with Afro-China policies. A number of policies have been 
suggested: for example, developing a monitoring mechanism by which all FDI coming to 
Africa can be screened, monitored is aligned to the development objectives of Africa.25 
This study is significant, at the policy level, for two reasons. One, it provides a 
framework for policy integration and possible re-engineering. Two, it discusses how 
weak institutions and the power factor26 contribute to the uncritical implementation of the 
BITs and investment policies, hence resulting in unequal returns on investment.  
 
1.5 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH  
The subject area under investigation is extensive; therefore a limited research scope is 
undertaken. The research will thus focus on Chinese investments in Africa as opposed to 
trade. The said investments will only be in the following areas: natural and mineral 
resources; oil; agriculture; manufacturing; and infrastructure. Further, this study will 
                                                 
23Meidan (2006). 
24Elling N. et al. ‘China in Africa; Implications for Norwegian foreign and development policies’. 
(2006)15.  CMI Report. Available at: www.cmi.no/publications (accessed on 9/10/08). 
25Kebonang (2006). 
26See definition of power at  fn 4 above. 
 
 
 
 
 6
examine BITs entered into by China with Uganda, Djibouti and Germany only for 
purposes of identifying specific elements of mis-engineering. 
 
1.6 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1 gives a brief overview of the research, the objectives and scope of the research, 
as well as the Chapter outline. 
  
In Chapter 2, four issues are discussed. First, a general overview of FDI regulation is 
given. This is followed by a discussion of how the lack of a multilateral agreement on 
investment has led to states regulating investments through host state regulations and 
BITs. Secondly, this Chapter discusses Chinese investments in Africa; its investment 
policies with regards to Africa; and the benefits and challenges facing Africa. Thirdly, an 
analysis of the Uganda, Djibouti and Germany BITs with China is undertaken to bring 
out the similarities. The specific elements of mis-engineering in the Uganda and Djibouti 
BITs with China will be identified. Finally, this chapter examines how the legal mis-
engineering has contributed to the unequal returns on investment. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the sources of China’s strong bargaining power, the reasons for 
African states’ weak bargaining power, and the contribution of this power asymmetry to 
the legal mis-engineering of China BITs with African states, and the resultant unequal 
returns on investment 
 
Chapter 4 examines weak institutions characterizing most African states, and how they 
have contributed to the unequal returns on the Chinese investments. 
 
Chapter 5 summarises the issues discussed, draws conclusions, and makes 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE LEGAL ‘MIS-ENGINEERING’ OF BITs: A TEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS. 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
There is no global regulation of FDI27 therefore it is regulated at national level largely 
through BITs. During BIT negotiations, African host states should ensure that due regard 
is given to there development goals through express provisions in the BITs. 28  This is 
because there is no doctrine of precedents in international investment arbitration.29 
Hence, despite the fact that issues regarding the extent of host state policy space in 
expropriation of the properties of foreign investors and investment protection have been 
clarified in recent Arbitral Tribunal decisions, future Tribunals are not bound by the 
decisions.30  
 
The above notwithstanding, developed states continue to conclude BITs with African 
states that do not give the latter policy space and regulatory flexibility; therefore they are 
mis-engineered.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27The Multilateral Framework on Investment (MFI) negotiations at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
was removed from the WTO Doha negotiation agenda, for the time being, through the General Council 
decision of 1st August 2004. See discussion on failure of multilateralism at Chapter 2.2.3 hereinafter. 
28Yu V. and Marshal F. ‘Investors’ obligations and host state policy space’. Paper presented at the second 
Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment Negotiators held in Morocco on the 3-4 November 2008, 
at p 23. 
29Ibid.  
30For example, with respect to investors’ right to fair and equitable treatment, the Tribunal in Parkerings-
Compagniet AS –vs- Lithuania (award on jurisdiction and merits, ICSID case No. ARB/05/08, award 14 
August 2007) made it clear that investors’ legitimate expectations must be interpreted in light of host 
states’ right to legislate, and that investors cannot expect the legal environment to remain unchanged. 
Further, it established that Tribunals are entitled to take account of public policy considerations when 
determining whether a host state has discriminated between the investor and other similar operations. In the 
area of expropriation, the awards in Methanex Corporation –vs- United States (final award on jurisdiction 
and merits 3 August 2005) and Saluka investments BV –vs- Czech Repubic (partial award, PCA – 
UNICITRAL Arbitration rules, 17 March 2006) declared that a non-discriminatory regulation for a public 
purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process is not deemed expropriatory unless the host state 
has given specific commitments to the investor that it would refrain from such regulation.  
 
 
 
 
 8
2.2. LEGAL MIS-ENGINEERING AS POWER POLITICS 
Five reasons demonstrate a deliberate mis-engineering of BITs between developed states 
and African states. First, states are driven by their national interest.31 Consequently 
developed states approach BIT negotiations strategically, with the aim of securing a deal 
closer to their own preferences.32 This is evidenced by the existence of model treaties and 
investment policies33 wherein a country’s preferences are encoded. Since developed 
countries are more economically powerful than African countries, they have leverage and 
control over the latter.34 As a result of this power asymmetry, developed countries are 
generally in a much stronger position to impose their interests in BITs and so the 
preferences of developed countries usually prevail.35   
 
Secondly, developed states know that African states lack financial capacity to contract 
qualified and experienced negotiators who would be able to analyse the practical, legal 
and policy consequences of the agreements being negotiated.36 As a result, they can 
impose their preferences, contained in model treaties and in investment policies, upon 
African states. 
 
Thirdly, the governments of most African states are known to be corrupt.37 Government 
and the elite class attending BIT negotiations are usually willing to concede to the 
requests of developed states to ensure that Multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest in 
                                                 
31These are a country’s goals and ambitions, whether economic, military or cultural; hence its security and 
survival. 
32Peinhardt C. and Allee T. ‘Delegating differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and patterns of dispute 
resolution design’. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association held at 
Hilton Chicago in 2007. Available at:www.allacademic.com/meta/p179106_index.html (accessed on: 
3.3.09). 
33Such as the China-Africa investment policies. 
34Parthapratim P. ‘Surge in Indian outbound FDI to Africa: An emerging pattern in 
globalization?’. (2008). Paper presented at the Global Studies Conference at the University of Illinois, 
Chicago, US on May 16-18 2008. Available at: www.iimcal.ac.in/research/download/OFDI_Partha-pal.pdf 
(accessed on 3/3/09). 
35Ibid. 
36Peinhardt (2007). 
37Harsch E. ‘Africans taking action on corruption’. United Nations Department of Public Information. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol11no1/corrupt.htm (accessed on 23/4/09). 
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their states as they will exchange preferable policies for private benefits once the 
investors set up shop.38  
 
Fourthly, FDI dependency weakens African states’ bargaining power. Following the FDI 
dependency theory, excessive dependence on foreign investment markets, inputs, 
technology and products, weakens a country’s bargaining position in the international 
arena and restricts the range of options for internal policies in order to accommodate the 
needs and requests of external actors .39 
 
Lastly, many scholars argue that FDI leads to economic growth.40 They state that FDI 
provides capital that may not be available in a host country’s domestic market thereby 
helping the host country to attain economic growth.41 Moreover, they posit that for those 
countries lacking capital resources and technologies, MNEs are “the only hope”.42 As a 
result of the above contentions, countries compete to attract FDI. This leads to ‘subsidy 
games’, whereby each country attempts to offer the investor the most favourable 
conditions as encoded in the model treaties being used at the negotiation table.43  
 
China is well aware of the above precarious position of African states.44 Despite this 
knowledge, it has not attempted to conclude BITs specially designed for African states 
                                                 
38Jung Y.‘JThe impact of corruption on a country’s FDI attractiveness: A panel data analysis, 
1984-2004’. Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 International Studies Association annual meeting 
held in San Francisco, CA on 26-29 March, 2008, at p 3. Referring to Tarzi S.  ‘Third world governments 
and multinational corporations: Dynamics of host's bargaining power’. (1991)10. International Relations ,at 
p 244, wherein it was stated that MNEs prefer countries “where individual leaders in host countries were 
known to accept private payments in exchange for their efforts to preserve the status quo”. 
39 See the explanation of the dependency theory in Chapter 1.2 herein. 
40Jung (2008) p 4. Referring to Indra D. and Oneal.J. ‘Boon or bane? Re-assessing the productivity of 
Foreign Direct Investment’. (1999)64. American Sociological Review at pp 766-782, Firebaugh G. 
‘Growth effects of Foreign and Domestic Investment’. (1992)8.The American Journal 
of Sociology at pp 105-130 and Jensen  M. ‘Democratic governance and multinational corporations: 
Political regimes and inflows of Foreign Direct Investment’. (2003)57. International Organisation at pp 
587-616. 
41Ibid. 
42Biersteker J. (1978) Distortion or development?: Contending perspectives on the multinational 
corporation at p 2. Referred to by Jung (2008) p 3. 
43Pedro P. and Luis C. ‘Competing for Foreign Direct Investment’. (2000)8. Review of International 
Economics at pp 360-371. 
44See WTO submission of China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Zimbabwe on 19th November 2002 
(WT/WGTI/W/152). It states, inter alia, “The Working Group should …examine legally-binding measures 
aimed at ensuring corporate responsibility and accountability relating to foreign investors, including 
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that balance the objectives of MNEs (i.e. profit maximization) and the development 
policy objectives of the host African states in order to ensure that African states obtain 
equal returns on investments. Instead, it has adopted the same BITs it signed with 
developed states notwithstanding the differences in the levels of development between 
developed and developing countries. Hence China’s BITs with African states are 
deliberately mis-engineered in order for the former to obtain personal gains at the 
expense of the latter. This chapter will analyse the Uganda, Djibouti and Germany BITs 
with China. The aim is to show the similarity between China’s BIT with Germany and 
that with Uganda and Djibouti; identify specific elements of mis-engineering; and, 
thereafter, discuss how they have contributed to the unequal returns on investment. 
 
Before commencing this analysis, an overview of FDI regulation and Chinese 
investments in Africa will be undertaken. 
 
2.3.    AN OVERVIEW OF FDI AND FDI REGULATION. 
 
2.3.1. FDI defined 
Most developing countries have relied on bilateral and multilateral donor assistance 
(Overseas Development Assistance – ODA) as a source of development finance.45 The 
decade between 1990 and 2000 witnessed a drop of ODA by more than half, forcing 
developing countries to search for alternative, and sustainable, sources of capital to 
finance national development. Consequently, African countries considerably liberalized 
their existing investment regulations and entered into international investment 
arrangements to facilitate the flow of FDI into their economies. This saw the rise of FDI 
                                                                                                                                                 
measures that clearly spell out investors' obligations and the obligations of their home governments.”  and 
“…their objective of global profit maximization, there could be conflict of interests between their objectives 
and the development policy objectives of the host countries and they could indulge in restrictive business 
practices (RBPs), manipulation of transfer prices and other such practices.  There is therefore a need to 
address the negative effects of the FDI activities by the MNEs that they may have on the host members, 
particularly the developing ones, while recognizing the positive role of the FDI”.   
45Towards Earth Summit. ‘Foreign Direct Investment: A lead driver for sustainable development?’ (2002) 
Economic briefing series No.1. Available at: 
http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/SF_Briefing_Papers/bp_FDI.pdf (accessed on 23/4/09). 
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inflows from USD 2.4 billion in 1985 to USD 36 billion in 2006.46 FDI is now the largest 
source of foreign private capital reaching African countries.47 
 
FDI is defined as capital invested by a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) in 
an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor (direct investment 
enterprise) for the purpose of acquiring a lasting interest.48An inflow of private capital 
plays a part in the host country’s development by helping to reduce the shortage of 
domestic savings and increasing the supply of foreign exchange.49 In addition, it 
significantly contributes to human capital formation; technology spill-over; enterprise 
restructuring; better organisational and managerial skills through mergers and 
acquisitions; and increased competition.50 FDI is thus viewed as a major stimulus to 
economic growth in developing countries, and as a powerful force for global 
integration.51  
 
The benefits from foreign corporate presence do not accrue automatically.52 To obtain 
maximum benefits the host state needs to manage its economy both efficiently and 
effectively. The presence of good infrastructure, an educated labour force, macro-
economic stability, good investment framework, an efficient legal system, less corruption 
and political stability, are thus paramount.53 
                                                 
46UNCTAD ‘World Investment Directory 2008’.Available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20075_en.pdf (accessed on 25/2/09). 
47Towards Earth Summit (2002).  
48The “lasting interest” implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the 
direct investment enterprise as well as a significant degree of influence on the management of the latter. 
See OECD ‘Survey of OECD work on international investment’. (1998). OECD working paper. Available 
at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/59/2111393.pdf (accessed on 25/2/09) and OECD ‘OECD benchmark 
definition of foreign direct investment’. (1996)3ed. Available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148.pdf (accessed on 25/2/09). 
49Ndulo M. ‘Multilateral agencies and agreements and the regulation of trade and investment for 
developing countries’. (1991)17. Lesotho L.J at p 162. 
50World Bank ‘Foreign Direct Investment- benefits beyond insurance’. (1993). World Bank development 
Brief No. 14. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Briefs/DB14.html (accessed 
on 25/2/09).  
See also OECD ‘Foreign Direct Investment for development: Maximising benefits, minimising costs’. 
(2002). Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/51/1959815.pdf (accessed on 25/2/09). 
51 OECD (1998) fn 48. 
52 OECD (2002) fn 50. 
53Asiedu E. ‘Foreign direct investment in Africa: The role of government policy, institutions and political 
instability’. Available at: www.people.ku.edu/~asiedu (accessed on 22/1/09). 
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FDI is not without its downsides, especially for host states. For example, there are well 
founded fears of political interference in domestic politics by powerful investors.54 
Further, high dependence on multinational companies is a source of potential instability 
in the unlikely event that the host state loses its attractiveness as a base for multinational 
investment, hence entailing substantial adjustment costs.55 Finally, repatriation of profits, 
and dividends, and failure to re-invest by the investors contribute to underdevelopment of 
the host state.56 
 
2.3.2. FDI regulation: The history of BITs 
Foreign investors invest to make profits and not for reasons of benevolence. Thus, if they 
make profits they expect to retain the same (subject to payment of appropriate taxes to 
the local authorities); and if they acquire property, they expect to be entitled to keep it.57 
This is why they demand legal security in the form of transparent and predictable rules. 
 
In the period after World War II, the rights of foreign investors vis-a-vis those of the host 
state (state in which they invest) were protected by international law and the international 
political, and sometimes military, power58 of the "home" state.59 
 
For example, under customary international law, the ability of a foreigner to undertake an 
investment in the host country was subject exclusively to the sovereignty of that 
country.60 Therefore the host country had the right to control the movement of capital 
                                                 
54Ndulo. (1991). 
55Ibid. 
56Ajit S. ‘FDI, globalization and economic development: Towards reforming national and international 
rules of the game’. ESRC centre for business research., University of Cambridge working paper No. 304. 
Available at:  http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP304.pdf (accessed on 26/2/09). See also Kebonang (2006). 
57Adeoye A. ‘International protection of direct foreign investments in the third world’. (1987)37 . 
International and Comparative law quarterly. 
58Host states feared reprisals of some form from the home state of investors and on account of this 
abstained from harassing them and treating them unfairly. See Jean Monnet Centre, ‘Explaining the 
popularity of BITs’. (2004). NYU School of law. Available at: 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-12-Contents.html (accessed on 25/2/09). 
59Salacuse J. and Sullivan N. ‘Do BITS really work? An evaluation of bilateral investment treaties and their 
grand bargain’. (2005)46. Harvard International  Law Journal. 
60Also referred to as sovereign rights of host states.  See Salacuse J. ‘BIT by BIT: The growth of bilateral 
investment treaties and their impact on foreign investment in developing countries’. (1990)24. The 
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into its territory, to regulate all matters pertaining to the acquisition and transfer of 
property within its national boundaries, to determine the conditions for the exercise of 
economic activity by natural and legal persons, and to control the entry and activity of 
aliens.61 Similarly, expropriation of property owned by foreigners was permitted only for 
a public purpose and only if accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation (the Hull rule).62  
 
Customary international law and other applicable international law failed to take account 
of contemporary investment practices and to address important issues of concern to 
foreign investors.63 For example:- 
 
a) Customary international law did not address the right of foreign investors to make 
monetary transfers from the host country.64 
b) The existing principles were vague and subject to varying interpretations. For 
instance, there was no crystallised principle on how compensation under the Hull 
rule was to be calculated. 65 
c) The applicable international law prompted disagreement between industrialised 
countries and newly decolonised developing nations.66 For example, foreign 
investors considered the sovereign rights as creating barriers to foreign capital and 
limiting their freedom to undertake investments.67 On the other hand, the 
developing countries rejected the Hull rule claiming that it served only to 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Lawyer. Available at: www.stephankinsella.com/texts/salacuse_bit_by_bit.pdf (accessed on 
25/2/09). 
61Salacuse (1990). See also Asante S. ‘ International law and foreign investment. A re-appraisal’. (1988)37. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly at pp 589-590 where the same was referred to as ‘state 
responsibility’. 
62The rule is named as such because Cordell Hull, while secretary of state for United States, declared that 
‘no government is entitled to expropriate the private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for 
prompt, adequate and effective payment therefore.’ See, Jean Monnet Centre (2004). See also Elkins et al. 
‘Competing for capital: The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960-2000’. Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the International Studies Association held at Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Canada, on 
March 17, 2004. Available at: www.allacademic.com/meta/p73308_index.html. Accessed on 2/3/09 
63Salacuse (2005). 
64Ibid. 
65Ibid. 
66Salacuse (2005). 
67Jean Monnet Centre (2004). 
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maintain their poverty and demanded that their particular needs and circumstances 
be taken into account. 68  
d) Existing international law offered foreign investors no effective enforcement 
mechanism to pursue their claims against host countries that had injured or seized 
their investments or refused to respect their contractual obligations.69 As a result, 
investors had no assurance that investment contracts and arrangements made with 
host country governments would not be subject to unilateral change at some later 
time.70 
Despite various efforts, no multilateral arrangements emerged to supplement the 
aforesaid uncertainties of customary international law and other applicable international 
law. Accordingly, from 195971, states started adopting BITs. These bilateral treaties 
established specific legal rules governing the investment and economic activities of 
nationals of western capital exporting states in the territories of other states. Developing 
countries willingly negotiated and ratified the same as a way to promote foreign 
investment in their territories.72  
Up to the mid- 1980s the negotiation of BITs proceeded at a moderate pace, rarely 
exceeding 20 new treaties per year.73 BITs have thus displaced customary international 
                                                 
68The Hull rule came under attack between 1950 and 1960.Developing countries condemned the rule as an 
infringement on the sovereignty of the expropriating nation and called for a less exacting expropriation 
standard. They thus called into question the validity of the Hull rule as customary international law. The 
UN General Assembly then passed Resolution 3171 supporting a rule under which expropriation was 
permitted with less than full compensation. In the beginning of the 1970s, developing countries demanded 
for the establishment of a New International Economic Order. In 1974, the UN General Assembly declared 
a New International Economic Order in Resolution 3201. The said resolution considered unacceptable any 
form of sanction on a country that has expropriated the assets of an investor hence undermining the Hull 
Rule or the standard of "appropriate" compensation favoured by many developing countries. In 1974, the 
General Assembly adopted another resolution (Resolution 3281, the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties) that put host country government in full control and placed the investor at the mercy of that 
government hence further emphasizing the sovereignty of host states ( See Jean Monnet Centre (2004) and 
Salacuse (1990). 
69Salacuse (2005). 
70Although the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") was formally 
established in 1965 as an affiliate of the World Bank to resolve disputes between host countries and foreign 
private investors, the Centre did not hear its first case until 1972. Injured foreign investors who were unable 
to negotiate a satisfactory settlement, secure an arbitration agreement with a host government, or find 
satisfaction in the local courts had few options other than to seek espousal of their claims by their source 
country governments, a process that by its very nature was more political than legal. See Salacuse (2005). 
71The first BIT was adopted in 1959 and it was between Pakistan and Germany. See UNCTAD ‘Bilateral 
Investment Treaties. 1959-1999’. (2000). Ref. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2. 
72Salacuse (1990). 
73Elkins (2004). 
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law as a source of applicable legal principles and are now the fundamental source of 
international law in the area of foreign investment.  
 
2.3.3. Accelerated bilateralism: An effect of failure of multilateralism and growth of 
          South-South co-operation 
The explosion in signing of BITs began in the late 1980s. More than one hundred new 
treaties were signed yearly on average for the decade of the 1990s.74 This can be 
attributed, partly, to the failure of multilateralism and the growth of South-South co-
operation.  
 
While bilateral deals continued to grow, multilateral efforts to regulate FDI were failing. 
Various efforts were made by organisations, regional trading groups and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) to regulate investments globally. 
 
Major organisations came up with rules and guidelines for regulating investment 
multilaterally. In 1976 members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) negotiated a voluntary set of rules, aimed at regulating 
investments among themselves; the UN efforts between 1976 and 1992 saw the 
establishment of The UN Code on Transnational Corporations; and the World Bank in 
1992 adopted a set of non-binding guidelines for the treatment of foreign investment in 
the Asian-Pacific region. 75 
 
Similarly, in 1990 regional efforts to include investment provisions in regional trade 
arrangements began. Investment chapters were included in regional agreements like the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1994), Mercosur (Colonia Protocol) 
and the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty.  
Efforts by the WTO have been through three multilateral agreements annexed to the 1994 
Marrakesh Agreement (GATT 1994). For example; the Agreement on Trade Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) proscribes governmental mandating of certain 
                                                 
74Ibid 
75Kumar N ‘Investment on the WTO Agenda: A developing country perspective and the way forward for 
the Cancun ministerial conference’. (2003). Working paper by the Research and Information System for the 
non-aligned and other developing countries (RIS). Available at: www.ris.org.in/dp56_pap.pdf  (2/3/09) at 
p6 
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performance requirements, for example, local content requirements and trade balancing 
requirements; the General Agreement on Services (GATS) binds governments to make 
some provisions for rights of establishment and national treatment standards for foreign 
controlled enterprises in specific industries; and the Trade Related Intellectual Property 
Agreement (TRIPs) binds signatories to certain standards on intellectual property. 
 
Countries attempted to widen the scope of the multilateral regime on investments beyond 
what is covered in the TRIMs, GATS and TRIPs Agreements. One such attempt was the 
initiative to establish a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) under the aegis of 
OECD launched in 1995. The OECD negotiations on MAI failed in 1998 after a strong 
NGO campaign that criticised the draft agreement for the following reasons: it conflicted 
with environmental policies and laws; it failed to balance the new rights it would give 
foreign investors with social and environmental responsibilities in the host countries; it  
rigidly interpreted the non-discrimination (national treatment) principle, thus created a 
situation whereby foreign investors would be treated not only as favourable as, but better 
than, domestic investors; and because all stakeholders, in particular in developing 
countries, affected by foreign investment rules were not consulted and, therefore, their 
interests were not fully represented in the draft agreement.76  
 
Following the failure of the MAI, the EU and Japan attempted to push the investment 
issue on to the WTO’s agenda at the First Ministerial Conference of WTO in Singapore, 
by proposing to create a possible Multilateral Framework on Investment (MFI) under the 
auspices of WTO.77 However, the WTO members did not reach a consensus on the 
comprehensive inclusion in the negotiations of matters related to investment. The 
Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI) was thus set up to study the 
relationship between trade and investment without a negotiating mandate78. Before the 
WGTI’s study process could conclude its work and recommend the desirability, if any, of 
                                                 
76Mehra M. ‘Update on the MAI’. (1998). Paper by the Oxfam GB. Available at: 
www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloads/Oxmai98.rtf ( accessed on 25/4/09). 
77Kumar (2003) p6 
78See WTO Singapore ministerial declaration adopted on 18 December 1996. Ref. WT/MIN((96)/DEC. 
Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm#investment_competition 
(accessed on 2/2/09). See also Kumar (2003) at p6. 
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a MFI within WTO’s ambit, the EU with the support of other industrialised countries 
pushed the investment issue for negotiation at the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the 
WTO held in Doha in November 2001.79 As a result, the Doha Declaration provided for 
the launch of negotiations on a multilateral framework after the Fifth Session of the 
Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at 
that session on modalities of negotiations.80 This meant that actual negotiations on 
investments could not commence without the approval of every single WTO member 
state.  
 
The Cancun Ministerial meeting of September 2003 (the Fifth Session of the Ministerial 
Conference) failed to mandate the WTO to negotiate a future multilateral investment 
agreement.81 On 1 August 2004 the WTO General Council decided to remove the 
investment topic from the WTO negotiating agenda, at least for the period of the current 
Doha work program.82 
 
In the absence of a multilateral agreement on investment, BITs have been used as an 
important instrument to protect foreign investors and attract FDI, hence the sudden 
proliferation of BITs. 
 
The accelerated growth of bilateralism could also be attributed to South-South co-
operation. Initially, BITs were signed between developed countries and developing 
countries (North-South co-operation), the latter mainly being former colonies of the 
                                                 
79Kumar (2003) pp 6 and 7. 
80WTO Doha ministerial declaration adopted on 14 November 2001. Ref. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. Available 
at:http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#relationship (accessed on 
2/2/09). 
81Tietje C. (2008) International investment, protection and arbitration at pp 66-73.. 
82The said decision stated, inter alia, that the “Relationship between Trade and Investment, Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy and Transparency in Government Procurement: the Council agrees 
that these issues, mentioned in the Doha Ministerial Declaration in paragraphs 20-22, 23-25 and 26 
respectively, will not form part of the Work Programme set out in that Declaration and therefore no work 
towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round.” See 
WTO ‘Text of the ‘July package’: The General Council’s post-Cancun decision.’ Ref. WT/L/579. 
Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm (accessed on 
24/4/09). 
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former.83 In the late 1990s many developing countries emerged as significant sources of 
foreign investment to other developing countries, and started signing BITs.84 This is 
attributed to geographical proximity and the fact that developing countries possess 
similar push and pull structural, cyclical, as well as policy, factors.85 
 
Over the last few years the number of BITs between developing countries has grown. For 
example, in 2005, 20 of the 70 new BITs were concluded between developing countries, 
bringing their total number to 644, whereas ten years before only 161 had existed.86 
Similarly, of the 44 new BITs signed in 2007, 13 were between developing countries, 
which now represent more than 26 percent of the total number of BITs.87 China has been 
the most active: 60 percent of the BITs it concluded between 2002 and 2007 were with 
other developing countries, mainly in Africa.88 
 
By 2007 a total of 2,608 BITs had been signed,89 up from approximately 385 BITs signed 
by the end of 1989.90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4. CHINA IN AFRICA 
 
2.4.1 South-South co-operation  
 
                                                 
83A large number of developing countries signed their first BITs with their former colonial masters, for 
example, India signed its first BIT with the UK. See also Malik M ‘Recent developments in regional and 
bilateral investment treaties’ (2008) paper presented at the second annual forum of developing country 
investment negotiators by International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/dci_recent_dev_bits.pdf  (accessed on 3/3/09) at page 6. 
84UNCTAD ‘South-South co-operation in international investment arrangements’ (2005) UNCTAD series. 
Available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20053_en.pdf  (accessed on 2/3/09) at p25. 
85Ibid 
86Ibid 
87Ibid 
88UNCTAD ‘Recent developments in international investment agreements (2007- June 2008)’ (2008) ref. 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2008/1. Available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20081_en.pdf  
(accessed on 2/3/09) at p4 
89UNCTAD (2008) fn 88 p2 
90UNCTAD (2000) fn 71. See also Malik  (2008). 
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Investment between developing countries (South-South investment) has grown 
tremendously. For example, between 1997 and 2000, South-South FDI flows rose from 
USD 4.6 billion in 1994 to an average of USD 54.4 billion between 1997 and 2000, 
equivalent to 36 percent of total FDI inflows to developing economies in the latter 
period.91   
 
The rapid increase in South-South investment has been linked to: first, liberalization of 
regulations and lowering of entry barriers in host countries, thereby encouraging foreign 
investment (market seeking investment); and secondly, the search for resources92to 
export back to home markets or to process in Africa and export to third markets 
93(resource seeking investment).94 
 
China is one of the major sources of South-South investment in Africa.95 Between 1990 
and 1997 Chinese investment in Africa amounted to about USD 20 million. From 1998 to 
2002 it increased six-fold to USD 120 million.96 By 2008, it was investing over USD 305 
million a year.97 This is attributed to the rapid economic growth in the past two decades 
leading to a sudden increase in income and high purchasing power of its middle class, 
hence an augmented demand in the manufacturing sector for oil, agricultural products, 
and natural resources.98 Since African economies are linked to the world economy as 
commodity exporters of agricultural products, oil, and raw materials, because of their 
natural comparative advantage, they became an important investment destination for 
China.99  
 
                                                 
91Gelb S. ‘South-South investment: The case of Africa’. (2006). World Bank. Available at: 
www.rru.worldbank.org/FPDForum/documents/2006/background/gelb_fondad_background.pdf (accessed 
on 10/3/09) at p 200. 
92Resources mean oil, gas, minerals, agriculture and labour. 
93Third markets include the local host countries, regional and sub regional markets, and the global market 
with the US being an import third market particularly in the clothing and textile sector. 
94Gelb (2006) p 201 
95The other major sources being Taiwan, India and South Africa. See Gelb (2006)  
96Gelb (2006) p 201 
97Xinhua,‘More Chinese enterprises eye investment in Africa’. (2008).China Daily. Available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-09/09/content_7009143.htm (accessed on 8/5/09) 
98Broadman (2007). 
99Goldstein (2007). 
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2.4.2 Chinese investments in Africa 
Resource development and manufacturing account for a large percentage of China’s 
investment in Africa.100  
 
a) Resource development 
Oil 
For four decades since the 1950s, China managed to be self-sufficient, meeting all its 
internal consumer oil needs, as it discovered massive oil reserves at its major oil 
reservoir, the Daqing oil fields, in the far north of the country.101 Due to its rapid 
economic growth, running at a rate of roughly nine percent per year, it was no longer able 
to meet its own consumption requirements through its domestic production of oil, and 
was forced to search for oil elsewhere.102 
 
Nearly 60 percent of Chinese crude oil imports came from the Middle East in the early 
1990s.103 To avoid over-reliance on Persian Gulf oil, China (in the mid-1990s) began 
looking for new energy resources in Africa and other regions around the world.104It 
currently receives one-third of its oil imports from Africa,  its biggest suppliers being 
Angola (13%), Sudan and Nigeria. Moreover, it is drilling for oil in Ethiopia, Mauritania, 
and off the Coast of Congo Brazzaville, while prospecting in Mali, Niger and Chad.105 
China carries out its oil investments in Africa through three companies: the China 
Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), the China National Petroleum Corporation 
                                                 
100World Bank ‘Potential of Africa-Asia trade and investment: Potential for ownership and partnership’ 
(2004) World Bank study on Africa-Asia trade and investment relations at p 74. 
101 Hurst C (2006) China’s oil rush in Africa. 
102In 2005 China consumed 6.59 million barrels per day while it only produced 3.75 million barrels per day. 
See Anonymous ‘China increases security of supply with energy deals in Nigeria and Kenya’ (2006) 
Global Insight. Available at: www.globalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail5726.htm (accessed on 10/3/09) and 
Energy Information Administration. Available at: www.eia.doe.gov (accessed on 10/3/09).  
103Hurst (2006). 
104Kolas A ‘China in African oil: Guilty as charged’. Available at: 
www.epsusa.org/publications/newsletter/june2007/kolas.htm (accessed on 10/3/09). See also Hurst (2006) 
p. 4. 
105Hurst C (2006) at p 4. See also Li J ‘China’s rising demand for minerals and emerging global norms and 
practices in mining’. (2006). Paper prepared for the Foundation for Environmental Security and 
Sustainability (FESS). Available at: 
www.coleurope.eu/file/content/StudyProgrammes/eco/chair/toyota/200612_conference/Presentations/Li_C
hinasRisingDemandForMinerals.pps+china+and+minerals+in+africaandhl=enandct=clnkandcd=43andgl=k
eandclient=firefox-a (accessed on 11/3/09) 
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(CNPC), and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), which handles 
offshore exploration and production and accounts for over 10 percent of China’s 
domestic crude production.106 
 
Minerals 
Industrialisation leads to an increase in income and mineral consumption hence China’s 
interest in Africa’s rich mineral resources. As at 2008, China was consuming 
approximately 30 percent of the globe’s zinc, 25 percent of its lead, 27 percent of its iron 
and steel, 47 percent of its cement, 25 percent of its aluminium, and 22 percent of its 
copper.107China is currently the world’s largest copper consumer having by passed the 
United States in 2004.108  
 
The minerals sought by China affect every aspect of its economy. For example, titanium 
is needed for producing military aircraft, iron ore to fuel its export of consumer goods, 
copper for light manufacture, cement for infrastructure, and diamonds for the country’s 
growing appetite for luxury items.109 Consequently, to guarantee security of resource 
supply, manage emergencies, and ensure that there is a buffer to adjust to market 
fluctuations, China commenced plans, in 2006, to set up a Strategic Mineral Reserve to 
stockpile uranium, copper, aluminium, iron ore and other minerals.110  
 
China’s main sources of minerals in Africa are, inter alia: The Democratic Republic of 
Congo for copper, timber and cobalt; Zambia for copper as well; South Africa for 
ferrochrome, aluminium, iron ore, platinum, gold and diamonds; and Zimbabwe for 
uranium.111 
 
                                                 
106Hurst C (2006) p 5. 
107Association for Asian Research (AFAR) ‘Feeding the dragon: China’s quest for Africa’s minerals’. 
(2008). Available at: http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/3124.html (accessed on 5/5/09). See also Li 
(2006) 
108ASAR (2008) 
109Ibid  
110Ibid 
111Ibid. See also Li (2006). 
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Crop production and agro-processing112 
For a long time Chinese investment in the agricultural sector in Africa was very limited, 
since it was self-reliant.113 This changed in the mid-1990s when China’s agricultural 
sector began facing growing problems. First, rapid economic growth led to better income, 
and which in turn led to a rising demand for protein, meat and processed foods.114 
Secondly, there was increased urbanisation due to rapid industrialisation, with loss of 
arable land, and soil erosion.115 Thirdly, water shortages as a result of unequal 
distribution of rainfall, groundwater, and surface water, as well as the spreading of 
deserts by around 3,000 km² a year, made planting crops that need a lot of irrigation 
increasingly difficult.116 Consequent to this, Chinese companies are presently buying and 
leasing land across Africa for crop production as well as investing in agro-processing.117 
These companies are specialising in growing rice, market garden produce, and industrial 
crops, such as, sisal and cotton. In addition, they are investing heavily in fishing and 
allied industries, as well as in fish farming (especially prawns), notably in 
Mozambique.118  
 
 
b) Manufacturing 
Chinese investment related to manufacturing is mostly in light industries, construction 
and infrastructure. 
 
                                                 
112Agro- processing is post-harvest activities that add value to the agricultural product prior to marketing. 
See Wilkinson J. ‘The food processing industry, globalization and developing countries’. (2004)1. 
Electronic Journal of Agricultural and Development Economics (eJADE) at pp 184-201. Available at: 
www.fao.org/es/esa/eJADE (accessed on 20/3/09). See also Yoshino Y. ‘Patterns of Africa-Asia trade and 
investment’.(2004). World Bank,wherein it was defined as to produce goods to be sold in China’s food and 
farming industries. 
113Dysck S. ‘China’s commodity hunger: From oil and copper to milk and grain’. A research by Deutsche 
Bank. Available at: www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-
PROD/PROD0000000000221119.pdf (accessed on 10/3/09). 
114Ibid  
115Ibid  
116Ibid  
117Spencer R. ‘China looks abroad to grow its own food’. (2008). The Telegraph. Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/1942254/China-looks-abroad-to-grow-its-own-
food.html (accessed on 20/3/09). See also Humphrey J. and Oetero A. ‘Strategies for diversification and 
adding value to food exports: A value chain perspective’. (2000). UNCTAD, ref. UNCTAD/ITE/Misc.23 
118Niquet V. ‘China African strategy’. Available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/0805-
Niquet-ANG.pdf (accessed on 20/3/09). See also Bezlova A. ‘China: Buying farmland abroad and ensuring 
food security’. Available at : http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=42301 (accessed on 20/3/09). 
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Light industries 
As regards light industries, textiles, clothing and furniture are the main targets of 
investment.  Chinese textile manufacturing companies are associated with the import of 
textile materials (e.g., cotton fabrics) from China to African countries for their textile 
factories. These are used to produce apparel and/or garment products that are exported 
back home as well as to the United States and Europe.119 For example, in Lesotho and 
Swaziland Chinese companies invested in the textile and clothing industry to take 
advantage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)120 and to circumvent the 
Multi Fibre Arrangement (MFA)121. However, upon the MFA being phased out in 2004 a 
number of these companies relocated to China.122 Currently, Chinese companies are 
investing in the lucrative textile industry of Egypt.123 
 
In addition, China has factories manufacturing a host of other products across the 
continent, for example, batteries in Mozambique, shoes in Nigeria and ethyl alcohol in 
Benin.124 
 
 
 
Infrastructure and construction 
Chinese firms have become an increasingly important participant in the infrastructure and 
construction sectors in many African countries. Many of these firms are state owned, for 
example, the China Road and Bridge Corporation, and are particularly competitive in 
                                                 
119World Bank (2004) fn 200 p 74. 
120This agreement allows Sub-Saharan African states to export their apparels duty and quota free to the 
United States. 
121The MFA imposed quotas for imports of textiles and clothing from more competitive developing 
countries like China and India into the USA, Canada , and the EU. 
122Claassens H. ‘The MFA’s impact on clothing and textile manufacturers in South Africa’. Available at: 
http://www.tradersafrica.com/articles.asp?articleid={551E4B75-7032-4A8B-8CC2-575D2EBC1B84} 
(accessed on 24/4/09). See also Anonymous ‘China winning resources and loyalties of Africa’. The 
Financial Times, 28th February 2006. Available at: http://www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=7051 
(accessed on 24/4/09) 
123Zou H. ‘Chinese textile overseas invest into Egypt and the preferred’. (2009). Political facts and tips. 
Available at: http://facttips.com/Politics/234/chinese-textile-enterprises-overseas-investment-into-egypt-or-
the-preferred.html (accessed on 24/4/09). 
124Brautigam D. and Gaye A. ‘Is Chinese investment good for Africa?’(2007.) Online discussion. Available 
at: www.cfr.org/publication/12622/is_chinese_investment_good_for_africa.html (accessed on 10/3/09). 
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large scale infrastructure and construction projects due primarily to their efficiency and 
low costs. 125 
 
The projects that they engage in are mainly those that no western donor or multilateral 
lending agency would touch, such as, stadiums and public buildings.126 Examples of 
some of the works they have undertaken are: stadiums in West Africa, Presidential 
Palaces (e.g. in Kinshasa), dams (e.g. Sudan’s Merowe Dam), hydro-electric plants (e.g. 
Zambia’s Kafue Gorge), roads, railways, and government buildings (e.g. Supreme Court 
and the Police and Prison Training College in Windhoek, Namibia). 127 
 
2.4.3. China and Africa strategy 
 
2.4.3.1 China-Africa Policy 
Policy history 
Inter-governmental relations between the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) and 
African countries were inaugurated in 1956 when Egypt became the first African nation 
to establish diplomatic relations with the P.R.C.128  
 
Between 1956 and 1964, China’s policy towards Africa was based on an ideological 
alliance.129 During this period China supported the political struggles for African 
independence through the provision of weapons and human assistance to numerous 
independence movements.130 After the attainment of national independence by most 
African countries, China sought Africa as an ally in its struggles against imperialism and 
hegemony through the provision of gratis economic aid regardless of the fact that its own 
                                                 
125 It should be noted that the number of Chinese private construction companies operating in Africa 
appears to be growing drastically. Burke C. and Corkin L. ‘Constructive engagement: An overview of 
China’s role in Africa’s construction industries’. (2008). Available at: www.ccs.org.za/downloads/CCS_-
_New_Impulses_from_the_South_-_May_08.pdf (accessed on 21/3/09). See also Gill B. and Reilly J. ‘The 
tenuous hold of China Inc. in Africa’. (2007). Available at: 
www.twq.com/07summer/docs/07summer_gill_reilly.pdf (accessed on 21/3/09) 
126 Alden C. (2007) China in Africa.  
127 Burke (2008) See also Gill (2007). 
128 Anshan  L ‘China and Africa: Policy and challenges’. (2007)3. China Security (World Security 
Institute) at pp 69-93. Available at: http://www.wsichina.org/cs7_4.pdf (accessed on 23/3/09).  
129 Ibid 
130Ibid  
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economic situation was precarious.131 Further, it helped African countries build a number 
of landmark structures (e.g. stadiums, hospitals, conference centres) that were national 
symbols of independence embodying the spirit of cultural decolonization.132 These 
projects cemented the Afro-Chinese relations, and by 1978 China had established 
diplomatic relations with 43 African countries.133 
 
On China’s realisation that aid alone was, unlikely to significantly transform the reality of 
African poverty, it changed its aid policy so as to help Africa help itself.134 Thus in the 
1980s its economic assistance began to include other forms of support, such as, 
preferential and discounted loans, co-operatives, and joint ventures for projects in 
Africa.135 These reforms helped to bring new technology and management practices to 
projects in Africa as well as pressed African nations to use money effectively.136 
  
In 1982 the 12th Communist Party of China (CPC) National Assembly decided to shift 
from a policy that emphasized “war and revolution” to one emphasizing “peace and 
development”.137 It thus established four principles to govern interstate political 
relationships, “Independence, Complete Equality, Mutual Respect, Non-interference in 
Others’ Internal Affairs138”, thereby leading to party to party relations between the CPC 
and many African governments.139 Associations based on these principles convinced 
many Africans of China’s sincerity in respecting African political choices and helped to 
promote economic and trade co-operation. Thus by 2002 the CPC had established 
relations with more than 60 political parties in 40 Sub-Saharan countries, which included 
both ruling and non-ruling parties.140 
 
                                                 
131Ibid  
132Ibid  
133Ibid  
134Ibid  
135Anshan (2007). 
136Ibid 
137Ibid 
138This principle emphasises sovereignty as the common denominator among all nations regardless of other 
factors, and fundamentally holds that all countries should be equal and no country has the right to dictate 
the sovereign affairs of others. See Anshan (2007). 
139Anshan (2007) 
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Current policy 
China’s rapid economic growth led to its need for further co-operation with Africa, both 
horizontally and vertically.141 This led to increased trade and investment between China 
and Africa. As a result the western countries began media campaigns claiming that China 
is engaged in "neo-colonialism" in Africa. To counter the negative public discourse, 
Beijing modified its Africa policy significantly and showed a responsive attitude to most 
expectations that were advanced by the west.142The modified Africa policy is contained 
in China's White Paper on Africa released in January 2006.143  
China did not change its aims of co-operating with Africa as well as the principles 
governing the relationship. In the White Paper China affirmed that its aims of co-
operation with Africa are to develop friendly relations, co-operation, peace, stability and 
development, on the basis of the Five Principles144 of Peaceful Coexistence. 145 
 
To ensure that it fulfils these aims, it undertook to adhere to the following principles for 
co-operation: sincerity; friendship; equality and mutual benefit; solidarity; reciprocity; 
and common development. With regard to sincerity, friendship and equality, it asserted 
that it would adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respect African 
countries' independent choice of the road of development, and support their efforts to 
grow stronger through unity. With regard to mutual benefit, reciprocity and common 
                                                 
141This means increasing the interaction from being predominantly political to being also social and cultural 
as well as the expansion of the economic co-operation beyond traditional sectors to all areas of commerce 
industry and technology. See Wenping H. ‘The balancing act of China’s Africa policy’. Available at: 
www.wsichina.org/cs7_2.pdf (accessed on 2/2/09). 
142Holslag J. ‘Friendly giant? China’s evolving Africa policy’. (2007)2. Asia paper. Available at: 
http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/documents/Holslag,%20Jonathan%20(2007),%20Friendly%20Giant,%20Asia
%20Paper,%20Asia%20Paper%202%20(5),%20BICCS,%20Brussels%5B1%5D.doc.pdf (accessed on 
23/3/09). 
143It is available at: www.english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234894.html (accessed on 
21/3/09). 
This document embodies a comprehensive and long term plan for enhanced co-operation in Sino-Africa 
relations. China presents therein its policy towards Africa, the objectives of the said policy, the measures to 
be taken to achieve them; its proposals for co-operation in various fields in the coming years with the view 
of promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term hence bring the mutually-
beneficial co-operation to a new stage. See Anshan (2007). 
144The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as promoted by China are: mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality 
and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. See 
www//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Principles_of_Peaceful_Coexistence (accessed on 22/3/09). 
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prosperity, it claimed that it would support African countries' endeavour for economic 
development and nation building, so as to ensure the common prosperity of China and 
Africa.  
 
China identified four fields of co-operation, in the White Paper, that it hoped would 
enhance all-round co-operation. They are:-  
1. Political: The co-operation will involve high level visits and dialogue between 
Chinese and African leaders; exchanges between legislative bodies (inclusive of 
the African Union (AU) parliament), political parties, and local governments; 
institutionalised consultation through national bilateral committees or joint 
committees on trade, economics, science and technology; and solidarity with 
Africa through mutual support in the UN on issues connected with sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights. 146 
 
2. Economic: The co-operation will be in trade, investment, agriculture, 
infrastructure, resources, debt reduction and relief as well as economic assistance. 
It proposed that this would lead to more access for African commodities to 
Chinese markets; duty-free access for some goods from Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) in Africa; establishment of trade and economic zones in Africa; 
support for co-operation of financial institutions; encouragement to establish 
China-Africa joint chambers of commerce and industry; encouragement for 
Chinese enterprises to participate and increase their engagement in building 
infrastructure in Africa; preferential loans for Chinese investors; co-operation of 
Chinese enterprises with African countries to rationally exploit African resources 
on a basis of mutual benefit; gradual increase of Chinese economic assistance to 
Africa; establishment of a special Afro-China agricultural co-operation program 
(including construction of ten agricultural technology demonstration centres); and 
                                                 
146The China White Paper containing the Afro-China policy is available at: 
www.english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234894.html (accessed on 21/3/09). 
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support for Africa in promoting its economic interests and development within 
multilateral trade systems.147 
 
3. Education, science, culture, health and social aspects: The co-operation will 
involve granting education scholarships; exchange of students between China and 
Africa; sending Chinese teachers to teach Chinese and develop Africa’s weak 
disciplines; construction of rural schools; enhancing scientific co-operation and 
technological exchange in bio-agriculture, solar energy, geological surveys, 
mining and new medicines; training for African professionals (African Human 
Resources Development Foundation); people to people exchanges (youth, 
women); sending Chinese volunteers to Africa; cultural exchanges (artists and 
athletes); exchange between media and sharing experiences on handling relations 
with domestic and foreign media; sending medical personnel and medicines; 
construction of hospitals ; help with improving facilities and medical personnel 
training; prevention and treatment of infectious diseases; protecting the 
environment by facilitating technological exchanges and co-operation in climate 
change, water resources conservation, anti-desertification, bio-diversity and other 
areas of environmental protection; actively carrying out personnel exchange, 
training and technological co-operation in the fields of disaster reduction and 
relief; and support exchanges and co-operation between the Red Cross Society of 
China and other Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), on the one hand and 
their African counterparts on the other.148 
 
4. Peace and security: Co-operation will involve support for military building for 
African countries through high level military and technological exchanges; 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations; support for regional organisations to 
settle regional conflicts; increase of intelligence, judicial and police exchanges 
(e.g. about legal system building) and co-operation (e.g. extradition); and 
combating terrorism, organised crime and corruption.149 
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In addition, China presented itself as a sister to African nations, with similar historical 
experiences (colonialism and struggle for national liberation), and being a developing 
country itself, as a political partner willing to speak in favour of African interests in the 
UN and other multilateral systems.150 It thus requested mutual support in the UN on 
issues connected with sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human rights. 
This undoubtedly shows that China’s interest with regard to Africa transcends the quest 
for resources and raw materials.151 It is trying to garner the support and solidarity of 
African states on major international issues that divide developed and developing 
countries, and in the process gain a higher status and an influential position in 
international affairs.152  
 
China used the White Paper to emphasise its stand on Taiwan by asserting the one 
China153 principle as the political foundation for the establishment and development of 
China's relations with African countries and regional organisations; thus there will not be 
relations with any country co-operating with Taiwan. 
 
Lastly, it undertook to utilise the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC)154 as a 
tool for strengthening political consultation and pragmatic co-operation between itself 
and Africa. In addition, it committed itself to try and find the best way for furthering co-
operation between the forum and the AU's New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD), and also pledged to provide the AU and Africa’s sub-regional organisations 
with assistance to the best of its capacity. 
 
                                                 
150Ibid 
151Ibid 
152Mingjiang L. ‘China’s domestic politics and its Africa policy”. Available at: 
www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/17NO1BOOKS.PDF?link_id=4057andslink
_id=5824andlink_type=12andslink_type=13andtmpl_id=3(accessed on 21/3/09). 
153The one China principle is the refusal to have official relations and contacts with Taiwan and support 
China's great cause of reunification. 
154Hereinafter referred to as “the forum”. It was launched in 2000 to act as an effective mechanism for the 
collective dialogue and multilateral co-operation between China and Africa as well as put in place a 
framework and platform for a new type of China-Africa partnership featuring long term stability, equality 
and mutual benefit. China is now using it as vehicle to explore and implement effective methods to realise 
the goals of the White Paper.  
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Criticisms 
The White Paper has been criticised on three main grounds. First, that the “no political 
strings attached” policy does not support good governance, transparency and political 
reform in Africa as set out in the objectives of NEPAD. Therefore, there is the risk of 
strengthening repressive regimes/elites and weakening social and environmental 
standards. Furthermore, the said policy makes ownership to be totally focused on 
governments and thus, no mechanism exists to ensure that governments listen to other 
perspectives.155  
Secondly, that the principle of non-interference in each others’ internal affairs is not 
based on international law and human rights.156 The non-interference principle holds that 
human rights should not be a reason for one country to interfere in another’s internal 
affairs.157 The West are opposed to this principle as they believes that human rights have 
historically arisen from a need to protect citizens from abuse by the state; therefore, all 
nations have a duty to intervene and protect people wherever they are.158 On the other 
hand, the developing countries, including China and most African nations, argue that 
state sovereignty is supreme.159 
 
Thirdly, that the White Paper stresses on bilateral relations and avoids multilateralism. 
Further, it fails to take into account the development agenda of the continent as provided 
for by the AU and NEPAD. 160 
 
 
 
2.4.3.2 Africa-China strategy 
Currently Africa does not have a China policy. In order to substantially benefit from 
China’s presence, Africa needs to assert its own strategy for China. The AU and NEPAD 
                                                 
155Economy E and Monaghan K ‘The perils of Beijing’s Africa strategy’ (2006) International Herald 
Tribune. Available at: www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/01/opinion/edecon.php (accessed on 23/3/09). See 
also Davies P ‘China and the end of poverty in Africa:Towards mutual benefit?’. Available at: 
www.oefse.at/Downloads/veranstaltungen/1011/Vienna_Penny%20Davies.pdf (accessed on 23/3/09). 
156Anshan (2007) 
157Ibid 
158Ibid 
159Ibid 
160Economy(2006) 
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should co-ordinate African strategies for China and ensure that African interests, needs 
and development goals take centre stage. In the meantime, individual African states can 
secure their interests through BITs by ensuring that they approach BIT negotiations 
strategically.  
 
 
2.5 BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF AFRO-CHINA CO-OPERATION 
There are significant direct and indirect economic and development benefits to Africa 
from China’s growing presence on the continent. Examples of these benefits include: low 
prices of manufactured goods; increased FDI, especially in infrastructure, with potential 
for Africa FDI flows to China; more favourable foreign aid; market access, with 
increased exports of both primary and manufactured products as well as services, that 
have diversified Africa exports ; improved infrastructure ; unconditional loans ; increase 
in employment opportunities for host countries ; transfer of skills and technology; and 
learning from China on how to manage gradual economic and political 
transformations.161 
On the flip side, there are present and future challenges that arise as a result of Chinese 
trade with, and investment in, Africa. These include, inter alia :  
 
2.5.1 Employment opportunities 
Many African countries have high unemployment rate.162 Notwithstanding this reality, 
Chinese firms continue to recruit skilled and non-skilled workers from China.163 These 
firms claim that it is more efficient and convenient for them to recruit skilled workers and 
managers from China than to train local workers, as the former are often more familiar 
with the technologies ; non-skilled Chinese workers face fewer language and cultural 
obstacles in communicating with management, and are more compliant with demanding 
                                                 
161Shinn (2007). See also Mwega F. ‘China, India and Africa: Prospects and challenges’. Paper prepared for 
the AERC-AFDB International Conference on Accelerating Africa’s Development Five Years into the 
Twenty-First Century held at Tunisia on 22-24 November 2006. Available at: 
www.afdb.org/pls/portal/url/ITEM/22FF6D2A4231DE42E040C00A0C3D37B0 (accessed on 23/3/09). 
Also see Goldstein (2007). 
162Gong S. ‘Chinese workers in Africa: Working conditions and potential conflicts’. (2007). UCLA African 
studies centre. Available at: http://international.ucla.edu/media/files/80.pdf (accessed on 24/4/09) 
163Ibid 
 
 
 
 
 32
labour practices, for example, working longer hours, working during local holidays, and 
working overtime on weekends; and, employing African workers entangles them in local 
laws to a higher degree than employing Chinese nationals. 164  
 
As a consequence, Chinese enterprises in Africa have contributed little to employment in 
local economies. This has led to protests by citizens and labour unions in several African 
nations. Hence, Chinese workers are increasingly becoming targets for crime and 
terrorism. For example, in 2007 the Ethiopian separatist Ogaden rebels killed nine 
Chinese workers in a raid on an Ethiopian oilfield.165 In the same year, sixteen Chinese 
workers were kidnapped in Nigeria in several separate incidents.166 More recently, two 
Chinese labourers were killed in a labour protest in Equatorial Guinea in April 2008, 
leading to the withdrawal by China of more than 400 of its workers from that country. 167  
 
2.5.2 Injury to domestic industries 
Chinese goods are normally cheaper than local products. 168This is advantageous to 
African consumers but injurious to parallel domestic industries (especially textile 
industries). This conflict is evidenced by various incidents around the continent. In 
Dakar, there were two mass demonstrations, one in support of Chinese merchants, and 
the other in opposition.169 In South Africa, there were similar protests which led to China 
imposing quotas upon its textile exports in order to allow the South African producers 
time to make their products competitive.170 In Zambia, Chinese clothes undermined the 
clothing and electrical sectors.171 In Ethiopia, although competition from Chinese shoes 
                                                 
164Anshan (2007) 
165Maclean W.‘African marvel, fret at China’s hard workers’. Mail and Guardian. 21st August 2008. 
Available at: http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-21-africans-marvel-fret-at-chinas-hard-workers 
(accessed on 24/4/09). 
166Ibid 
167Ibid  
168Uffot E. ‘The rush for Chinese products’. Newswatch. 27 October 2008. Available at: 
http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_contentandtask=viewandid=183andItemid=32 
(accessed on 14/5/09). 
169Anshan (2007) 
170Ibid 
171Kaplinsky R. et al. ‘The impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa’. (2007).Paper prepared for DFID. 
Available at:www.uneca.org/eca_programmes/acgd/Overview_Report.pdf (accessed on 23/3/09) 
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imports led to an upgrading of processes and design by many domestic firms, it 
simultaneously had a negative impact on employment and domestic output.172 
 
2.5.3 Environment and Illegal exploitation of natural resources 
China’s domestic policies have prioritised economic growth over the protection of the 
environment, often with harrowing results.173 Although the Chinese government has set 
in place laws, regulations and institutions to protect the environment, it has not 
succeeded.174 Chinese companies have exported their domestic environmental track 
record to Africa. For example, Chinese run mining operations in Africa have had a 
detrimental impact on the environment, for instance, the copper mines in Zambia and 
Congo, and titanium sands projects in ecologically sensitive parts of Mozambique, 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Madagascar.175 In Gabon, a Chinese company explored for oil in 
Loango National Park until the country’s national park service ordered the exploration to 
stop as it was threatening rare plants and animals.176 Moreover, the Environment Ministry 
had not approved the environmental impact study.177 
In addition, China illegally exploits natural resources, for instance, it is a major importer 
of illegal timber from forests in Cameroon, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea. Up to 50% of 
all timber imported to China in 2004 were illegal, while in 2006 China was the world's 
leading importer of illegal timber. 178 Chinese businesses have also been implicated in 
ivory smuggling, notably in Sudan and Zimbabwe, as well as illegal fishing in 
Mozambique.179 Moreover, they buy up to 75 % of Sudan’s ivory.180  
                                                 
172Ibid 
173Bosshard P.‘China’s environmental footprint in Africa’. (3rd April 2008). SA Institute of International 
Affairs (SAIIA) China in Africa policy briefing No. 3. Available at: 
http://internationalrivers.org/files/SAIIA%20policy%20briefing%20508.pdf ( accessed on 25/4/09) 
174Ibid 
175Schiller B. ‘The China Model’ (20/12/2005). Open democracy. Available at: 
www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-china/china_development_3136.jsp (accessed on 23/3/09). 
176Bosshard (2008) 
177Ibid 
178See www.globaltimber.org.uk 
179See www.careforthewild.org/default.asp and Standing A. ‘Corruption and industrial fishing in Africa.’ 
(2008) Anti-corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI). Available at:  
http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?3188=corruption-and-industrial-fishing-in-africa (accessed on 
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2.5.4 Violation of labour laws 
The labour practices of Chinese enterprises in Africa are objectionable. They pay their 
employees exceptionally low wages compared to other foreign investors and make their 
workers work long hours with no breaks.181 For example, in Zambia, workers in Chinese 
mines are getting paid as little as USD100 a month when the lowest paid miner at the 
Konkola Copper Mines, Zambia’s largest producer, earns USD424 monthly.182 
Furthermore, they lock employees in the factory during the night shift to ensure they do 
not leave work or steal merchandise. On 16 September 2002, 29 workers on night shift at 
the Chinese company, West African Rubber Products Company Limited, in Zambia, were 
burned to death because they were locked inside the factory without any outlet in case of 
emergency.183  
 
In addition, Chinese mining companies have an atrocious reputation for sending 
employees underground with no protective clothing.184 Such substandard working 
conditions caused the death of approximately 50 mining employees after an explosion at 
the China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining (Group) Co in Chambishi, Zambia, in April 
2005.185  
 
 
2.5.5 Immigrants 
Migration of the Chinese to the continent has increased tremendously. Thousands of 
Chinese labourers and engineers were imported to build Ethiopia’s $300m Takazee Dam. 
In Sudan, Chinese workers constructed an oil pipeline and, 74,000 Chinese still remained 
in country after the construction, 10,000 of them were employed by the China National 
                                                                                                                                                 
180See www.careforthewild.org/default.asp 
181Anonymous. ‘China exportation of labour practices to Africa.’ Available at: 
http://www.ihlo.org/CINTW/ArticleLabourPracticeExport.html (accessed on 23/3/09). 
182Ibid referring to 
Shacinda, S: ‘Chinese labour policies mar African welcome’. Available at :www.today.reuters.com /misc 
(accessed on 23/3/09). 
183McGreal, C ‘ Thanks China, now go home: Buy-up of Zambia revives old colonial fears’ (2007/2/5) The 
Guardian, Lusaka, www.guardian.co.uk/china/stor/0,,2005902,00.html (accessed on 23/3/09)/ 
184‘Zambians wary of ‘exploitative’ Chinese employers’ IRIN, UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=61640 (accessed 0n 23/3/09). 
185 Ibid 
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Petroleum Company (CNPC).186 More than 3,000 Chinese live in Cameroon, 5,000 in 
Lesotho, 50,000 in Nigeria and 300,000 in South Africa.187 This massive transfer of 
personnel is unlikely to have a positive impact on the African job markets, the building of 
local capacity and the transfer of technologies.188 In addition, local retailers are faced 
with rapidly increasing business competition from expatriate Chinese traders.189   
 
2.5.6 Support of oppressive regimes 
China is known to support oppressive regimes, thereby complicating democratic 
consolidation and good governance.190 For example, during the war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea from 1998 to 2000, China bypassed a UN arms embargo and sold over USD 1 
billion of weapons to both states.191 Similarly, it sells weapons to Bashir of Sudan, 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and other buyers who then feed them into active conflicts.192 
Light weapons from China have flooded into the Great Lakes area, where millions have 
died as a result of civil conflict.193 By supporting dictators, China validates corrupt 
regimes, hurting the continent in the long term.194 
 
2.6. A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE UGANDA, DJIBOUTI AND GERMANY 
       BITs WITH CHINA 
                                                 
186Schiller (2005) 
187Mwega (2006) 
188Tull, Denis M. ‘China’s engagement in Africa: Scope, significance and consequences’. (2006)44. 
Journal of Modern African Affairs.  
189Mwega (2006) 
190Eisenman J. and Kurlantzick J. ‘China Africa strategy’.  
Available at: www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Africa.pdf  (accessed on 23/3/09) 
191When Ethiopia went to war with neighbouring Eritrea in the late 1990s, the United States evacuated its 
Peace Corps volunteers, scaled back military aid and issued a security warning to US citizens and 
companies. In contrast, China saw an opportunity to expand its influence. It dispatched even more 
diplomats, engineers, businesspeople and teachers to Ethiopia.  
Eisenman J and Kurlantzick J ‘China Africa strategy’.  
Available at: www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Africa.pdf  (accessed on 23/3/09) 
192Oil explorations and export by Chinese investors in Sudan raised Sudan’s total export earning. The oil 
revenue was being used to fund military build up by the Sudan government. Moreover, Chinese made 
tanks, fighter planes, bombers, helicopters, machine guns, and rocket propelled grenades have been used in 
Sudan’s civil war. See ‘China invests heavily in Sudan’s oil industry,” Sudan Tribune, December 23, 2004. 
See also Anonymous ‘Of rogue multinationals and the mechanics of war’ East African Alternatives for 
November/December 2000. See also Stephanie H. ‘China's oil imports from Sudan draw controversy’. 
(2004). Available at: http://www.voanews.com/ (accessed on 29/3/09). 
193Amosu A. ‘China in Africa: It’s (still) the governance stupid’. (2007/3/9). Foreign Policy in Focus 
(FPIF) discussion paper. Available at: http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4068 (accessed on 23/3/09  
194Zhiqun (2007) p 29 
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2.6.1 Introduction 
As stated earlier, China is not driven by benevolent concerns with regard to its 
investments in Africa.195 Its aim is to reap the maximum returns that can be secured with 
the barest of input and least possibility for technology and knowledge transfer.196 This is 
why China is adopting the same BITs with African states as the ones it has concluded 
with developed states, notwithstanding the differences in levels of development between 
the former and the latter. 
 
The above is buttressed by the fact that China’s old generation BIT practice197 was 
characterised by, first, a limited National Treatment198 provision which reduced the 
obligation to accord National Treatment to “the extent possible”, thereby watering down 
China’s obligation to undertake goodwill efforts of adopting equal treatment of foreign 
investors; and secondly, limited the consent199 to investor state dispute resolution..200 
Consequently, China was able to retain some policy space and as a result benefited from 
inward FDI. 
 
In the late 1990’s China entered into a new generation BIT practice that broke through 
the reservations with regard to National Treatment of foreign investors and limited 
consent to dispute resolution; hence according broad protection to investors.201 The 
                                                 
195Mosoti V. ‘Non-discrimination and its dimensions in a possible WTO framework agreement on 
investment: Reflections on the scope and policy space for development of poor economies’. (2003) 4. The 
Journal of World Intellectual Property. 
196Ibid 
197At that time it was predominantly a capital importing state. 
198See Article 3 (3) of the China-UK BIT (1986). It states: “In addition to the provisions of paragraph (1) 
and (2) of this Article other Contracting Party shall to the extent possible, accord treatment in accordance 
with the stipulations of its laws and regulations to the investments of nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting Party the same as that accorded to its own nationals and companies.” 
199Their old generation BITs only allowed for investor-state disputes concerning the amount of 
compensation due in case of expropriation. See China –Sweden BIT (1982) and China-UK BIT (1986). 
Article 7(1) of the China-UK BIT states “A dispute between a national or company of one Contracting 
Party and another Contracting Party concerning an amount of compensation which has not been amicably 
settled after a period of six months from written notification of the dispute shall be submitted to 
international arbitration.” 
200Schill S. ‘Tearing the great wall: The new generation investment treaties of the People’s Republic of 
China’. (2007). Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law. 
201Ibid 
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change in BIT practice was necessitated by the fact that at around this period, China 
became both a capital exporting state and a capital importing state, as opposed to being 
predominantly a capital importing state.202As a result, it was faced with the challenge of 
striking a balance between the mutual interest existing between itself and the developed 
countries203 of protecting their investors abroad and upholding state sovereignty, and 
regulatory leeway as far as possible.204 
  
Although China was aware of the development needs of African states, and that 
developed and developing countries are at different levels of development205, it adopted 
the same new generation BITs for both categories of states. Hence, the new Chinese BITs 
with developing African states are deliberately mis-engineered. They curtail the policy 
space of developing African states and therefore they are unable to obtain equal returns 
on investments.  
 
In light of the above, this section carries out a textual analysis of the Uganda, Djibouti 
and Germany BITs with China with the aim of demonstrating the similarities between the 
two developing countries’ BITs (Uganda and Djibouti) with that of the developed country 
(Germany), and identifies specific elements of mis-engineering and how they have 
contributed to the unequal returns on investment.206 
 
BITs signed by China follow the common typography of international investment 
agreements. They include, inter alia, the Preamble; definition of investment and investor; 
provisions designed to offer certain absolute standards of treatment (for example “fair 
                                                 
202Ibid. Similarly in 2008, China’s stock of FDI was USD 758.9 billion (at home) and USD 139.3 billion 
(abroad). See CIA (2008) 
203These developed countries are also both capital exporting and capital importing states. For example in 
2008, Germany’s stock of FDI was $ 924.7 billion (at home) and $ 1.36 trillion (abroad). See CIA fn 202 
above. 
204Schill (2007) 
205Since China was a predominantly capital importing state before now, with limited provisions on dispute 
resolution and National Treatment in its old generation BITs. See also supra fn 44 - WTO submission of 
China, Cuba, India, Kenya, Pakistan, Zimbabwe of 19th November 2002 (WT/WGTI/W/152). 
206This paper takes the position that FDI can be a positive force in the domestic economies and 
development planning of developing countries. This avoids the considerable debate on the effectiveness of 
FDI as an engine for promoting economic development. 
Note:The Uganda BIT was signed in 2004 while the Djibouti one was signed in 2003 
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and equitable treatment”); relative standards of treatment (National Treatment or Most-
Favoured Nation); protections against expropriation of foreign investments or 
nationalization; and recourse to dispute settlement (state to state and investor  to state). 
 
2.6.2 Preamble 
The Preambles assert the goals of the BITs. The undertakings therein are not binding, but 
Preambles serve as useful aids in the interpretation of the BITs.207 Where an operative 
provision is worded in an ambiguous manner or there is a lacuna in the text, reference 
may be made to the Preamble to set out the context in which the Treaty and the individual 
obligations are to be read.208 
Arbitration Tribunals have interpreted BITs by referring to the Preambles and have 
adopted interpretations that ensure their effectiveness. For example, in SGS Société 
Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of the Philippines209, the Tribunal stated, 
inter alia,that: 
“The object and purpose of the BIT supports an effective 
interpretation of Article X (2) [the “umbrella clause” of the 
Philippines-Switzerland BIT].  The BIT is a treaty for the 
promotion and reciprocal protection of investments. According to 
the Preamble it is intended ‘to create and maintain favourable 
conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in 
the territory of the other’. It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in 
its interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered 
investments.”  
                                                 
207Dolzer R. and Stevens M.(1995) Bilateral Investment Treaties. International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes. 
See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Article 31 states that a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the Treaty in 
the context and in light of its object and purpose. The context shall comprise of the text, its Preamble and 
annexes. 
208Dolzer (1995) 
209SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of the Philippines (2004) 8 ICSID Reports 515 
(paragraph 116 (C5/20) 
 
 
 
 
 39
Similarly, in Ecuador v. Occidental210 the Court of Appeal stated, inter alia: 
“We accept Mr Greenwood's submission that the object and purpose of a 
BIT (including this BIT) is to provide effective protection for investors of 
one state (here OEPC) in the territory of another state (here Ecuador) and 
that an important feature of that protection is the availability of recourse to 
international arbitration as a safeguard for the investor. In these 
circumstances it is permissible to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation 
in favour of the investor: see e.g. the views of the arbitrators in para 116 of 
their award in SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v Republic of the 
Philippines (2004) 8 ICSID Reports 515.” 
 
All the three BITs state their purpose as strengthening economic co-operation and 
increasing economic development and prosperity of the parties by creating favourable 
conditions for investments and encouraging reciprocal protection of the same in order to 
stimulate business initiative of investors. The Djibouti and Uganda BITs contain an 
additional purpose, which is, to stimulate transfer of capital and technology. The Djibouti 
BIT goes further and avers that it aims to intensify the co-operation of both States on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefits.   
 
All three Preambles fail to mention issues, like: promotion of respect for internationally 
recognised worker rights; recognition of international law or principles of international 
law as a basis for economic co-operation; the need to balance the interests of the various 
stakeholders; promotion of sustainable development; and commitment to act in 
conformity with existing Human Rights and maintain health, safety and environmental 
measures. These issues are important for ensuring sustainable development of African 
states. 
 
In light of the above, there is a deliberate mis-engineering of the Uganda and Djibouti 
Preambles as they do not make it clear that the objective of the investment promotion and 
protection must not be pursued at the expense of its public policy goals, such as, the 
                                                 
210Ecuador v. Occidental (No.2) [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 64 ( paragraph 28 (B/4) 
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protection of health, safety, the environment, and the promotion of internationally 
recognised labour rights. The provisions of the BIT(s) will not be interpreted in light of 
the said public policy objectives. In effect, Chinese investors are not obliged to establish 
high levels of environmental, labour rights and human rights protection in host states and 
as such can compromise the relevant standard merely to satisfy political and economic 
interests.211 
 
2.6.3 Definition of “investment” 
The definition of “investment” is crucial for the establishment of the jurisdiction of 
Arbitral Tribunals. The term is usually interpreted in the context of each particular BIT in 
which it is used, that is, only the interests of investors falling within the scope of an 
“investment” as defined in the BIT can form the basis of a claim under the BIT.212  It is 
also important for identifying the investment the host state wishes to attract.213  
 
The Uganda BIT defines investment as every kind of property, such as, goods, rights and 
interests of whatever nature, while the Djibouti BIT defines it as every kind of asset 
invested by investors of the home state in the host state in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of the host state. The Germany BIT, on the other hand, defines investment as 
every kind of asset invested directly or indirectly by investors of one party in the territory 
of the other party. The three definitions cover not only capital that has crossed the borders 
but also all other kind of assets invested by the investor in the territory of the host 
country.214 
 
The three BITs complement the broad conceptualisation of “investment” by including a 
non-exhaustive list of covered assets within the definition. The list has five categories of 
                                                 
211OECD ‘International Investment Agreements: a survey of environmental, labour and anti corruption 
issues’. (2008). Available at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/5/40471550.pdf (accessed on 23/3/09) 
212When there is a definition of a term in the Treaty itself, that definition shall apply and the words used in 
the definition shall be interpreted in the light of the principle set out in Article 31(1) of the Treaty on the 
Law of Treaties. Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties (1969) Article 31(1) provides, as the main 
rule for treaty interpretation, that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
213Only such investments described in the BIT may benefit from the protection and be eligible for a claim 
to dispute settlement. See OECD (2008). See also Malik (2008). 
214UNCTAD ‘Investor-State dispute settlement and impact on investment rulemaking’.(2007). Available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20073_en.pdf  (accessed on 5/5/09) at p 22. 
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assets: first, movable and immovable property and any related property rights, such as, 
mortgages, liens or pledges; second, various types of interests in companies, such as 
shares, stock, bonds, debentures or any other form of participation in a company, 
business enterprise or joint venture; third, claims to money and claims under a contract 
having a financial value, and loans directly related to a specific investment; fourth, 
intellectual property rights; and fifth, business concessions, that is, rights conferred by 
law or under contracts. This list thus includes portfolio investment (which may be 
undertaken for short term gains or risk diversification purposes) and direct investment,  as 
well as rights to realise economic or commercial activities based on a contract, i.e., the 
expectation to obtain future profits.  
 
Many Arbitral Tribunals prefer to rely on the non-exhaustive list in the definition of 
investment, rather than on the broad phrase “every kind of asset”. For example, in 
Eureko B.V –vs- Poland,215 Eureko sought protection for its investments in Poland 
which allegedly consisted of a 20% shareholding in PZU and rights derived from the 
shares, such as, corporate governance rights and rights to acquire additional shares in the 
company upon meeting certain conditions. To establish whether the claimant had made 
an investment entitled to protection under the 1992 Netherlands-Poland BIT, the ad hoc 
Arbitral Tribunal noted that the term “investment” under Article 1 of the said BIT is 
broad and covered, inter alia, “…ii) rights derived from shares, bonds and other kind of 
interests in companies…”.It therefore held that corporate governance rights derived from 
the 20% shareholding in PZU constituted an investment under the BIT. 
Similarly, in Petrobart –vs- Kyrgyz Republic,216 the Arbitral Tribunal had to decide 
whether a contract for the sale of gas condensate, which did not involve any transfer of 
money or property as capital in a business, qualified as an investment under the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT). The Tribunal found that a right conferred by contract to undertake 
an economic activity concerning the sale of gas, including a right to be paid for such a 
sale, is an investment under Article 1 (6) (c) which covers claims to money and claims to 
performance pursuant to a contract having economic value and associated with an 
                                                 
215Eureko B.V –vs- Republic of Poland, partial award on liability, 19 August 2005. 
216Petrobart –vs- Kyrgyz Republic, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce case No. 126/2003, final award, 29 
March 2005. 
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investment; and Article 1(6) (f) relating to any right conferred by law or contract 
permitted by law. 
 
Some Tribunals, however, base their decision on the broad phrase “every kind of asset”. 
For example, in Fedax –vs- Venezuela217 the claimant argued that promissory notes 
acquired by way of endorsement from the respondent qualified as investments under the 
Netherlands- Venezuela BIT and the ICSID Convention. The Tribunal held that, 
according to the BIT, the phrase “every asset” justifies a broad interpretation, and that 
promissory notes are investments under the BIT and ICSID.   
 
In light of the above, whatever aspect of the definition of investment the Tribunal decides 
to rely on, its interpretation will be broad. A broad based definition of investment is good 
for Germany and China, as it ensures that a wide variety of their investors’ assets are 
protected in the capital importing state.218 However, from the perspective of developing 
countries it is problematic, as it creates some uncertainty.219 For example, it may commit 
developing host countries to permit, promote or protect forms of investment that they did 
not contemplate at the time they entered into the BIT, and would not have agreed to 
include within the scope of the BIT had the issue arisen explicitly.220 In addition, it may 
commit them to provide treaty coverage to some investments that they may otherwise 
wish to restrict or control at the current time due to their development strategies, albeit 
that they plan to liberalise further in the future.221 Moreover, the inclusion of short term 
investments (portfolio investments) in the definition has the potential of creating capital 
volatility in the event of economic turbulence as investors may withdraw investments.222 
 
                                                 
217Fedax N.V –vs- Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, decision on objection to jurisdiction, 
11 June 1997, 37 ILM 1378 (1998) 
218Malik (2008) 
219Ibid 
220Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) international ‘Multilateral Framework on Investment.’ The 
International Working Group on Doha Agenda (IWOGDA). (2005). Available at: http://www.cuts-
international.org/Scope_Definition.htm (accessed on 26/4/09). 
221Ibid  
222Ibid  
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In light of the above, the Uganda and Djibouti BITs are mis-engineered. The scope of 
their definition of “investment” should have been narrowed down, by use of exclusions 
and limitations, to the assets listed. The exclusions may include, inter alia : real estate or 
other property not acquired for the purpose of economic benefit or any other business 
purposes, for example, a vacation home: and, certain financial assets or transactions 
perceived as not entailing real acquisitions of interests by a foreign investor in the host 
country.223  
 
For example, Article 9 of the Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common 
Investment Area (CCIA)224 excludes from its definition of “investment,”  
“goodwill market share, whether or not it is based on foreign origin trade, 
or rights to trade; claims to money deriving solely from commercial 
contracts for the sale of goods and services to or from the territory of a 
Member State to the territory of another Member State, or a loan to a 
Member State or to a Member State enterprise; a bank letter of credit; or 
the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such 
as trade financing”.  
 
The Canada model FIPA (2007) has a similar exclusion. 
 
Limitations could be included in the coverage of assets, such as, portfolio investments 
and intellectual property rights (IPR). Despite the fact that portfolio investment has the 
capital volatility characteristic (i.e. may be withdrawn quickly), it can be an important 
source of capital and foreign exchange for Uganda and Djibouti, and, therefore, capable 
of providing a positive contribution to their development.225 Hence, instead of excluding 
                                                 
223UNCTAD ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in investment rulemaking’.(2007). 
Available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf (accessed on 5/5/09). 
224It was adopted at the twelfth Summit of COMESA Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in 
Nairobi, Kenya, on 22nd and 23rd May 2007. Available at: 
http://programmes.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_contentandview=articleandid=82andItemid=66andla
ng=en (accessed on 24/4/09). 
225CUTS (2005)  
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it from the definition of “investment”, its application could be limited only to investments 
that have been established for some minimum period of time. 226 
  
With regard to IPR, its coverage may be limited by requiring that it be associated with a 
business operating in the developing host state territory.227 This ensures that simply 
holding an IPR in a foreign country does not trigger the rights or obligations of the BIT. 
As a result, the foreign investor must ensure that the investment has a significant 
operational presence in the host state, not just market share of some form or other.228 IPR 
in the CCIA definition has this limitation.229  
 
The Uganda and Germany BITs extend their application to all investments without any 
regard as to the time of establishment, while the Djibouti BIT extends its application only 
to investments made after its entry into force.230 Although the Uganda BIT is not 
retroactive, it applies to all existing investments of investors from China in the territory 
of Uganda once it enters into force.231 There is mis-engineering of the Uganda BIT as the 
‘old’ investments which had not been subjected to the approval procedure of the BIT (or 
current domestic legislation) are included, hence amounting to preferential treatment.232 
China was in this case trying to seek as wide a protection as possible.  
 
The Djibouti BIT includes a limitation to the scope of the investment by stating that the 
investment must be in accordance with its laws and regulations. This means that Djibouti 
retains full discretion and control over the admission of the investment into its territory 
and thus the BIT does not grant any right of establishment to Chinese investors.233 Such 
discretion and control may entail formal requirements included in Djibouti’s domestic 
                                                 
226Ibid 
227Malik (2008) p 8. 
228IISD Model International agreement on investment for sustainable development: Negotiators handbook 
(2005). Available at:  
http://www.corporateaccountability.org/eng/documents/2005/june_2005_iisd_model_international_agreem
ent_on_investment_for_sustainable_development_negotiators_handbook_pdf_678_kb.pdf (accessed on 
30/3/09) 
229Malik (2008) p 8. 
230See Article 11 of the Djibouti-China BIT  and  Article 12 of the Uganda-China BIT 
231UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 6 
232Dolzer (1995) p 44 
233UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 
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legislation, compliance with which may be crucial for determining whether the agreement 
applies to a particular investment.234 The purpose of the provision, as explained by the 
Tribunal in Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. Morocco235, is “to prevent 
the Bilateral Treaty from protecting investments that should not be protected, 
particularly because they would be illegal”. Likewise, the provision emphasises that 
investment is covered only if it is consistent with the development policy, and other 
policies, as expressed in the domestic legislation of Djibouti.236In addition, it creates a 
“level playing field” for both foreign and domestic investors as they all have to observe 
the laws of the land.237  
 
In Fraport –vs-. the Philippines,238 the Tribunal declined to exercise its jurisdiction 
based on the BIT between Germany and the Philippines (1997). It held that, since Fraport 
was fully aware that it was in breach of domestic law, it had not made an investment “in 
accordance with the laws of the Philippines”. 
 
There is a legal mis-engineering of the Uganda BIT as it does not contain a similar 
emphasis. Uganda has not prevented the Bilateral Treaty from protecting investments that 
should not be protected, particularly because they would be illegal under its laws or are 
against its development policies.239 A Chinese investor can, therefore, intentionally 
structure an investment in violation of Ugandan law and policies.240 
Moreover, the three BITs do not contain an interpretative note stipulating that for an asset 
to be a covered “investment” it must have the “characteristics of an investment”, such as 
                                                 
234Ibid 
235Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. Kingdom of Morocco, decision on jurisdiction, Case No. 
ARB/00/4 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003), at para. 46. 
236UNCTAD (2007) supra fn 223 
237Ibid 
238Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide – vs-  Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25. 
Award 16 August 2007. 
239See Tribunal decision in Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A., v. Kingdom of Morocco, (ICSID 
Case No. ARB00/4), decision on jurisdiction, 16 July 2001, (2003) 42 ILM 606. See also OECD 
‘Definition of investor and investment in international investment agreements’.(2008).Available at: 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/5/40471550.pdf (accessed on 23/3/09) at pp 76 
240See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. The Republic of the Philippines, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, award, 16 August 2007, where the Tribunal held by majority that an 
investment intentionally structured in violation of Philippine Law in order for the investor to gain the 
prohibited management and control of a project did not qualify as an investment. 
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“the commitment of capital or other resources, be of a certain duration, the expectation 
of gain or profit, the assumption of risk, or the contribution to host state development”, 
as stated in  Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Egypt.241 The said provision can be 
found in Article 2 (2) of the Norwegian draft model BIT and Article 1 of the US-Rwanda 
BIT (2008). 
 
The provision is important for the developing countries’ BITs as it limits the coverage of 
investments to only those that contribute to host state economic development. 
 
2.6.4 Definition of “investor” 
 
The definition of “investor” is important for African states as it identifies the investors a 
country wishes to attract. Moreover, it is important in determining the jurisdiction of the 
Arbitral Tribunal, since being an investor from a state party to the Treaty is a necessary 
condition of eligibility to bring a claim. 242  
 
The Uganda and Djibouti BITs have a single definition of “investor” which applies to 
both parties. An “investor” is defined as either a natural person or a legal person.243 The 
natural person needs to have the nationality of either contracting party in accordance with 
the laws of that contracting party.244 The legal person must be an economic entity( 
including   companies, corporations, associations, partnerships and other organisations) 
incorporated and constituted under the laws and regulations of either party, and having 
their seats (place of administration) within the territory of that party.245  
 
The Germany BIT offers two definitions. One relates to Germany the other to China. In 
respect of Germany, an “investor” is defined as a German within the meaning of the 
Basic Law of German or a juridical person having its seat in Germany. China, on the 
                                                 
241See Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, decision on jurisdiction, 6 
August 2004, where the Tribunal held that even if the term asset is broadly defined, a bank guarantee 
cannot be termed as an investment. It claimed that it would turn the provision to be a meaningless one. 
242OECD ‘International Investment Law: Understanding concepts and tracking innovations: A companion 
volume to international investment perspective’. (2008). 
243Article 1(a) and (b) of the China-Uganda BIT and the China-Djibouti BIT 
244Article 1(a) of the China-Uganda BIT and the China-Djibouti BIT 
245Article 1(b) of the China-Uganda BIT and the China-Djibouti BIT 
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other hand, defines an “investor” as a natural person with China’s nationality, or 
economic entities incorporated and constituted under the laws of China with its seat in 
China. 
 
All three BITs do not contain a denial of benefit clause providing that each party reserves 
the right to deny to any company the advantages of the BIT, if nationals of any third 
country control such company and, in the case of a company of the other party, that 
company has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other party, or is 
controlled by nationals of a third country with which the denying party does not maintain 
normal economic relations.246 The clause is important to developing countries as it 
enables them to carve out from the definition of “investor” shell companies owned by 
nationals of a third country to which they did not intend to offer treaty protection.247 
 
In the Austria – Libya BIT (2004) the denial of benefits clause states:- 
“A contracting party may deny the benefits of this Agreement to the 
investor of the other Contracting party and to its investments, if the 
investor of a Non-Contracting party own or control the first mentioned 
investor and that investor has no substantial business activity in the 
territory of the Contracting party under whose law it is constituted.” 
 
The denial of benefit clause, therefore, acts as a filter on the admissibility of claims. This 
was so stated by the Tribunal in Generation Ukraine –vs- Ukraine. In the said case, the 
claimant was a company registered in the United States (US) and had established a 
subsidiary in Ukraine. Ukraine invoked the denial of benefit clause (Article 1(2)) of the 
US – Ukraine BIT to deny the claimant the advantages of the BIT, because the claimant 
had no substantial business in the US and was in fact controlled by Canadians. The 
                                                 
246OECD ‘Definition of investor and investment in international investment agreements’. (2008). Chapter 1 
of the OECD publication ‘Understanding concepts and tracking innovations’. Available at: 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/5/40471550.pdf (accessed on 23/3/09) at p 32 
247OECD (2008) fn 246 p 28 
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Tribunal, in its award, stated that the denial of benefit clause “…is a potential filter on the 
admissibility of claims which can be invoked by the respondent state”.248 
Similarly, in Plama –vs- Bulgaria249 the ICSID Tribunal stated that the right to deny 
provision provided for in BITs serves as a filter of the admissibility of claims. 
 
On the basis of the above, the Uganda and Djibouti BITs are mis-engineered, as they do 
not give them the authority to effectively carve out from the definition of “investor” shell 
companies owned by nationals of a third country to which they do not intend to offer 
treaty protection; for example, because they have a record of involvement in corruption 
activities, environment degradation, and human and labour rights violations. 250 
 
2.6.5  Investment promotion and protection 
Investment promotion and protection provisions in BITs directly aim at encouraging 
outward or inward foreign investment through particular measures of the contracting 
parties.251 
 
Article 2 of the three BITs state that each party shall (in accordance with its laws and 
regulations):  
“encourage investors of the other Party to make investments in its 
territory; accord fair and equitable treatment,  constant protection and 
security of such investments in its territory; refrain from taking any 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures against the management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment and disposal of the investments by the 
investors of the other Party; and  provide assistance in and facilities for 
obtaining visas and working permit to nationals of the other Party 
engaging in activities associated with investments made in the territory of 
that Party.”  
 
                                                 
248Generation Ukraine Inc. –vs- Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, 16 September 2003 at paragraph 15.7 
249Plama Consortium Limited –vs- Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, decision on 
jurisdiction 8 February 2005. 
250OECD (2008) fn 246 p 76 
251UNCTAD ‘Investment promotion provision in international investment agreement’. (2008) at p 5 
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The Article is mis-engineered from the perspective of developing African states. It 
merely concentrates on protection of the investment of Chinese investors, and does not 
sufficiently address the issue of promotion of investment for purposes of attaining host 
state economic development. First, it does not provide for exchange of information on 
market requirements know-how and technology transfer through investment and joint 
ventures, as well as sharing of expertise on entrepreneurship and management.252 
Linkages between foreign affiliates and domestic firms are important channels through 
which assets, know-how and technology may be transferred from the former to the 
latter.253 They contribute to the upgrading of domestic enterprises, integrating foreign 
affiliates more firmly into the host economies and promoting a constructive engagement 
between states.254 Article 29 of the IISD Model International Agreement on Investment 
for Sustainable Development (IISD Model) is a good example of such a provision. 
 
Secondly, it does not provide for promotion by the Chinese investors of technology 
transfer, as well as technical and managerial training of citizens of host African 
countries.255 This can be achieved by expressly requiring Chinese investors: to refrain 
from imposing restrictive clauses in technology transfer contracts with their affiliates and 
licensees that prevent absorption and assimilation of technology transferred; and, to 
provide information on transferred technologies (especially data on availability of 
substitute technologies, information needed for technical, institutional and financial 
assessment of the technology transfer transactions).256 Moreover, it could provide for the 
establishment of a technical assistance committee whose mandate would be to promote, 
facilitate and support, through technical assistance, the attainment of sustainable 
development. Article 37 of the IISD Model proposes the establishment of such a 
committee. The aforesaid express provision and the committee would ensure that the 
technology transferred is meaningful and appropriate to the host African state thereby 
supporting further innovation.257  
                                                 
252UNCTAD (2008) fn 251 pp 45-48. 
253Ibid 
254Ibid 
255Yu (2008). 
256Ibid 
257Ibid 
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Thirdly, there is no mention of the establishment of an institutional framework between 
the parties to be employed to overlook the implementation of the agreement; monitor 
investment relations; forward proposals on how best to promote foreign investment 
between the parties; and organise workshops or fairs on investment opportunities with the 
participation of foreign investors.258 Moreover, the institutional framework would be 
utilised to modify existing investment promotion activities and terminate those that prove 
to be ineffective.259 Article 23(1) of the Norwegian draft model BIT establishes such an 
institution, known as the joint committee.260 
 
Fourthly, it does not provide for granting host states a right to seek information from 
potential Chinese investors, or their home state, about its corporate government history 
and investor practices. This information is important for the state and the local 
communities, as it will enable them to make an informed decision about an investment.261 
Further, it heightens the role of the community as they are able to participate in pre-
establishment decision making,262 leading to community empowerment. 263 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6.6  Treatment of investments 
                                                 
258UNCTAD (2008) fn 251 pp 45-48. 
259UNCTAD (2008) fn 251  p 79. 
260It states, inter alia, that “The Parties hereby establish a Joint Committee composed of representatives of 
the Parties... The Joint Committee shall: supervise the implementation of this Agreement;…where relevant, 
suggest to the Parties ways to enhance and promote investment action;…where relevant, discuss issues 
related to corporate social responsibility, the preservation of the environment, public health and safety, the 
goal of sustainable development, anticorruption, employment and human rights, …” 
261Article 28 (Commentary)  IISD Model p 40. 
262This means that when information gathered about an investor and investment is forwarded to the 
community, they are able to communicate their views. The host state can use these views in pre-
establishment decision making. 
263Article 28 (Commentary)  IISD Model p 40. 
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A country’s treatment of foreign investors and their investments is very important for 
purposes of attracting FDI.264 Certain general standards are used in international practice 
to secure a particular level of treatment for FDI in host countries which would ensure that 
parties treat investments of investors of the other party in a manner that is equal and fair, 
not less favourable than that it accords to the investments and associated activities of its 
own investors (National Treatment), and not less favourable than that it accords to the 
investments and associated activities by the investors of any third State (Most Favoured 
Nation treatment).265    
 
2.6.6.1 Fair and equitable treatment 
Fair and equitable treatment is an absolute standard that grants protection to a foreign 
investor independently of the host state’s treatment of its nationals or nationals of a third 
state.266 
 
Articles 3(1) of the three BITs provide that “investments of investors of each Contracting 
Party shall all the time be accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party.”. The clause fails to define “fair and equitable treatment” as 
well as make reference to international law.  
 
The absence of a reference to international law leads to an interpretation that “fair and 
equitable treatment” envisages conduct “which goes far beyond the minimum standard 
and afford[s] protection to a greater extent and according to a much more objective 
standard than any previously employed form of words”267. Therefore, in ascertaining the 
content of the fair and equitable standard in a dispute, one would have to inquire, on a 
case by case assessment, whether “in all the circumstances the conduct in issue is fair 
and equitable or unfair and inequitable”. 268 In effect, this would amount to the 
application of the plain meaning of the words “fair and equitable” to each individual case, 
                                                 
264Dolzer (1995) 
265Article 3 of the Uganda-China BIT and the Djibouti China BIT 
266Schill (2007) 
267UNCTAD ‘Fair and equitable treatment’ UNCTAD series on issues in International Investment 
Agreements (1999) referring to Mann F. (1990) British treaties for the promotion and protection of 
investments pp 234-251. 
268Ibid 
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independently of other standards. This, in practice, would mean giving considerable 
discretion to the Tribunal entrusted with determining whether a breach of the standard 
has occurred, bearing in mind the subjectivity inherent in the notions of fairness and 
equity.269 This has the potential of making numerous governmental regulatory actions 
inconsistent with the obligations of the BIT, regardless of whether those measures were 
adopted and implemented on a non-discriminatory basis.270 
 
Conversely, when reference is made to international law, violation of fair and equitable 
treatment has been dealt with on a case by case basis by Arbitral Tribunals. For example: 
a) In United Mexican States –vs- Metalclad Corp.271 and Emilio Augustin Maffezini –
vs- The Kingdom of Spain,272 the Tribunals stated that violation of the fair and equitable 
standard would be established if government conduct was unjust due to: lack of 
transparency and predictable laws that protect investors against a reversal of decisions; 
inconsistent actions by different government organs; and, arbitrary changes of the law.  
b) The Arbitral Tribunal in Waste Management Inc. –vs- United Mexican States273 
affirmed that violation of the said standard would arise if the government conduct was 
arbitrary; grossly unfair; unjust or idiosyncratic; and, discriminatory (e.g. exposes the 
investor to sectional and racial prejudice). 
c) In Pope and Talbolt –vs- Canada274 the Tribunal avowed that if the government 
wilfully disregards the due process of the law and lacks procedural propriety, the host 
state would be in violation of the standard. 
d) The Tribunal in Mondev International limited –vs- United States275 averred that 
unfair and inequitable treatment of foreign investors will be established where 
government conduct was improper and discreditable. 
                                                 
269Ibid 
270UNCTAD (2007) fn 223  pp 31 and 32 
271United Mexican States –vs- Metalclad Corp., Judgment, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2 May 
2001, 5 ICSID Reports 236. See also Schreuer C. ‘Fair and equitable treatment in Arbitral practice’ (June 
2005)6. Journal of world investment and trade. Available at: http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/77.pdf 
(accessed on 1/5/09). 
272Emilio Augustin Maffezini –vs- The Kingdom of Spain, award, 13 November 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 419. 
See also  Schreuer(2005) 
273Waste Management Inc. –vs- United Mexican States, award, 30 April 2004.See also Schreuer (2005) 
274Pope and Talbolt –vs- Canada, award in respect of damages, 31 May 2002. See also  Schreuer (2005) 
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e) In Tecmed –vs- Mexico276 and Pope and Talbot –vs- Canada the Tribunal asserted 
that unfair and inequitable treatment of investors means hostile treatment, harassment, 
and coercion by government authorities.  
From the above arbitral jurisprudence, it follows that fair and equitable treatment under 
international law includes: the requirement of stability and predictability of the legal 
framework and consistency in the host state’s decision making; the principle of legality; 
the protection of investor confidence or legitimate expectations; procedural due process 
and denial of justice; protection against discrimination and arbitrariness; the requirement 
of transparency; and, the concept of reasonableness and proportionality.277 Violation of 
these government obligations would be found in fewer cases than if fair and equitable 
treatment were accorded its plain meaning. Therefore, the aforesaid mis-engineering of 
failure to clarify the meaning of “fair and equitable treatment”, and limiting its meaning 
to the minimum standard of treatment, give a very wide ambit to the duty of treatment of 
host states as there is no clear limit to its applicability. This significantly impairs the 
flexibility and discretion of the Djibouti and Uganda governments to regulate, and to 
pursue, their public policy objectives.278 
 
2.6.6.2 National Treatment 
National Treatment in a BIT context means “the obligation of contracting parties to 
grant investors of the other contracting party treatment no less favourable than the 
treatment they grant to investments of their own investors”.279 The effect of this is to 
create a level playing field between foreign and domestic investors in the relevant 
market.280 This is disadvantageous for host countries as it distorts the growth of its 
domestic and infant industries.281  
  
                                                                                                                                                 
275Mondev International limited –vs- United States, ICSID Case No. Arb (AF)/99/2, award of 11 October 
2002. See also  Schreuer (2005) 
276Tecmed –vs- Mexico, ICSID Case No. Arb (AF)/00/02, award of 29 May 2003. See also Schreuer (2005) 
277Schill(2007) 
278UNCTAD (2007) fn 223  pp 31 and 32 
279UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 33 
280Ibid 
281UNCTAD (1999) ‘National Treatment’. UNCTAD series on issues in International Investment 
Agreements. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/II (Vol. IV) at p 47 
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National Treatment contains two different concepts: "pre-admission" National Treatment 
and "post-admission" National Treatment.282 "Pre-admission" National Treatment refers 
to any requirements placed upon the incoming investment or investor as a prerequisite for 
admission into the host state. Some examples of this type of regulation include 
restrictions or prohibitions on investing in certain sectors of the economy, local inputs 
requirements, export requirements, use of local labour, or local ownership 
requirements.283 "Post-admission" National Treatment refers to any regulations, including 
taxation, licensing, and health and safety laws, imposed on the investment (or its 
associated activities) after it has already been established.284 The three BITs refer to post-
admission National Treatment. This is good for the developing African states as it allows 
them to put into place policies on market access (i.e. who can have access to their internal 
investment environment) and to impose any conditions they may consider necessary.285 
This helps them to preserve national development goals, security and protection of public 
morals.286 
 
For policy space purposes, the Uganda and Djibouti BITs are mis-engineered as, first, 
they do not provide for exceptions to National Treatment.287 There are stark inequalities 
in economic power, technical capabilities and financial strength between China on the 
one hand, and Djibouti and Uganda, on the other. Certain differentiation between national 
and non-national firms is thus necessary to bring about a degree of operative equality.288 
The exceptions would therefore enable Uganda and Djibouti to exclude certain types of 
                                                 
282Reading M. ‘The bilateral investment treaty in ASEAN: A comparative analysis’. (1992)42. Duke Law 
Journal pp. 679-705. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1372842.pdf (accessed on 27/03/2009) at pp 
699 
283Ibid 
284Ibid 
285Countries have the sovereign right under public international law to place checks on the entry of aliens 
into their countries be they natural or artificial persons. See Mosoti (2003) p 1022 and  1029  
286Mosoti (2003) p 1022 and 1029.  
287Article 3 (2) of the China-Djibouti BIT and the China-Uganda BIT state “Without prejudice to its laws 
and regulations, each Contracting Party shall accord to investments and activities associated with such 
investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party treatment not less favourable than that 
accorded to the investments and associated activities by its own investors.” 
288UNCTAD (1999) fn 281  p 3 
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enterprises, industries or activities from the operation of National Treatment thereby 
allowing policy flexibility while maintaining National Treatment.289 
 
The most relevant type of exception would be the industry specific exception, whereby a 
contracting party reserves the right to treat domestic and foreign investors in certain types 
of activities or industries differently under its laws and regulations for reasons of national 
economic and social policy.290 The most common method of doing so is to “opt out” of 
the general National Treatment obligation, typically by way of an annex of reserved 
industries and activities which fall outside the scope of the National Treatment 
obligation, and in which differential treatment is possible.291 The Norwegian draft model 
BIT uses this approach. Article 3 (2) states: “National treatment shall not apply to the 
reservations set out in Annex [A].” 
 
This approach may, however, curtail the ability of a host country to distinguish between 
domestic and foreign investments as it may be difficult to identify with precision all the 
industries and activities to which national treatment should not apply.292 
 
Article 18 (4) of the CCIA investment Agreement addressed the said problem by 
allowing for review of the reserved industries list. Article 18 of the said Agreement 
states:  
 
“This Agreement shall not apply to the Temporary Exclusion List and/or 
Sensitive List which a Member State may submit provided the Temporary 
Exclusion List and/or Sensitive List is submitted to the CCIA Committee 
within six months after the date of ratification and accession to this 
Agreement…The Sensitive and Temporary Exclusion Lists shall be 
reviewed every two years and at such subsequent periodic intervals as may 
be decided by the CCIA Committee.” 
 
                                                 
289UNCTAD (1999) fn 281 p 12 
290UNCTAD (1999) fn 281 p 46 
291Ibid 
292UNCTAD (1999) fn 281 p 64 
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Another method is using The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) “opt-in” 
hybrid model (also known as the “progressive liberalisation” model) whereby the 
obligation of National Treatment will not be a general obligation applicable to 
investments in all industries and sectors and by all parties, but a specific commitment 
applying only in industries and sectors inscribed in a party’s schedule.293 The application 
is to be gradually extended to other sectors through successive rounds of negotiations. 
Furthermore, if a state decides to include a sector in its schedule, it retains the possibility 
of deciding the level of National Treatment it proposes to grant in that sector by listing 
specific limitations it wishes to maintain.294 Those limitations could actually be specific 
discriminatory measures that are inconsistent with the national treatment standard. Hence, 
by scheduling them, a party maintains the legal right to continue to apply them. 
 
These approaches enable a government to “sequence the level of support that it gives to 
domestic investors while shrewdly anticipating to grant some scale-back support to both 
local and foreign investors or to completely eliminate such support at a certain point in 
future”.295 The power and economic asymmetries are thus recognised, hence helping the 
struggling domestic industry to be able to compete with external or foreign investment 
bringing about a degree of operative equality.296  
 
Secondly, the BITs do not specify, in their National Treatment provisions, that the 
treatment concerned will be that which the host country accords to its own investments 
“in like circumstances”. The qualification “like circumstances” refers to broad objective 
characteristics of a business, for example, its economic sector, the size of the business or 
its geographical location.297 In S.D Myers –vs- Canada,298 the Tribunal interpreted the 
term “like circumstances” by referring to the economic sector. It stated, inter alia, that: 
 
                                                 
293UNCTAD (1999) fn 281 p 12 
294Ibid 
295Mosoti (2003) p 1020 
296Mosoti (2003) p 1021 
297Wandrag R. ‘SACU – US FTA: Investment issues’ (2006) South African Institute of International 
Affairs (SAIIA) at pp 16 and 17. 
298SD Myers –vs- Canada, UNICITRAL award of 12 November 2000. Available at: 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/SDMyers/SDMyersMeritsAward.pdf (accessed on 4/5/09) 
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“…. The concept of “like circumstances” invites an examination of 
whether a non-national investor complaining of less favourable treatment 
is in the same “sector” as the national investor. The Tribunal takes the 
view that the word “sector” has a wide connotation that includes the 
concepts of “economic sector” and “business sector… From the business 
perspective, it is clear that SDMI and Myers Canada were in “like 
circumstances” with Canadian operators such as Chem-Security and 
Cintec. They all were engaged in providing PCB waste remediation 
services. SDMI was in a position to attract customers that might otherwise 
have gone to the Canadian operators because it could offer more 
favourable prices and because it had extensive experience and 
credibility...” 
 
The qualification (“like circumstances”) infers that National Treatment is a comparative 
standard that should only be applied in comparative circumstances.299 This, therefore, 
allows preferential treatment of domestic investors (and, therefore, “less favourable” 
treatment of foreign investors) on the basis of their actual economic conditions, such as, 
“infant industries” or “minority industries” or economic/business sector.300 This gives 
African governments policy space to pursue national policies through preferential rules 
and regulations.301 For example, preferential regimes for small and medium businesses 
would not have to be extended to include large multi national corporations, as they would 
not compete in “like circumstances”.302 
 
Lastly, the two developing countries’ BITs do not include a development clause in their 
National Treatment provision; hence they are mis-engineered. This means that Uganda 
and Djibouti are obliged to grant the same privileges, benefits and incentives (for 
example, special policies and programmes that they grant to domestic industries to 
stimulate their growth and competitiveness) to Chinese investors thereby further 
                                                 
299Wandrag (2006) pp 16 and 17. 
300Wandrag (2006) p 17 
301UNCTAD (1999) fn 281 p 26. See also Wandrag (2006) at p. 17. 
302Wandrag (2006) p 17. 
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strengthening the foreign investor’s competitiveness.303 The development clause allows 
preferential treatment in relation to legally specified development measures (for example 
investment incentives for domestic investors for purposes of economic development of 
the host state) provided they do not substantially impair investments by foreign 
investors.304 
 
The Netherlands- Jamaica BIT contains such a clause. Its Article 3 (6) states: 
 
“Special incentives granted by one Contracting Party only to its nationals 
in order to stimulate the creation of local industries are considered 
compatible with this Article, provided they do not significantly affect the 
investments and activities of nationals of the other Contracting Party in 
connection with an investment.”305 
 
2.6.6.3 Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment 
The MFN treatment standard means that investments or investors of one contracting party 
are entitled to treatment by the other contracting party that is no less favourable than the 
treatment the latter grants to investments or investors of any other third country.306  The 
MFN standard seeks to prevent discrimination against investors from foreign countries on 
grounds of their nationality, and therefore establishes, at least in principle, a level playing 
field between all foreign investors protected by a BIT. 307 MFN treatment may be based 
upon a treaty; another agreement; a unilateral, legislative or other act; or mere practice.308 
 
The MFN standard, therefore, ensures that investments or investors of contracting parties 
to a BIT receive the best treatment that each of them has granted to the investments or 
                                                 
303UNCTAD (1999) fn 281 
304UNCTAD (1999) fn 281 
305The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of Jamaica BIT is available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/netherlands_jamaica.pdf (accessed on 5/5/09) 
306UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 38 
307UNCTAD (1999) ‘Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment.’ UNCTAD series on issues in International 
Investment Agreements. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10 (Vol. III). 
308OECD (2005) ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment’. OECD series on International Investment Law: A 
changing landscape.  
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investors of any other third country.309 At the same time, the MFN standard sets certain 
limits upon host countries with regard to their present and future investment policies, by 
prohibiting them from favouring investors of one particular foreign nation over those of 
another foreign country.310  
 
However, not all treatment given by a host country to foreign investors falls under the 
scope of the MFN provision. In order to be covered by the MFN clause, the treatment has 
to be the general treatment usually provided to investors from a given foreign country.311 
Therefore, if a host country granted special privileges or incentives to an individual 
investor in an investment contract between it and the host country (so-called “one-off” 
deals), there would be no obligation under the MFN clause to treat other foreign investors 
equally. The reason is that a host country cannot be obliged to enter into an individual 
investment contract.312 Freedom of contract prevails over the MFN standard. Only if this 
individual behaviour became general practice in the host country, for example, if an 
incentive is granted under a general subsidy programme, would the MFN provision 
apply. It may be difficult to decide at what point an individual practice, which has been 
repeated in several cases, becomes general treatment. The relevance of MFN in this 
particular instance is that all foreign investors should be treated equally for purposes of 
being potential candidates for the special privilege or incentive which, in practice, could 
only be granted to one individual investor.313 
 
Article 3 (3) of the three BITs are identical. For policy space purposes, there is mis-
engineering of the Djibouti and Uganda BITs with China,  as the MFN clause, first, does 
not contain a statement averring that MFN applies only to investments that are “in like 
situations”. This impedes Djibouti and Uganda from treating different categories of 
investment differently, or from differentiating between enterprises of different sizes, as 
long as fairly objective and defensible criteria are used in making such distinctions.314 
                                                 
309UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 38 
310UNCTAD (1999) fn 307 
311Ibid 
312Ibid 
313Ibid 
314Mosoti (2003) p 1025. See also UNCTAD (1999) fn 307 p 7 
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Secondly, the BITs do not provide for general exceptions to MFN and National 
Treatment. The BITs should allow contracting parties to derogate from the non-
discrimination standard, for purposes of maintenance of public order, public health or 
public morality; and for national security reasons.315 For example, Article 24 of the 
Norwegian draft Model BIT (2007) permits the host state to adopt measures that 
discriminate between investors or between investments. It states that: 
  “ i)to protect public morals or to maintain public order;316ii)to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; iii) to secure compliance with laws 
and regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement; iv) for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or v) for the protection of the environment.” 
 
Article 22 (1) of the CCIA Investment Agreement contains a similar provision. 
   
Thirdly, the BITs do not provide for country specific negotiable exceptions that provide 
leeway to countries to make MFN exceptions with regard to any measure or sector.317 
These exceptions are normally set out by the parties to a BIT in its Schedule.318 They 
include those measures maintained or intended, and discriminatory policies that may not 
be consistent with its MFN treatment.319 For purposes of development, inclusion of the 
said exceptions would enable Djibouti and Uganda to steer foreign investors into those 
activities they consider particularly important for their economic development and 
thereby contribute to acceleration and deepening of the process of industrial 
development.320       
 
 
 
                                                 
315UNCTAD (1999) fn 307 p 15 
316The public order exception may be invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed 
to one of the fundamental interests of society 
317Mosoti (2003) p 1025 
318Mosoti (2003) pp 1027 and 1028 
319Ibid 
320That is, those activities they can reasonably expect to acquire a comparative advantage hence promote 
production in such areas. See UNCTAD (1999) fn 307 p 38 
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2.6.7 Expropriation 
Expropriation is the involuntary forced divestment of FDI.321 Expropriation can take 
different forms. First, it can be direct, where an investment is nationalised or otherwise 
directly expropriated322through formal transfer of title or outright physical seizure.323 
Secondly, it can be indirect, 324where the state interferes with the use of that property, or 
with the enjoyment of the benefits accruing there from, even where the property is not 
seized and the legal title to the property is not affected.325  
 
A state has a right to nationalise foreign owned property for: legitimate public welfare 
measures (e.g., health, environment or safety regulations); public interest measures; and 
legitimate measures necessary to protect public morals, public order, human, animal or 
plant life or health, safety, national treasures of artistic, historic, or archaeological value, 
or for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.326 Further, exercise of the right 
should not be discriminatory and compensation should be provided.327 
 
Not all state measures interfering with property amount to expropriation. It has been 
stated that: 
  
“State measures, prima facie a lawful exercise of powers of governments, 
may affect foreign interests considerably without amounting to 
expropriation. Thus, foreign assets and their use may be subjected to 
taxation, trade restrictions involving licenses and quotas, or measures of 
                                                 
321Kobrin S. ‘Expropriation as an attempt to control foreign firms in LDCs: Trends from 1960 to 1979’. 
(1984)28. International Studies Quarterly, pp. 329-348. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600634 
(accessed: 30/03/2009). 
322‘Expropriation applies to individual measures taken for a public purpose while nationalisation involves 
large-scale takings on the basis of an executive or legislative act for the purpose of transferring property or 
interests into the public domain ‘ See OECD ‘Indirect expropriation and the right to regulate in 
international investment law’. (2005) at p 45 
323International law is clear that a seizure of legal title of property constitutes a compensable expropriation. 
See OECD (2005) fn 322 p 46 
324Also referred to as “de facto”, “disguised”, “constructive” or “creeping” expropriation. See Kobrin 
(1984) 
325OECD (2005) fn 322 p 45 
326This is now generally accepted. See Sornarajah M. (1994) The International Law on Foreign Investment  
at Chapter 6 
327Property of aliens cannot be taken, whether for public purposes or not, without adequate compensation 
.This is a well recognized rule of public international law. See OECD (2005) fn 322 and Sornarajah (1994) 
Chapter 6. 
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devaluation. While special facts may alter cases, in principle such 
measures are not unlawful and do not constitute expropriation”.328  
 
In addition, non-discriminatory measures related to application of competition law to an 
investment, consumer protection, securities, environmental protection and land planning 
are non-compensable takings as they are regarded essential to the efficient functioning of 
the state.329 
 
There is a thin line between the concept of indirect expropriation and non-compensable 
regulatory governmental measures.330 Hence, Tribunals have established some criteria to 
distinguish these concepts and these are: 
i) the degree of interference with the property right331, 
ii) the character of the governmental measures, i.e. the purpose and the context of the 
governmental measure,332 and 
 iii)the interference of the measure with reasonable and investment-backed 
expectations333 
 
                                                 
328Brownlie I. (2003) Public International Law at p 509. This was similarly quoted in OECD (2005) fn 322 
p 47 
329OECD (2005) fn 322 p 47 referring to Sornarajah (1994) p 283. 
330OECD (2005) fn 322 p 71 
331Several BIT Tribunals have recently retained the criterion of the severity of the impact (substantial 
deprivation) to qualify an act by a state as an expropriation. For example, in CME (Netherlands) v. Czech 
Republic (Partial Award) (13 September 2001). Available at: 
http://www.biicl.org/files/3919_2003_cme_v_czech_republic.pdf (accessed on 30/3/09), the Tribunal 
found that an expropriation had occurred because the Media Council caused the destruction of the operation 
of the company in question to the extent that it became a company “with assets, but without business”. It 
stated also that although “regulatory measures are common in all types of legal and economic systems in 
order to avoid use of private property contrary to the general welfare of the host state” the administrative 
measures taken by the host country did not fall under such a category. 
332Governments have the right to protect, through non-discriminatory actions without compensation hence a 
governmental measure taken for purposes of promoting generally recognised considerations of the public 
health, safety, morals or welfare will normally lead to a conclusion that there has been no ‘taking’. For 
example, in Lauder v. The Czech Republic (Final Award) (3 September 2002), the Tribunal commented on 
the interference with property rights by stating that: “… Parties to [the Bilateral] Treaty are not liable for 
economic injury, that is, the consequence of bona fide regulation within the accepted police powers of the 
State”. This was so quoted in OECD (2005) fn 322 p 68 
333Investors in all other countries, have to assume a risk that the country might experience strikes, lock-
outs, disturbances, changes of economic and political system and even revolution. If any of these risks 
materialises it does not necessarily mean that property rights affected by such events can be deemed to have 
been taken. This was so stated in Starret Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-United States Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 
154 (1983) as quoted  in  OECD (2005) fn 322 p 69 
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Article 4 of the three BITs allows a host state to expropriate the investments of Chinese 
investors, or take any other measures having the effect of dispossession, provided it is for 
the public benefit and compensation is paid.  
 
For developmental purposes, the Uganda and Djibouti BITs are mis-engineered as they 
neither explain “other similar measures”334 or “any other measures having the effect of 
dispossession” 335nor establish any criteria to identify such measures. The words are 
broad enough to suggest that every measure substantially impairing the value of an 
investment could be challenged as an indirect expropriation. A broad concept of indirect 
expropriation could have the effect of converting a country's routine regulatory acts into a 
potential indirect taking, and, consequently, entailing compensation in favour of the 
affected foreign investor.336 
 
Recent Arbitral Tribunals have identified the above problem, and have opted to give 
“expropriation” a more restrictive interpretation, despite the presence of the words “other 
similar measures” or “any other measures having the effect of dispossession”.337 For 
example, in Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) –vs- The Czech Republic338 
the Tribunal ruled that bona fide regulations, adopted in a non-discriminatory manner, 
aimed at the general welfare, would not be regarded as expropriation. 
 
Similarly, in Methanex Corporation –vs- United States339 the Tribunal held that non-
discriminatory regulations for a public purpose, if enacted with due process, will not 
amount to expropriation if it affects, amongst others, a foreign investor or investment, 
unless specific commitments have been given by the regulating government to the then 
                                                 
334Article 4(I) of the China-Djibouti BIT 
335Article 4(I) of the China-Uganda BIT 
336UNCTAD fn 223  p 44 
337Wandrag (2006) p 17. 
338Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) –vs- The Czech Republic Partial Award, March 17, 2006 
http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Saluka-CzechRep-Partial_Award.pdf . The summary of the 
case was extracted from Wandrag (2006) p 20. 
339Methanex Corporation v United States, Final Award, 9 August 2005. The summary of the case was 
extracted from Wandrag (2006) at p 20. 
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putative foreign investors contemplating investment that the government would refrain 
from such regulation. 
 
The above two cases demonstrate that Arbitral Tribunals are in support of the need of 
governments’ policy space.340 Despite this recognition, African states need to negotiate 
for “similar measures” or “any other measures having the effect of dispossession” to be 
expressly defined in the BITs. This is because there is no doctrine of precedents in 
international investment arbitration.341  
 
More recent investment agreements are defining the said terms. For example, the United 
States- Rwanda BIT (2008) offers the following definition of “measures equivalent to 
expropriation”: 
“The second situation addressed by Article 6(1) is indirect expropriation, where 
an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct 
expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure. 
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a 
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation requires a case-by 
case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: 
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action 
or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an 
investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred; 
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable 
investment-backed expectations; and 
(iii) the character of the government action. 
(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a 
Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare 
                                                 
340Wandrag (2006) p 17. 
341Yu (2008) 
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objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute 
indirect expropriations.”342 
 
Further, Article 4 (2) of both the Uganda and Djibouti BITs state that prompt 
compensation should be equivalent to the real value of the investment before the 
expropriation is taken or the impending expropriation becomes public knowledge, 
whichever is earlier. It however fails to provide for a valuation criteria to determine the 
said real value as well as incidences when compensation may be adjusted. Hence, an 
Arbitral Tribunal may decide to award “full compensation” which may include all future 
profits lost thus neutralising the economic and developmental objective behind the 
expropriation.343  
 
In light of the above, there is a need to balance the foreign investor’s desire to be fully 
compensated for its loss and the policy reasons behind the host state’s lawful 
expropriation, when determining the value of compensation.344 Most Tribunals have 
found the “going concern” (fair market value) approach as the best valuation method to 
strike such a balance.345 This method takes into account not only the net book value of 
the assets (both tangible and intangible) of the expropriated concern but also the 
goodwill, and future prospects and the ability to earn revenue346. It thus emphasises the 
real commercial prospects of the expropriated undertakings as the basis of calculating 
compensation.347 Therefore, where these prospects are shown to be poor the amount of 
compensation awarded is considerably discounted.348 This thus means that loss of future 
profits, per se, is not recoverable in the case of lawful compensation and the right to full 
restitution is not guaranteed in all circumstances.349 
 
                                                 
342United States-Rwanda BIT (2008) at in Annex B paragraph 4 
343Muchlinski P. 2ed(2007). Multinational Enterprises and the Law at pp 587-620 
344Ibid 
345Ibid 
346Mouri A. ( 1994) The international law of expropriation as reflected in the work of the Iran-U.S. claims 
tribunal at pp 420-430 
347Ibid 
348Ibid 
349Mouri (1994). See also Muchlinski (2007) 
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For example, in Amoco International Finance Corp. –vs- Iran350 the Tribunal rejected 
the net book value method of valuation proposed by Iran and instead adopted the going 
concern method that is based on the concept of legitimate expectations. This was also the 
position of the Tribunal in American International group –vs- Iran351. 
 
Moreover, the amount of compensation awarded can further be reduced by the amount of 
any direct state investment, state subsidy or aggravating conduct of the investor. 
 
The going concern valuation method and the adjustments to compensation have been 
adopted by recent International Investment Agreements. For example, Article 8(b) of the 
IISD Model Agreement states, inter alia, that:- 
 
“Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value 
including declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as 
appropriate, to determine fair market value. Compensation may be 
adjusted to reflect aggravating conduct by an investor or conduct that does 
not seek to mitigate damages.” 
 
In addition to the above, the BITs do not allow for burdensome compensation to be paid 
in instalments352 where interest will be at the rate established by agreement between the 
parties or by a competent Tribunal, as provided for in Article 20 (5) of the CCIA 
investment Agreement. The said Article states that: 
 
“On payment, compensation shall be freely transferable. Awards that are 
significantly burdensome on a host state may be paid yearly over a period 
agreed by the Parties, subject to interest at the rate established by 
agreement of the disputants or by a Tribunal.” 
 
                                                 
350Amaco International Finance Corp. –vs- Iran, 15 Iran-US CTR 189 (1987 II). Extracted from 
Muchlinski (2007) 
351American International Group –vs- Iran, 4 Iran-US CTR 96 (1985). Extracted from Muchlinski (2007) 
352For example, the IISD Model provides that burdensome compensation can be paid over a period of at 
least three years, or such other periods the parties may agree upon. 
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This clause is important because Uganda and Djibouti are both LDC’s353 and as such, in 
certain situations, may not be able to pay compensation promptly because of financial 
difficulties. 
 
2.6.8  Transfers 
Investors invest in foreign countries to make profits and repatriate them to the home 
state.354 Therefore, they require a guarantee that they shall not be prevented by the host 
state from doing so. 
 
Article 6 of the China-Djibouti BIT and China – Germany BIT as well as Article 7 of the 
China-Uganda BIT guarantee Chinese investors ( and vice-versa) that they will be able to 
transfer their investments and returns to their home states.355 The China-Djibouti BIT 
further subjects the said guarantee to its laws and regulations. 
 
Unlike the Djibouti BIT, the Uganda BIT has a Balance of Payment (BoP) exception 
which provides that the right of repatriation of profits may be temporarily restricted in: 
 
“...serious balance of payments difficulties and external financial 
difficulties or the threat thereof… provided that this restriction: i) shall be 
promptly notified to the other party; ii) shall be consistent with the articles 
of agreement with the International Monetary Fund; iii) shall be within an 
agreed period; iv) would be imposed in an equitable, non discriminatory 
and in good faith basis”356 
 
The “BoP exception” is important for situations in which the host country is experiencing 
extremely low levels of foreign currency reserves and thus finds it exceptionally difficult 
to convert and transfer funds related to investments.357 The provision therefore allows the 
                                                 
353UNCTAD ‘UNCTAD list of LDC’s. Available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3641andlang=1 (accessed on 30/3/09) 
354Sornarajah (1994) Chapter 6 
355The provision does not prevent the host state from the imposition of taxes or other normal government 
fees. This fact is further buttressed in Article 7 (4) of the China-Uganda BIT 
356Article 7 (4) of the China-Uganda BIT 
357Negotiators hand book of the IISD Model investment Agreement. Available at:  
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Ugandan government to manage all currency flows in the event of a BoP crisis without 
being in breach of the BIT. The omission of the provision in the Djibouti BIT is a mis-
engineering. 
 
Both BITs provide that the transfer shall be made in a “freely convertible currency and at 
the prevailing market rate of exchange applicable within the parties accepting the 
investments and on the date of transfer”.358 The said provision does not permit the parties 
to either use the currency in which the investment was originally made or agree on the 
convertible currency to use, hence, it is mis-engineered. The importance of framing the 
provision as such is that it provides the host state with some flexibility, since it is given 
the opportunity to agree with the investor on the currency to be used.359 In the absence of 
an agreement, transfers are effected in the currency in which the capital was originally 
invested.360 Moreover, the host state would not have to use its foreign exchange reserves 
to comply with the obligation if the capital was originally invested in domestic 
currency.361 
 
The transfer provision should not prevent parties from ensuring compliance with other 
measures relating to matters such as bankruptcy, trading in securities, criminal acts or 
compliance with resolutions of Tribunals.362 Both BITs do not provide for such specific 
exceptions to the transfer Article and are thus mis-engineered. 
Article 10(c) of the IISD Model Agreement is a good illustration of the specific exception 
provision for transfers. It provides that: 
“Notwithstanding Paragraphs (A) and (B), a Party may prevent a transfer 
through the equitable, non-discriminatory and good faith application of its 
laws relating to: 
i) bankruptcy, insolvency or the protection of the rights of creditors; 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.corporateaccountability.org/eng/documents/2005/june_2005_iisd_model_international_agreem
ent_on_investment_for_sustainable_development_negotiators_handbook_pdf_678_kb.pdf (accessed on 
30/3/09) 
358Article 6 (3) of the China-Djibouti BIT and Article 7(3) of the China Uganda BIT 
359UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 60 
360Ibid 
361Ibid 
362Negotiators handbook – IISD Model Agreement. See also UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 62 
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ii) issuing, trading or dealing in securities; 
iii) criminal or penal offences; 
iv) reports of transfers of currency or other monetary instruments; or 
v) ensuring the satisfaction of judgments in adjudicatory proceedings.” 
 
Both BITs do not address the issue of speculative capital inflows as they do not have a 
provision requiring all capital inflows to remain in the country for at least one year. This 
provision is important as it preserves the flexibility of host states to appropriately 
administer financial and monetary policies.363 
 
2.6.9 Performance requirement 
Generally FDI flows are expected to facilitate industrialisation and development of host 
countries by enabling them to tap the resources of MNEs, such as, production technology, 
organisational and managerial skills, marketing know-how, and marketing networks. 
Host countries also expect to benefit from knowledge spill-over and other favourable 
externalities from FDI.364 However, there is considerable variation in the ‘quality’ of FDI 
inflows and not all of them benefit host countries equally.365 Therefore, governments use 
performance requirements to improve the overall quality of FDI inflows.366 For example, 
they impose local content requirements on MNEs and/or their affiliates to intensify 
generation of local linkages; or impose export obligations in order to expand the 
contribution of FDI to the expansion of manufactured exports of the host state.367 
 
Developed countries extensively employed performance requirements in their process of 
development especially when they were net importers of capital. For example, in the 19th 
century, the US was a capital importing country and had restrictions on foreigners’ 
                                                 
363UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 62.  
364Kumar N. ‘Performance requirements as tools of development policy: 
Lessons from experiences of developed and developing countries for the WTO 
agenda on trade and investment’(2003)RIS discussion paper No. 52. Available at: 
http://www.ris.org.in/dp56_pap.pdf  (accessed on 31/3/09) 
365Ibid 
366Ibid 
367Ibid 
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ownership in agricultural land, mining, and logging.368 Furthermore, it discriminated 
against foreign firms in banking and insurance, prohibited foreign investment in coastal 
shipping, reserved the directorships of national banks for American citizens, deprived the 
foreign shareholders of voting rights in the case of federally-chartered banks, and 
prohibited the employment of foreign workers by foreign firms.369 Similarly, in the post-
World War II period Australia imposed 50 percent domestic ownership requirement in 
natural resource projects, and also employed offsets policy under which larger 
government contracts required new domestic activity of 30 percent of their import 
content.370 
 
The form of these performance requirements employed by developed countries in the 
1990s changed in favour of trade policy measures that achieve the same objectives but 
are consistent with the provisions of TRIMs. These include rules of origin371 to increase 
domestic value addition, voluntary export restraints and anti-dumping. 
 
Both BITs do not contain a performance requirement provision therefore the parties are 
free to use performance requirements measures as far as they are imposed as a condition 
for the establishment of the investment or applied afterwards on a non-discriminatory 
basis.372 However, because such measures are often applied on a case by case basis, 
conflicts with other rules, such as the National Treatment or MFN obligations, may 
occur.373 To avoid this situation, such measures should be expressly allowed in the BITs 
and exempted from being found in breach of the agreement through a provision deeming 
them to be in compliance.374 In effect, pre-establishment performance requirement 
                                                 
368Ibid 
369Ibid 
370Kumar ibid 
371Rules of origin determine the extent of domestic content a product must have to qualify as an internal 
product in a preferential trading agreement hence, they have the same effect as the local content 
requirements 
372UNCTAD (2007) f 223 p 65 
373Article 26 of the IISD Model Agreement 
374Commentary on Article 26 of the IISD Model Agreement contained in the negotiators handbook. 
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measures375 would be acceptable. Afterward, any performance requirement measure 
would be fully subject to the agreement.376 
Below is a sample performance requirement Article that should have been incorporated in 
both BITs. 
“(A) The Parties recognize their obligations regarding Trade Related 
Investment Measures established in other international agreements to 
which they are a Party. 
(B) Subject to Paragraph (A), host states may impose performance 
requirements to promote domestic development benefits from investments. 
Measures adopted prior to the completion of the host state measures 
prescribing the formalities for establishing an investment shall be deemed 
to be in compliance with this Agreement. If such measures are taken after 
the completion of the host state measures prescribing the formalities for 
establishing an investment, they shall be subject to the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
(C) Measures covered by this Article include requirements: 
i) to export a given level or percentage of goods or services; 
ii) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; 
iii) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services 
provided in its territory; 
iv) to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory; 
v) to relate the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of 
exports or to the amount of foreign exchange flows associated with such 
investment; 
                                                 
375They are performance requirement measures taken before all the formalities or requirements to establish 
an investment have been completed 
376The distinction between pre-establishment and post-establishment is important for fairness (for the 
investor) and policy space (for the host state) purposes. An investor needs to know all conditions before 
making the decision to invest. Performance requirements can impact, in a significant way, the economics of 
an investment. Therefore, to alter it after the fact would be to alter the decision underlying an investment, a 
decision usually taken in consultation with the host state. Hence, the subsequent shift in the economics of 
an investment towards other actors in the host state merits coverage by the Agreement in fairness to the 
investor and to balance the provision. 
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vi) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment 
produces by relating such sales to the volume or value of its exports or 
foreign exchange earnings; and 
vii) similar measures intended to promote domestic development.”377 
 
2.6.10 Umbrella clause 
This is provided for in Article 11 of the China-Uganda BIT and Article 10(2) of the 
Germany and Djibouti BITs. The Articles impose a requirement on each contracting 
party to observe all investment obligations entered into with investors from the other 
contracting state. This broad language enables the international arbitration Tribunal 
constituted under the BIT to exercise jurisdiction over claims concerning breaches of 
contract, agreement, license, permit etc, by a host state notwithstanding the fact that there 
is an exclusive forum selection clause in the contract.378 
 
It is inappropriate to grant to an international Dispute Settlement Body full jurisdiction to 
hear any type of complaint for breach of contract, or breach of a permit, etc. as a direct 
breach of an international agreement through the umbrella clause.379International 
arbitration is expensive for developing countries. Moreover, they have few lawyers 
trained in international arbitration and would thus be forced to hire lawyers from 
developed countries whose legal fees are extremely high. This makes total international 
arbitration costs beyond reach of many developing countries, especially LDC’s.  
 
The old generation Chinese BITs ,for example the UK-China BIT (1986), did not contain 
an umbrella clause since China, at that time, was reluctant to include it as it was 
essentially a capital importing state.380 Hence, the inclusion of this clause is a deliberate 
mis-engineering of the Uganda and Djibouti BIT by China. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
377Article 26 of the IISD Model Agreement 
378Negotiators handbook: IISD Model Agreement 
379Ibid 
380Schill (2007) 
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2.6.11 Minimum standard for environmental, labour and human rights protection 
 
An Article setting the minimum standards for environmental381, labour and human rights 
is missing in the three BITs. It is important to commit parties to the maintenance of the 
environment and other standards for example labour, public health and safety, and to 
prohibit them from reducing the said standards for purposes of attracting and maintaining 
investments. 
 
Such a provision is important for developing countries as it acts as a clear and strong 
prohibition against lowering standards, weakening or reducing domestic law on labour, 
environment and human rights in order to encourage investments; and protects African 
states from Chinese investors who might choose to waive or derogate from the said laws. 
As a result, a level playing field is maintained for states. It also prevents a potential “race 
to the bottom” in environmental or other standards.  
 
The provision, therefore, demands high level of domestic law in the said areas and also 
sets the minimum standards, through reference to international instruments such as the 
ILO (International Labour Organisation) declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights of Work, 1990, and international human rights agreements.382  
 
This provision is common in recent US BITs. For example, Article 12 and 13 of the US-
Rwanda BIT contains such a provision. 
 
2.7.12 Anti-corruption 
Corruption is a major obstacle for economic growth. It hinders economic development by 
reducing domestic investment, discouraging FDI, encouraging overspending in 
government, and distorting the composition of government spending away from 
                                                 
381There is also a notable absence of environmental issues in the China Africa policy discussed earlier. This 
shows that China is not committed to sustainable use of the environment. African states hence must insist 
for environment provisions to be included in BITs 
382An Article similar to Article 22 and 32 of the IISD Model Agreement 
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education, health, and the maintenance of infrastructure, towards less efficient public 
projects that have more scope for manipulation and bribe-taking opportunities.383  
 
The BITs do not contain an anti-corruption Article prohibiting the parties from offering, 
soliciting or promising gifts of any pecuniary or other nature, whether directly or through 
intermediaries, to any public official of the other party and making such acts (including 
incitement, aiding and abetting, conspiracy to commit such acts) criminal offences 
subject to appropriate criminal enforcement and sanctions under domestic law.384 
Such a clause is important for the two developing African states as it would ensure that 
parties to the BIT do not engage in corrupt activities, as such activities hinder economic 
growth and sustainable development. 
 
The IISD model BIT contains appropriate anti-corruption Articles. Article 13 prohibits 
investors from bribing public officials of host state or engaging in other corruption 
activities in order obtain contracts, permits, licenses or other rights in relation to an 
investment. While Article 22 and 32 requires host and home states, respectively, to make 
bribery and corruption criminal offences in their states subject to appropriate criminal 
enforcement sanctions. 
 
2.7.13 Top managerial personnel 
Host countries may use compulsory legislation to ensure the participation of their 
nationals in the management or control of foreign investments.385 This is justified on 
national security grounds and for purposes of ensuring that their nationals receive 
technical training and managerial experience from foreign investments.386  
 
Host states should thus be allowed to require that a majority of the board of directors, or 
any committee of an investment, be of a particular nationality, or be resident in the 
territory of the host country (as opposed to requiring that an investment appoint to senior 
                                                 
383Wei S. ‘Corruption in economic development: Beneficial grease, minor annoyance or major obstacle?’ 
(1998). World Bank development research group Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/wei.pdf (accessed on 31/3/09) at pp 24 
384Negotiators handbook: IISD Model Agreement 
385UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 72 
386Ibid 
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management positions individuals of any particular nationality), provided that the 
requirement does not materially impair the ability of the investor to exercise control over 
its investment.387 
 
Article 9 (1) and (2) of the US-Rwanda (2008) BIT contains such a provision. It states: 
“1. Neither Party may require that an enterprise of that Party that is a 
covered investment appoint to senior management positions natural 
persons of any particular nationality. 
2. A Party may require that a majority of the board of directors or any 
committee thereof, of an enterprise of that Party that is a covered 
investment, be of a particular nationality, or resident in the territory of the 
Party, provided that the requirement does not materially impair the ability 
of the investor to exercise control over its investment.” 
 
Such a provision is lacking in the three BITs. The inclusion of the said provision is 
important as it assures investors that they will be able to have the management officers 
they wish to manage the investment, with an exception. The exception allows host states 
to ensure a minimal level of representation on the Board for purposes of national security 
and obtaining technical training and managerial experience.388 This contributes to 
sustainable development of the host developing states through transfer of managerial 
skills. 
 
2.7.14 Dispute resolution 
Disputes are an inevitable occurrence in many international commercial transactions as 
the contracting parties have different commercial and legal expectations, cultural 
approaches and political ramification.389 When they arise and cannot be resolved through 
diplomatic channels and negotiations, they will need to be resolved in accordance with a 
legal process. This process should have the confidence of the parties or at least be in a 
                                                 
387See Article 9 of the IISD Model Agreement 
388See commentaries on Article 9 of the Negotiators handbook-IISD Model Agreement 
389Mistelis L. ‘ International arbitration: Trends and challenges’. (2007). Available at: 
www.adrmeda.org/romeconference07/materials/Arbitration%20-%20Trends%20and%20Challenges.pdf 
(accessed on 31/3/09) 
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forum that is acceptable to the parties. In such circumstances, parties to a BIT frequently 
prefer to use arbitration as a private, independent and neutral system. 
 
In Article 9 (Settlement of dispute between contracting parties) of the China-Uganda 
BIT, the parties agreed to first resolve the dispute through diplomatic channels. If they 
fail to settle the dispute within three months, the dispute may be submitted to an ad hoc 
joint committee consisting of the representatives of the two parties or to ad hoc 
arbitration.390In the event that the joint committee also fails to settle the matter within six 
months, the parties may refer the dispute to an ad hoc arbitration Tribunal. In such a 
situation, one party informs the other of its intention to refer the dispute to arbitration. 
Each party then appoints an arbitrator within two months from the date of the said 
notification. Within two months of appointment, the two arbitrators must select a national 
of a third State having diplomatic relations with both parties to be Chairman of the 
Arbitral Tribunal. If the aforesaid time limits have not been complied with, either party 
may request the President of the International Court of Justice to make the necessary 
appointment(s). The Arbitral Tribunal determines its own rules and its decision is final 
and binding on the parties. 
 
Article 8 of the China –Djibouti BIT and the China- Germany BIT are similar to the 
above Article of the Uganda BIT except that the dispute is referred straight to the ad hoc 
Tribunal, if parties fail to settle the dispute within six months through diplomatic 
channels, as opposed to submitting it first to a joint committee. 
 
Article 8 (Settlement of disputes between an investor and a contracting party) of the 
China-Uganda BIT provides that any dispute arising between an investor of one 
contracting party and the other contracting party shall as far as possible be settled 
amicably through negotiations. If it is not settled within six months, it shall be submitted, 
by the choice of the investor, to either the competent court of the other contracting party 
or to ICSID. However, the contracting party to the dispute may require the investor to go 
through domestic administrative review procedure specified by the laws and regulations 
                                                 
390The joint committee is set up by the parties and comprises of relevant experts. The procedures of the 
committee are decided by both parties. 
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of that contracting party before submission of the dispute to ICSID. The choice that the 
investor takes shall be deemed final. The arbitration award shall be based on the law of 
the contracting party to the dispute including its rules on the conflict of law. The award 
shall be final and binding. Both parties shall commit themselves to its enforcement and 
shall each bear its costs for its appointed arbitrator and legal representation. However, the 
cost of appointment of Chairman and the Tribunal shall be shared equally between the 
parties. 
 
The above Article is similar to Article 9 of the China-Djibouti BIT and the China-
Germany BIT except that the investor in the Djibouti and Germany BIT has a choice 
between ICSID and an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal as opposed to ICSID and the courts of 
the contacting party to the dispute.  
 
For sustainable development purposes, the Uganda and Djibouti BITs are mis-engineered 
as they relieve the investor of the obligation to exhaust local remedies, as a condition for 
submitting a dispute to international arbitration. The Article should require parties to first 
attempt to settle the dispute locally. Only if a resolution has not been reached within a 
certain period of time should the claim be allowed to be submitted to international 
arbitration. This is important for host states as it reduces the cost of dispute resolution 
substantially.391 
 
The BITs do not address a number of issues such as the procedures to apply when 
submitting a notice of intent for arbitration, how to prevent the same dispute from being 
simultaneously taken up in more than one legal forum, specification of the place of 
arbitration, measures for interim injunctive relief and preliminary objections.392 This is 
important for purposes of increasing predictability and control over the execution of 
arbitration procedures.393Article 28 of the US-Rwanda BIT and Annex A Article 7 of the 
CCIA contain such a provision. 
 
                                                 
391See Article 12 of the Belgium–Luxembourg and Botswana BIT of 2003 
392UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 120 
393UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 120 
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Moreover, the BITs do not contain a control mechanism as they do not provide for the 
possibility for specialised authorities of the contracting parties to interpret certain matters 
or provisions of the agreement, which shall be binding for the arbitral Tribunal. For 
example, Article 21 of the BIT between the United States and Rwanda (2008) provides: 
 
“ […] 
3. Article 6 [Expropriation] shall apply to all taxation measures, except 
that a claimant that asserts that a taxation measure involves an 
expropriation may submit a claim to arbitration under Section B [investor-
State dispute settlement] only if: 
(a) the claimant has first referred to the competent tax authorities of both 
Parties in writing the issue of whether that taxation measure involves an 
expropriation; and 
(b) within 180 days after the date of such referral, the competent tax 
authorities of both Parties fail to agree that the taxation measure is not an 
expropriation.” 394 
 
This provision allows the competent tax authorities of both contracting parties to decide 
whether a particular taxation measure is in fact an expropriation. If the authorities agree 
that this is not the case, the investor is prevented from submitting a claim under the 
investor–State dispute settlement provisions. This mechanism aims at ensuring that 
technical matters or provisions of the BIT are interpreted by specialised authorities of the 
host state. Thus, such decisions are not primarily left to the Arbitral Tribunals hence 
promoting fairness.395 
 
A slightly similar provision is found in Annex A Article 10 of the CCIA which states:  
 
“A Tribunal, at the request of a disputing party or on its own initiative, 
may appoint one or more experts to report to it in writing on any factual 
                                                 
394Text in brackets added 
395UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 120 
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issue concerning environmental, health, safety or other matters raised in a 
proceeding. The Tribunal shall consider any terms or conditions relating to 
such appointments that the disputing parties may suggest.” 
 
The BITs do not contain a procedure to avoid frivolous claims in investment related 
disputes, i.e. claims that evidently lack a sound legal basis.396 Such a procedure entails an 
Arbitration Tribunal addressing and deciding, as a preliminary question, any objection by 
the other party that, as a matter of law, the claim is not one for which an award in favour 
of the claimant may be made. Inclusion of such a procedure is important to prevent 
Chinese investors from abusing the system397consequently wasting time, effort, fees and 
other costs, not only for the defendant contracting party, but also for the Arbitral 
Tribunal.398 Article 28 of the US-Rwanda (2008) BIT contains such a provision. 
 
The BITs also fail to provide for transparency in Arbitral proceedings. Such a provision 
allows open hearings, availability of Arbitral documents (for example the notice of 
intention to arbitrate, the settlement of any dispute, the intention of a panel or appeal, the 
pleadings, evidence and the decisions) to the public and amicus curiae submissions . The 
inclusion of such provisions helps to open disputes under the BIT to public review 
thereby safeguarding public interest. Moreover, it helps African states know the 
consequences of certain domestic policies to the terms of the BITs and as such they are 
able to amend their policies appropriately to avoid costly claims by foreign investors. 
This provision is common in recent BITs for example Article 19 of the Norwegian draft 
model BIT, Annex A Article 9 of the CCIA, and Article 29 of the US-Rwanda BIT. 
 
Finally, both BITs do not provide for the consolidation of claims. That is, providing for 
the “joinder” of claims having a common question of law or fact in, and/or arising out of 
the same events or circumstances. This helps foster judicial economy and avoids 
                                                 
396UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 121 
397The system is abused when Chinese investors think that the greater the number of claims, the better the 
chance of having the Arbitral Tribunal adjudicating at least one in their favour. See UNCTAD (2007) fn 
223 p 121  
398UNCTAD (2007) fn 223 p 121 
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inconsistent results.399Annex A Article 11 of the CCIA and Article 33 of the US-Rwanda 
BIT are examples of such a provision.  
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The above analysis of the Uganda, Djibouti and Germany BITs with China has shown 
that their provisions are similar. Moreover, it has demonstrated, first, that the Germany-
China BIT is balanced as it protects German foreign investors in China while at the same 
time protecting Chinese investors in Germany. Secondly, that the Djibouti and Uganda 
BITs with China are mis-engineered as they broadly protect Chinese investors without 
adequately addressing the development goals of Uganda and Djibouti. 
 
Moreover, the analysis of the BITs has identified several elements of mis-engineering. 
These elements have obliterated the sovereign ability of both Uganda and Djibouti to 
formulate investment policies that are in tandem with their development needs hence 
leading to unequal returns to investment. These unequal returns include, inter alia, 
insufficient transfer of technology, technical and managerial skills; violation of human 
and labour rights; unsustainable use of the environment; over exploitation of natural 
resources; and condoning and promotion of corrupt activities leading to diversion of 
benefits of FDI from the state etc. 
 
Although BITs cannot promote investment in and of themselves, it is imperative that they 
are well drafted. This is because they can help to create a favourable legal environment 
that reduces the level of real and perceived risks for the investors, while at the same time 
give developing countries sufficient policy space. It is impossible to come up with a 
perfect BIT that will adequately cover the concerns of both host and home states. 
However a balance can be struck, through negotiations and compromise, which will 
ensure both parties substantially benefit. African states thus need to approach BIT 
negotiations strategically with a model that is consistent with the goals and requirements 
of economic development. Unfortunately, African states have weak bargaining power in 
negotiating BITs and therefore the possibility of reaching such a balance is unfeasible.  
                                                 
399UNCTAD (2007) fn 223  p 123 
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The next chapter examines how Africa’s weak bargaining power in negotiating BITs has 
contributed to the mis-engineering of the BITs and the resultant unequal returns to 
investments.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE POWER FACTOR: OF WEAK BARGAINING POWER 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A state’s power is a reflection of its aggregate resources.400 Therefore, national power is 
determined by a state’s capabilities, which in turn determine the position of a state in 
relation to other states in international relations.401 It thus follows that in bilateral 
negotiations states with more aggregate resources will prevail as they can use their 
superior resources402 to coax weaker states into making more concessions through threats 
and promises.403The effect is that outcomes of bilateral negotiations are likely to 
represent the interests of the more powerful state, and are therefore predetermined. This 
is buttressed by the existence of model bilateral treaties that leave room for only minor 
changes on a case by case basis.404  
 
In light of the above, this chapter will examine the sources of China’s strong bargaining 
power, the reasons for African states’ weak bargaining power and the contribution of this 
power asymmetry in the legal mis-engineering of China BITs with African states hence 
the resultant unequal returns on investment. 
 
3.2 BARGAINING POWER405DISPARITY 
The dependency theory406 predicts that developing host states are in a permanently 
weaker bargaining position in relation to BITs because of the unequal conditions of trade 
and investments in the international economy, and because of the willingness of the local 
                                                 
400Resources in this context mean economic strength, military capabilities, technological development, 
stability of the political system and administrative capacity. See Tallberg J. ‘Bargaining power in the 
European Council’. (2007). Swedish Institute of European Policy Study (SIEPS). Available at: 
www.statsvet.su.se/publikationer/tallberg/tallberg_sieps_final_2007.pdf (accessed on 5/4/09) 
401Tallberg (2007) p 16 
402These resources have to be issue specific resource. Therefore, in this case it will be market power, skills, 
technology and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
403Tallberg (2007). 
404Jean Monnet (2004) See also Albin C. (2001) Justice and fairness in international negotiation. 
405Bargaining power is the ability of negotiators to exert influence over each other, win accommodations 
from the other and to influence an outcome of a negotiation. See Hicks B. et al. (1997) Cooperative 
strategies: Asian Pacific perspectives. 
406Kebonang (2006). 
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ruling elites to submit to the interests of foreign capital.407  Hence, even though African 
states have the power to control access to their home markets and natural resources, 408 it 
is usually surpassed by the superior advantage409 of China (i.e. the ability to offer foreign 
capital; managerial and technological know-how and; opportunities for 
commercialization and industrial development) arising from variation of the said 
resources.410  
 
For example, Moran411 undertook a study of the US copper companies and the Chilean 
state and found that since Chile needed technology and investments for new mining 
venture in the copper industries, the bargaining power of the US copper companies 
increased.412 Moreover, he established that after nationalisation the Chilean copper 
industry remained vulnerable to pressure from US by means of an embargo on spares and 
technology.413 Consequently, he concluded that host states are usually in a weaker 
bargaining position in situations whereby their economies and industries are not mature 
and as such require new technologies and investments from foreign investors.414  
 
Similarly, in the 1970’s, the UK government was constrained in its bargaining with 
Chrysler Corporation over the latter’s investment in the Linwood car manufacturing plant 
in Scotland, because it wanted to attract employment opportunities as the region  had a 
high unemployment rate.415 
 
                                                 
407Muchlinski (2007) p 117-118 
408The access includes investment opportunities, internal markets, labour supplies, raw materials and other 
sources that China desires. See Jeffry F. and David L (2000) 4th Ed. International political economy: 
perspectives on global power and wealth at pp 156 
409Which is China’s ability to provide FDI to African States. 
410Jeffry(2000). See also Bennett C. and Sharpe E. ‘Agenda setting and bargaining power: The Mexican 
state versus transnational automobile corporations’. (Oct., 1979)32. World Politics pp 57-89 .Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010082 (accessed: 05/04/2009) 
411Muchlinski (2007) pp 104-107 cross referencing Moran T. (1974) Multinational Corporations and the 
politics of dependence: Copper in Chile 
412Ibid 
413Ibid 
414Ibid 
415Muchlinski (2007) pp 61-80 cross referencing Hood N. and Young S. (1982) Multinationals in retreat: 
the Scotish experience. 
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Consequently, China is able to negotiate BITs that meet its national interests without 
necessarily meeting the development needs of the African states and thus gaining 
disproportionately. This explains why even though Djibouti and Uganda have the ability 
to control access to their markets and resources, they desperately need China’s 
investments for transfer of technology and managerial skills, industrialization and 
commercial development. Therefore, they concede to unfavourable provisions during 
BIT negotiations.  For instance, there are no exceptions to National Treatment standard 
contained in Article 3(2) of the Djibouti and Uganda BITs with China such as the right to 
treat domestic and Chinese investors differently so that struggling domestic industries are 
able to compete with external and foreign investors and so bringing about a degree of 
operative equality.416 Similarly, Article 4 of the said BITs defines expropriation broadly. 
As a result, every measure substantially impairing the value of an investment could be 
challenged as an expropriation even though it is a routine regulatory act or an act 
undertaken for public welfare.417This gives Chinese investors broad protection at the 
expense of the policy space of African states.  
 
Host states are usually aware of the effects of certain provisions in a BIT on its policy 
space but they nevertheless concede to their inclusion because of their weaker bargaining 
position.418Therefore, depending on its extent and exercise, bargaining power undermines 
the voluntary nature of transactions and thereby affects the capacity of the weaker party 
to act on objective judgment of utility.419 
The discussion above identifies six sources of China’s strong bargaining power in 
bilateral investment negotiations.  
 
3.2.1 Advanced Technology and technology transfer capabilities 
Technology includes knowledge and methods that are necessary to carry on or to improve 
the existing production and distribution of goods and services as well as entrepreneurial 
                                                 
416See Chapter 2.5.4 and UNCTAD (1999) fn 281 
417See Chapter 2.5.6 
418Muchlinski (2007) pp 117-118 
419Drahos P. ‘When the weak bargain with the strong: Negotiations in the WTO’. (2003)8. International 
Negotiation at pp 34. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=418480 (accessed 
on 5/4/09) 
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expertise and professional know-how.420 Technology transfer, on the other hand, is the 
process through which commercial technology is disseminated.421 It involves the 
successful learning of information by one party from another party, and the effective 
application of that information in generating marketable products and services.422 Once 
technology is transferred, it raises awareness of its existence, thereby creating a 
‘demonstration effect’ and possible ‘spill-over’ to local firms in the course of time.423 
Technology is therefore a powerful tool for combating poverty through its contribution to 
sustained economic growth, enhanced market efficiency, and creation of employment 
opportunities.424 
 
The emergence and the development of the Chilean salmon industry and Chinese 
economic success are good examples of the important role of technology transfer in 
industrial development. Technology transfer enabled Chile to build a globally 
competitive and innovative salmon industry within two decades, hence making it the 
second largest salmon producer in the world.425 Moreover, the industry is Chile’s main 
export sector thus contributes significantly to regional development. 426 
 
Between 1974427 and the early 1980s, Chile’s salmon industry exported mainly frozen 
tailless and beheaded salmon that were easier to process, store and transport.428 FDI 
played a marginal role in the early development phases of the industry. However, the 
                                                 
420Santikarn M. (1981) Technology Transfer at pp 3-6.  
UNCTAD distinguishes between hard technology i.e. equipment, industrial processes and soft technology 
i.e. knowledge, information, expertise, organizational skills, management, marketing and technical know-
how. See UNCTAD World Investment Report 2004 at p 132. 
421Muchlinski (2007) p 430. 
422UNCTAD  ‘Report of the expert meeting on international arrangements for transfer of technology: Best 
practices for access to and measures to encourage transfer of technology with a view to capacity-building in 
developing countries, especially in least developed countries’. (2001). Ref: TD/B/COM.2/EM.9/3. 
Available at: http://unctad.org/en/docs/c2em9d3.en.pdf . 
423Muchlinski (2007) p 430. 
424UNCTAD ‘The role of science and technology in the achievement of the MDGs’. (2004). Ref: 
TD(XI)/BP/4. 
425UNCTAD ‘Transfer of technology for successful integration into the global economy: A case study of 
the salmon industry in Chile’ (2006).Available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit200512_en.pdf 
(accessed on 25/4/09) at pp 21-26. 
426Ibid 
427This is when the first major firm to farm salmon, Domsea Farms Chile, owned by the US firm Union 
Carbide, started operation. 
428UNCTAD (2006) fn 425 pp 21-26 
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good performance and success of the industry attracted many foreign firms seeking to 
expand salmon production or provide inputs and support services.429 Thus, in the mid 
1980s, mergers with foreign firms and joint ventures commenced. The entry of large 
firms into the Chilean salmon industry facilitated the introduction of new technologies 
and practices, such as, automated feeding and fish-counting systems. Moreover, it 
facilitated expansion of production and export of value-added products as the industry 
acquired and developed technologies for processing and packaging various fish products. 
This led to vertical integration and the increase of the average size of firms. This led to a 
rise in employment opportunities. Total employment by the sector increased almost 
threefold between 1992 (10,200 workers) and 2002 (40,500 workers). In 2004, the 
number rose to 45,000 workers.430 
 
China, on the other hand, has been the largest host country of FDI as a developing 
economy since 1993. Major firms like Microsoft, Intel, General Motors (GM), Honda and 
Motorola, Siemens, Nortel and Volkswagen established their production bases in China 
in order to take advantage of the differences in production, communication and labour 
costs, as well as personnel pool and large domestic market size.431 These firms generated 
technology spill-over effects when developing and producing new products through the 
provision of technical assistance to supporting enterprises for meeting new technology 
requirements; staff training ;and provision of a manufacturing base to domestic firms for 
developing new products. 432As a result, by the end of 1990, Chinese private enterprises 
(e.g. Huawei, ZTE, TCL etc) developed and became leading technology providers. In 
addition, because of joint ventures, its automobile industry grew tremendously, leading to 
transfer of technology, managerial, and technical expertise. This enabled some domestic 
private enterprises to eventually come up with new car models without establishing joint 
                                                 
429Ibid 
430Ibid 
431China has sophisticated technological infrastructure as well as cheap labour and well educated workers 
especially in engineering and science thus has been very attractive to developed country’s MNEs. See 
Muchlinski (2007) at p 435 and Theodore M. et al. (2005) Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote 
Development? at pp 327-331 
432Ibid  
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ventures with foreign firms.433 Thus, China utilised FDI inflow to transform its traditional 
industries through advanced and applicable technology.434  
The industrial, mining, transport and agricultural sector of many African countries are 
hampered by poor infrastructure, obsolete technology and a lack of technological 
capacity to innovate.435 Hence, in the current knowledge-based global economy, transfer 
of technology and technological capability building is critical for purposes of economic 
growth, as demonstrated above.436  
For example, the Namibia's marine resources are among the richest in the world as its 
nutrient rich Benguela source currently produces numerous commercially important 
species of fish and shellfish.437 Many opportunities thus exist in value addition activities, 
mariculture and freshwater (aquaculture) fisheries. However, Mara Zaire, manager of 
Namibia Investment Centre, stated that they are at present unable to effectively and 
efficiently utilise the marine resource since they do not have the know-how and 
market.438 Consequently, they desperately need the Chinese to avail to them the same.439  
China is aware that African states easily absorb technology imported from 
technologically advanced developing countries more easily than technology imported 
from developed countries; hence China is very attractive to African States.440 This has 
thus tremendously increased its bargaining power in bilateral investment negotiations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
433Ibid   
434Deng Z. et al. ‘Swapping market access for technology? An assessment of China’s preferential foreign 
direct investment policies’. Available at: 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/News_and_Events/event_reports/IFCCS_Conference_Nov_08/abstracts/
Ziliang_Deng.pdf (accessed on 7/4/09). See also Theodore M.  et al. (2005)  Does Foreign Direct 
Investment Promote Development? at pp 327-331 
435Muchlinski P (2007) 
436UNCTAD (2001) fn 422 p 6. 
437Namibia Investment Centre. Speech of the Manager, Mara Zaire (8/9/2008). Available at: 
http://www.chinafair.org.cn/English/News/230570.html (accessed on 5/5/09). 
438Ibid 
439Ibid 
440Muchlinski (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 88
3.2.2 Investment as a resource 
Investment as a resource, in this context, means the ability of China to provide African 
states with export market access, foreign capital, technical and managerial skills.  
 
3.2.2.1 Market access 
Accelerating the growth of exports has become a priority for the governments of many 
African countries.441 This drive for export promotion is triggered, firstly, by the debt 
crisis that has led to the pressure to increase exports in order to finance imports and 
interest payments on external debt.442 Secondly, the realisation that exports can help gain 
some measure of growth in the face of stagnant domestic demand.443 Lastly, the 
successful experience of countries that followed an export-oriented growth policy.444 
 
These governments thus see FDI from China through MNEs as a way of doing this. The 
MNEs would bring the necessary technology to produce products of export quality; the 
skills and attitude to ensure delivery, quality and dependability necessary for export 
marketing; and knowledge of and direct access to the world’s largest markets.445  
Moreover, China has a huge domestic market. This is attributed to the rapid economic 
growth that it has experienced in the last two decades.446 For example, in 2007, its 
economy grew by 13% up from 9.2% in 2003.447Such growth needs resources to fuel it. 
Since China does not have sufficient resources domestically, it buys from around the 
                                                 
441UNCTAD ‘Formulation and implementation of foreign investment policies: Selected key issues’ (1992) 
Available at: http://unctc.unctad.org/data/e92iia21a.pdf (accessed on 5/5/09) at p 24. 
442Ibid 
443Ibid  
444For example, China was able to increase its export performance from USD 18 billion in 1980 to USD 
593 billion in 2004. This was as a result of substantial rise in FDI inflows from almost zero to USD 61 
billion in the same period, with the accumulated FDI being as much as USD 560 billion by the end of 
2004.See Zang K. ‘How does FDI affect a host country’s export performance? The case of China’ 
Available at: http://faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/confer/xian05/papers/zhang.pdf (accessed on 6/4/09).  
445UNCTAD (1992) fn 441p 24 
446Hurst (2006) China’s oil rush in Africa.  
447China’s growth slowed down in 2008 because of the global financial crises. See Keliher M. ‘Replacing 
US in Asian export market’ (2004) Asian Times Online of 11/2/04. Available at: 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/china/FB11Ad01.html (accessed on 7/5/09). See also Bristow M. ‘China’s 
economic growth’ (2009) BBC News of 22/1/09. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7843947.stm (accessed on 7/5/09). 
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globe.448 For instance, 38% of China’s imports are resource goods which include 
agricultural products, chemicals, minerals, metals and textiles, which African states are 
endowed with.449African States are eager to gain access to this market in order to increase 
their exports. For example Rajesh Jeeta, Mauritius Minister of Industry, Small and 
Medium Industries, Commerce and Cooperatives stated in an interview that "Mauritius 
has strong economic ties with China. China remains one of our major trading 
partners…..with robust growth being registered and rising standard of living, the 
Chinese market is expanding and becoming more sophisticated. While Mauritius 
obviously cannot match the clout of China, it can certainly raise and diversify its exports 
to this growing market. I hope that this event will also provide some insight into ways 
and means to increase exports to China…"450 
In light of the above, China has high bargaining power in bilateral negotiations because 
of the said eagerness of African states to access the world market, and the Chinese 
market, in particular.  
 
3.2.2.2 Foreign capital 
An undeveloped financial sector as well as the history of macroeconomic instability and 
high inflation characterizing a number of African States has contributed to a savings gap, 
with domestic savings lower than domestic investments.451 The Harrod-Domar growth 
model postulates that there is a direct relationship between a country’s saving rate and its 
rate of economic growth.452 Hence, countries should strive to fill the saving-investment 
gap so as to achieve economic growth.453 
 
                                                 
448Keliher (2004) 
449Ibid 
450Xinhua ‘More Chinese enterprises eye investment in Africa’. (2008) China Daily. Available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-09/09/content_7009143.htm (accessed on 8/5/09). 
451 Krkoska L. ‘Foreign direct investment financing of capital formation in central and eastern Europe’. 
(2001). European Bank for Reconstruction and Development working paper No. 67.Available at: 
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/wp0067.pdf ( accessed on 5/4/09) at pp 2-5. 
452Sen H. ‘Different arguments for and against the role and impact of foreign investment on the 
development potentials of developing countries: An overview’ (1998)13 Journal of Economics and 
Administrative Sciences Dokuz Eylul University at pp 181-190. Available at: 
www.geocities.com/ceteris_paribus_tr2/h_sen12.pdf (accessed on 5/4/09). 
453Ibid 
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FDI is an important source of capital financing that would contribute to filling the 
aforesaid gap.454 In Singapore, for instance, FDI made important contributions in filling 
the gap between domestic savings and investment. In 1960 the share of gross domestic 
savings was equal to -3 % of GDP.455It increased to 20 % of GDP in 1970 and 33% of 
GDP in 1981. With the contribution of FDI, the share of investment reached 42 % of 
GDP in 1981 which was the highest rate in the world at that time.456 
 
Moreover, privatisation related FDI inflows would help to finance the fiscal deficit where 
the need for large infrastructural spending and generous welfare programmes are 
inconsistent with budget revenue constraints, including inefficient tax administration.457 
Further, it would cover the often large current account deficits caused by the inflow of 
consumer and investment goods which are not produced domestically.458 Although FDI is 
not the only source of financing for either the fiscal deficit or the current account deficit, 
its nature of being a stable long term capital inflow makes it preferable to short term 
flows or debt financing so as to avoid an increase in macroeconomic instability.459 
 
China is one of the major sources of Africa’s foreign capital.460 In 2008, China’s 
outbound FDI was USD 139.3 billion, a substantial amount of which was invested mainly 
in Africa and Asia. For instance, between January and June 2008, it invested an estimated 
USD 305 million in Africa.461 China’s ability to provide foreign capital to African states 
gives it bargaining leverage in bilateral negotiations. African states would be willing to 
compromise in order to ensure a BIT that will pave the way for the needed foreign capital 
is concluded. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
454Ibid 
455Ibid 
456Ibid 
457Krkoska (2001) 
458Ibid 
459Ibid 
460The other major sources being Taiwan, India and South Africa. See Gelb (2006) p 201 
461Xinhua (2008) fn 450 
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3.2.2.3 Employment and human resource development 
Africa is experiencing massive unemployment and underemployment.462 For example, in 
2006, North Africa had the highest unemployment rate in the world while Sub-Saharan 
Africa's was second.463 Most urban unemployment in African countries takes the form of 
underemployment.464 It arises when people undertake any available economic activity, 
however poorly paid and unproductive, because of lack of social-safety nets as well as 
alternatives in the form of unemployment insurance or job training for formal sector 
work.465 In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, the urban informal sector466 is estimated to 
employ more than 60 per cent of the urban labour force at extremely low incomes.467 
 
Since urbanisation is irreversible, urban ‘decent employment’468  is the key to solving the 
problems faced by cities,469 hence promoting economic growth.470 Prerequisites for 
creating decent employment include structurally transforming the economies of African 
countries through labour intensive technologies.471 This can be achieved through foreign 
investment, in the private sector, by MNEs that use labour intensive technologies, 
particularly those that require unskilled labour. This would increase employment both 
directly and indirectly.472  
 
                                                 
462ILO ‘Global employment trends 2007’. (2007)Available at: 
www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Press_releases/lang--
en/WCMS_081866/index.htm (accessed on 5/4/09) 
46312.2% and 9.8% respectively. See ILO (2007) fn 462 
464Ibid  
465Ibid 
466The urban informal sector includes such activities as small-scale peddling, petty services or work in 
unregistered factories. 
467Ibid 
468Decent employment is an integrative concept that refers to both quality and quantity of labour. Decent 
employment should be productive and secure work, ensure respect of labour rights, provide an adequate 
income, offer social protection and include social dialogue, union freedom, collective bargaining and 
participation. 
469The problems faced by cities include overcrowding, hunger, disease, crime and malnutrition. 
470As pointed out by Mr. Samir Radwan, a senior economist of the ILO. See ILO ‘Unemployment threatens 
world cities’. (1996).  Available at: http://www.uneca.org/ERA2005/full.pdf (accessed on 4/4/09) 
471Economic Commission for Africa ‘Economic report on Africa (2005): Meeting the challenges of 
unemployment and poverty in Africa’. Available at : www.uneca.org/era2005/overview.pdf (accessed on 
4/4/09) at p 78 
472Ibid  
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Moreover, MNEs would assist human resource development by introducing new 
technology and training of its employees in the requisite skills. This would raise the 
number of skilled labourers who can be employed in the formal sector and MNEs that use 
capital intensive technologies. Similarly, if the MNEs enter into joint ventures with local 
firms, managerial skills would be transferred to the locals.473 
 
China is home to many MNEs that can bring FDI into Africa, thus providing African 
states with access to its domestic market, the export market, the much needed foreign 
capital as well as employment opportunities, technical and managerial skills. This 
therefore raises China’s bargaining position in bilateral negotiations and it is thus able to 
impose its interests on African States. 
 
3.2.3 China’s commercial intelligence network 
Commercial intelligence networks are networks that gather, distribute and analyse 
information relating to a state’s trade, investments, economic and business performance 
as well as those of other states.474 Included in the network are state’s investment 
promotion agencies, centres and bureaus, its business organisations (for example, a 
national chamber of commerce), as well as individual corporations.475 The more 
integrated the network, in terms of information sharing and analysis, the more effective a 
country is likely to be in bilateral investment negotiations.476  
 
China has developed sophisticated networks over time. For example, it currently has the 
China Council for International Investment Promotion (CCIIP) whose major task is to 
ensure that China’s economic strategies are adequately addressed in its investment 
relations with other states.477CCIIP is at the apex of an elaborate consultative structure 
that involves more than twenty investment promotion centres, bureaus, and agencies 
around the country; foreign investment consulting companies and; several members from 
                                                 
473Employment is increased indirectly by providing backward and forward linkages and by influencing 
employment in competing firms. See Sen (1998). 
474Drahos (2003) p 7.  
475Ibid 
476Drahos (2003) 
477CCIIP website. http://www.cciip.org.cn/english/index.htm (accessed on 5/4/09) 
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the private sector.478 Moreover, it liaises with international organizations such as the 
World Bank, World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA), United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO), Investment Climate Advisory Service (FIAS) and 
the Africa Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).479 
 
CCIIP facilitates Chinese enterprises investing overseas by cooperating with relevant 
chambers of commerce, trade associations, investment promotion agencies and economic 
societies, at home and abroad, thereby serving as a platform for information exchanges 
on trade and investment.480  
 
The information obtained from CCIP can be used by the government during bilateral 
investment negotiations to enable its negotiators enter into informed and persuasive 
dialogue with African states’ negotiators.481  
 
3.2.4 Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) 
With regard to international negotiations, BATNA is the superlative, real and actionable 
option that can be undertaken by a state party to a negotiation if the current negotiations 
fail and an agreement cannot be reached.482Hence, BATNAs define the minimum 
conditions for an agreement as well as enhance the ability to "walk away”.483 They give 
states bargaining power, since,  the better a state’s BATNA appears both to it and to the 
other state, the more credible their threat to walk away.484 Moreover, its negotiators can 
adopt a more firm and forceful stance when proposing ideas and interests as the basis for 
an agreement; they are unlikely to be subjected to internal pressure to make an agreement 
for the mere reason that they are unaware of what would happen should the negotiation 
                                                 
478Ibid 
479Ibid 
480Ibid 
481Information has been established to be one of the key assets for a BIT negotiation team. See Sunshine R. 
(1990) Negotiating for international development: a practitioner's handbook at p 93. 
482Venter D. ‘BATNA explained’. Negotiation skills training academy news letter. Available at: 
http://www.negotiationtraining.com.au/articles/next-best-option/ (accessed on 5/5/09). 
483Sebenius J. and Lax D. ‘The art of getting the best deal’. Financial Times , 28/9/2008. Available at: 
http://www.people.hbs.edu/jsebenius/FT/The_Art_of_Getting-Part_1.html (accessed on 5/5/09). 
484Fisher R. and Ury W. (1983). Getting to yes: Negotiating without giving in at p 111.  
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fail; and they are not committed to reach an agreement because they are uninformed of 
alternatives outside the negotiation.485  
 
It is important for state negotiators to be familiar with the other party’s BATNA in order 
to know whether they are desperate for an agreement. This will enable them make a 
decision between demanding for more and making additional concessions, as they will be 
aware of up to what point the other party will stay at the bargaining table.486 
 
Chinese international negotiators are well trained and aware of both their BATNA as well 
as that of the other party.487 Furthermore, they put in a lot of time to research their 
options in order to ensure good decision making and negotiation outcome.488 African 
negotiators, on the other hand, arrive at the bargaining table ill prepared.489 This therefore 
gives China a bargaining leverage. 
 
3.1.5 Unconditional aid 
Aid is referred to as official development assistance (ODA)490 in the international arena. 
ODA originated from the success of the Marshall Plan, the largest and most successful 
aid package in history, in which USD 13 billion was spent after World War II by the US 
for the reconstruction of the infrastructure, policies and governance processes of a 
                                                 
485Ibid. See also Spangler B. ‘Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)’. (2003). Beyond 
Intractability Organisation. Available at: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/batna/ (accessed on 
5/4/09) 
486Ibid  
487See discussion on Chinese commercial intelligence network above. 
488Ibid 
489This under-preparation is attributed to the fact that negotiators of African countries are over-extended 
and as such have inadequate time to prepare. See Sunshine (1990) chapter 3 p 95 
490“According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, official aid or ODA refers to 
“… grants and loans to developing countries and territories which are: (i) undertaken by the official sector 
of the donor country; (ii) with the promotion of economic development and welfare in the recipient country 
as the main objective; and (iii) at concessional financial terms (i.e. if a loan has a grant element of at least 
25 per cent)”. This generally accepted definition excludes concessional flows of private voluntary 
organizations and official flows with little or no concessionality. Grants, soft loans and credits for military 
purposes are also excluded. However, there are difficulties with this definition, and some analysts include 
non-concessional loans from the World Bank in ODA, while others include IMF loans whether 
concessional or not. Most analysts, however, often ignore the fine distinctions between the various 
forms of financial flow to developing countries.” UNCTAD ‘Doubling aid: Making the big push 
work’.(2006) at pp 14. Available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsafrica20061_en.pdf (accessed on 
10/4/09). 
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devastated Europe.491 It was accompanied by conditionalities.492 Every country benefiting 
from US assistance had to sign a bilateral agreement binding it to balance budgets; 
restore financial stability and stabilise exchange rates at realistic levels; and set aside 
counterpart funds from government budgets and put them at the disposal of the US 
administrators to underwrite further investment. 493 
 
Aid is a highly effective tool in raising economic growth in good macroeconomic policy 
environments, provided it is “for an extended period, rather than as an exceptional 
financing item”.494 In African states, it is used to fill budget deficits, finance 
infrastructural projects and as a source of capital financing that would contribute to filling 
the savings-investment gap.495 In 2007, net ODA to Africa from developed countries 
amounted to USD 38.7 billion. Developed countries still attach conditionalities to ODA 
in the form of (unlike in the Marshall plan) democratic reforms; market opening; and 
human rights and environmental protection.496  
Even though Africa is a major recipient of ODA497, it has criticised the use of 
conditionalities on the premise that it undermines the domestic democratic processes by 
supplanting public policymaking, thereby transferring sovereignty.498 Hence, the policies 
imposed are not formulated and decided upon (“owned”) by the Africans. Thus, 
                                                 
491Rich R. ‘Applying conditionality to development assistance’. (2004)11. Agenda at pp 321-334 quoting 
Sanjana J. ‘The Marshall plan and its implications for development assistance today’. (2000). Hemispheres, 
The Tufts University Journal of International Affairs.  
492Conditionality is defined as "a mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or promises to take, 
certain policy actions, in support of which an international financial institution or other agency will 
provide specified amounts of financial assistance" Killick T. ‘Aid and the political economy of policy 
change’. (1998). Overseas Development Institute, London at pp 6. 
493Rich (2004) quoting Hogan M. ‘American Marshall planners and the search for a European neo-
capitalism’. (1985) 90. The American Historical Review at pp 44–72. 
494Lum T et al. ‘Comparing global influence: China’s and U.S. diplomacy, foreign aid, trade, and 
investment in the developing world’. (2008). Paper prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
for the members and committees of Congress. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34620.pdf 
(accessed on 10/4/09) at p 40. 
495Sen (1998). 
496Rich (2004). 
497In 2007, net ODA to Africa amounted to USD 38.7 billion, representing 37% of total aid. See OECD 
‘Aid targets slipping out of reach?’(2007) at p 3. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/25/41724314.pdf (accessed on 10/4/09)  
498Santiso C. and Paul H. ‘World Bank and good governance: Good governance and aid effectiveness’. 
(2001)7.  The Georgetown Public Policy Review. 
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governments may agree to start the proposed reforms simply to obtain conditional 
resources, and then later abandon them.499 
China has recently become economically strong enough to significantly increase its 
presence as a donor of ODA to Africa.500 Its ODA takes a different form to that of 
developed countries as it consists of interest-free or concessional501 loans (of up to 41%) 
rather than grants (which constitute only 3%); infrastructure financing mainly of 
challenging trade and investment projects that aid donors from developed countries have 
avoided because of technical difficulties or hardships; and debt forgiveness. 502 The most 
important characteristic of China’s ODA to African states is that it is unconditional, 
except for the one China policy.503  
 
More than 35 African countries are engaging with China on infrastructure finance deals 
mainly in hydropower generation and railways.504 The finance is channelled primarily 
through the China Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank on terms that are marginally 
concessional.505 In some cases, infrastructure finance is packaged with natural resource 
development.506 That is, repayment of the loan for infrastructure development is made in 
terms of natural resources (for example, oil). This arrangement is mainly used by the 
                                                 
499Harsch E. ‘Making Aid more effective’ Available at: 
www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vo113no2/28_29eca.htm (accessed o 10/4/09) 
500Lonnqvist L. ‘China’s aid in Africa: implications for civil society’. (2008).International NGO Training 
and Research Centre(INTRAC) policy briefing paper 17. 
501Concessional loans are loans provided to developing countries with lower interest rates and longer 
repayment periods than typical or standard market or multilateral loans, i.e. less than market interest rates 
and extended grace period (also known as a soft loan). Grants have no repayment obligations but are tied to 
projects. Concessional loans are better than grants (provided they are given in good policy environments) 
as they  can provide more funds. See http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/glossary/item.shtml?x=344934 
(accessed on 10/4/09) and Koeda J. ‘Grants or concessional loans? Aid to low income countries with a 
participation constraint’. (2004). University of California, Los Angeles (UNCLA) job market paper. 
Available at: http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/workshops/macro/macropaper04/koeda_revised.pdf 
(accessed on 11/4/09) 
502Lum (2008).  
503China’s policy of “non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs” has won Africa’s support 
because it is regarded as respectful of their countries’ sovereignty. See Lum (2008) and Chapter 2 of this 
thesis.  
504Foster V et al ‘Building bridges: China’s growing role as infrastructure financier for Sub-Saharan 
Africa’. (2008). World Bank publication. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/BB_Final_Exec_summary_English_July08_W
o-Embg.pdf (accessed on 6/5/09) at p 3 
505Foster (2008)  p 7 
506This is usually referred to as “Angola mode” or “resources for infrastructure”. 
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China Ex-Im Bank for countries that cannot provide adequate financial guarantees to 
back their loan commitments. For example, in 2004, China Ex-Im Bank agreed to give 
Angola a very substantial line of concessional credit to enable the government to repair 
infrastructure damaged in the country’s 27-year civil war.507 So far, the government of 
Angola has drawn three instalments totalling USD 4 billion from this credit line.508 The 
first instalment, for USD 2 billion, is known to have been backed by 10,000 barrels per 
day of oil exports.509 
 
China’s engagement in Ethiopia amounts to a total of USD 1.6 billion.510 The main focus 
has been on the ICT sector, particularly the Ethiopia Millennium Project to create a fiber-
optic transmission backbone across the country and roll out the expansion of the GSM 
network.511 Most of these were financed under export seller’s credit arrangements with 
the Chinese telecommunications operator ZTE, for the supply of equipment to the 
Ethiopian national telecommunications incumbent.512 
 
In Sudan, China has financed close to USD 1.3 billion of infrastructure projects, 
including the development of more than 2,200 MW of thermal generating capacity, the 
1,250-MW Merowe hydropower scheme, and a number of other significant investments 
in the rail, road, and water sectors.513 
 
In light of the above, Chinese finance is, on a scale, large enough to make a material 
contribution toward a state’s infrastructure needs. This gives it a bargaining niche in 
bilateral negotiations. Moreover, in bilateral negotiations, China is known to offer 
infrastructure finance projects as part of a package to win much larger commercial 
projects from a host country, which typically involve large-size acquisition of natural 
resources related assets by Chinese enterprises.514 
                                                 
507Foster (2008) p 4 
508Ibid 
509Ibid 
510Foster (2008) p 5 
511Ibid 
512Ibid 
513Ibid 
514OECD ‘China’s outward direct investment’. (2008). OECD investment policy review. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/11/41792683.pdf (accessed on 6/5/09) at p 91.  
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 3.2.6 Competition: A race to the bottom 
China receives a substantial amount of inward FDI from developed countries. For 
example, its stock of inward FDI in 2007 was USD 758 billion.515 As a result its 
industrial structure has been moving up the value chain, while its exports have shifted 
toward more high-tech products.516 For this reason, China has been forced to shift low-
tech and labour-intensive manufacturing to secondary locations in western inland 
provinces and foreign countries.517 Its MNEs have therefore been investing in developing 
countries to replicate their low tech and labour intensive production model that produces 
low value added goods. The MNEs select countries where their said model fits in well 
with the endowment pattern as well as the stage of economic development, in order to be 
relatively easy to transplant.518 For example, Chinese companies are currently investing 
in the lucrative textile industry of Egypt, the foot wear industry in Nigeria, batteries in 
Mozambique and ethyl alcohol in Benin. 519  
 
Although the said Chinese MNEs employ labour intensive technology, it is slightly more 
advanced than for the host developing state. In addition, their international marketing 
system is better and their managerial skills more sophisticated than for the host 
developing states.520  
 
In light of the above, China provides African states with capital, technology and 
management skills to tap.521 In addition, their technology is easily adaptable and more 
suited for developing countries. As a result, African states compete amongst themselves 
to get a pie of market share and foreign capital from China.522 Increased competition for 
investments cause African countries to lower (or retain poor) human rights, labour and 
environmental standards as well as relax their policies and regulations in order to attract 
                                                 
515Ibid 
516Ibid 
517Ibid 
518Ibid 
519Zou (2009) and Brautigam (2007). 
520OECD (2008) fn 514 
521Parthapratim (2008) 
522Ibid. 
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foreign capital. 523 This creates a real risk of ‘racing to the bottom’.524 Moreover, it causes 
African countries not to demand for changes in core provisions of the model BITs. 
Consequently, China gets an opportunity to impose terms that are more favourable to 
them.525 For example, the Djibouti and Uganda BITs with China give the Chinese 
investors broad protection and thereby limits the policy space of African countries 
considerably. 
 
From the above analysis it is readily understandable why China has strong bargaining 
power and African states comparatively weak bargaining power in bilateral negotiations 
and therefore contributing to the legal mis-engineering of the BITs and the resultant 
unequal returns on investment.  
 
3.3  IMPROVING BARGAINING POSITION 
African states can improve their bargaining position through adequate preparation by the 
negotiators, diversification from export of primary commodities, value addition and 
grouping.  
 
3.3.1 Preparation 
A BIT negotiating team’s asset is information.526 That is, being clear about what the goals 
and purpose of the negotiation is; having an excellent grasp of technical issues; having a 
strategic plan and a BATNA; and having details about the other party’s negotiating 
culture and the likely effect when the two cultures interact at the bargaining table, their 
                                                 
523World Bank ‘Is globalization causing a “race to the bottom” in environmental standards?’ (2001). 
Available at: www.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/documents/AssessingGlobalizationP4.pdf  
(accessed on 9/4/09. See also Ikiara M. ‘Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), technology transfer and poverty 
alleviation: Africa’s hopes and dilemma’. (2003). Special series No. 16. African Technology Policy Studies 
Network (ATPS) paper. Available at: http://www.atpsnet.org/pubs/specialpaper/SPS%2016.pdf (accessed 
on 11/4/09). 
524"Race to the bottom" arises when states compete with each other as each tries to underbid the others by 
lowering taxes, spending, regulation etc so as to make itself more attractive to outside financial interests or 
unattractive to unwanted outsiders. See Schram F. (2000) After welfare: The culture of post-industrial 
social policy  at p. 91. 
525Elkins (2004) 
526Sunshine (1990) p 93 
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goals and their BATNAs. This information can be acquired through carrying out 
adequate research and consultations with experts, technical advisors and/or specialists.527 
 
The major component of preparation that is highly underestimated by African country 
negotiators is the impact of cultural diversity.528 Cultural values529 generate a cultural 
perspective530 which in turn helps shape a negotiating style.531 Our society’s customs are 
conveyed to us at childhood by family and teachers until we internalise them and make 
them our own.532 As a result, habits for doing things and assumptions about how things 
ought to be done are formed. Our perceptions then become selective, as over time, we 
filter out sensory data inconsistent with our cultural perspectives hence, giving rise to 
preconceptions and pre-dispositions.533 
 
People from the same country tend to develop and share a distinctive negotiation 
approach and style because of their national cultural perspective. This style affects 
decision making behaviour, including goal-setting and strategising during negotiation 
preparations. Knowing the other party’s cultural tendencies in advance gives international 
development negotiators distinct and tactical advantages, as they are able to establish 
possible areas of complementarities and synergies and therefore can capitalise on them.534  
 
With regard to strategic planning, it is important for negotiators to formulate a 
negotiating plan, that is, what the country wants to achieve from the bilateral 
negotiations. Coming up with a model BIT is a good way of doing this. The International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) came up with a model BIT as well as a 
                                                 
527Ibid  
528Ibid  
529Cultural value is the society’s basic beliefs, norms, standard of conduct and customs. See  Sunshine 
(1990) 
530Cultural perspective is the viewpoint or lens for looking at and interacting with the world. See Sunshine 
(1990) 
531Sunshine (1990) p 27 
532Sunshine (1990) pp 29-30 
533Sunshine (1990) pp 29 -30 
534Berton P et al. (1999) International negotiation: Actors, structure/process, values at p 29 
 
 
 
 
 101
negotiators handbook that African country bilateral investment negotiators could use to 
guide them in coming up with their strategic plans.535 
 
The risks of negotiating with inadequate information are grave. At a minimum, they 
include being taken by surprise by an unanticipated question or assertion of the other 
party, missing a window of opportunity or falling for unfounded threats and promises 
hence making ill-considered concession.536 
 
Preparation is often the weakest component of negotiation performance for African 
country negotiators, relative to their industrialised country counterparts.537 Frequently, 
African country negotiators arrive at the bargaining table ill-prepared and therefore 
curtail their ability to make reasoned persuasion.538 In light of the above, African 
countries need to take negotiation preparations very seriously in order to improve their 
bargaining power. 
 
3.3.2 Diversification and value addition 
Many African countries are highly dependent on primary commodities such as 
agriculture (coffee, tea, cocoa, fisheries), natural resource extraction (diamonds, copper, 
iron, steel, aluminium), oil, natural gas and coal for export earnings.539 For example, 
diamonds is Botswana’s main export commodity. Botswana became a significant 
diamond producer after 1982 when a major mine was opened. Income from diamond 
mining, both in the form of taxes and dividends, accounts for about half of government 
revenues.540 Similarly, Nigeria is predominantly dependent on petroleum and cocoa; 95% 
                                                 
535They are both available at the IISD website : http://www.iisd.org 
536Sunshine (1990) at p 95 
537Ibid  
538Ibid  
539South Centre ‘Dependency of developing countries on non-agricultural commodities: Characteristic and 
challenges’ (2005) ref: SC/TADP/AN/COM/2 at p 4. Also see UNCTAD  ‘Diversification of production 
and exports in commodity dependent countries, including single commodity exporters for industrialisation 
and development taking into account the special needs of LDCs’. (2002). Ref: TD/B/COM 1/EM.18/2. at p 
3. 
540UNCTAD (2002) fn 539 p 7 
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of Ugandan exports consist of coffee; and 95% of Zambian exports consist of copper and 
zinc.541 
 
The world prices of primary commodities are highly volatile; consequently, dependency 
on primary commodities makes African countries vulnerable to booms and crashes in the 
world market prices resulting in severe microeconomic and macroeconomic shocks.542 
Heavy dependence on the export of very few primary commodities due to lack of 
diversification, makes them even more vulnerable.543 This constrains their ability to attain 
a path of stable and sustained growth and employment creation that could benefit all 
segments of their population.544 For example, Burundi is dependent on the export of 
coffee and tea to an extent of 87%.545 Between 1986 and 1987, the prices of coffee and 
tea fell by 37% and 20% respectively.546 As a result Burundi’s annual exports fell from 
USD 154 millions to only USD 90 millions - a decline of almost 40%.547 In 1988, with a 
marginal improvement of 7% in coffee prices, coupled with an increased volume of 
exports, total exports rebounded to USD 132 million.548 However, they contracted 
drastically again in 1989 to USD 78 million only due to a 20% fall in coffee prices.549 In 
2003, after a passage of more than 15 years, Burundi’s total exports were only USD 37 
million.550 The surge in export prices had a double effect on investment, through 
increased financial resources due to export receipts and improved access to international 
capital markets.551 However, when export prices collapsed, no positive structural change 
                                                 
541Parimal J. ‘Rethinking policy options for export earnings’. (2006). South Centre research paper No. 5 at 
p 11. Available at: 
www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_docmanandtask=doc_downloadandgid=125andItemid= 
(accessed on 11/4/09) 
542Collier P. ‘Primary commodity dependence and Africa’s future’. (2002). World Bank at p 2. Available 
at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTABCDEWASHINGTON2002/Resources/Collier-full.pdf 
(accessed on 11/4/09). See also Parimal (2006) p 19 
543Parimal (2006) p 13 
544Collier (2002). 
545Parimal (2006) p 7 
546Ibid 
547Ibid 
548 bid 
549Ibid 
550Ibid 
551Berthelemy J. and Soderling L. ‘The role of capital accumulation, adjustment and structural change for 
economic take-off: Empirical evidence from African growth episodes’. OECD (1999) working paper 150 at 
p 27. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/63/1921696.pdf (accessed on 11/4/09. 
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had taken place to cushion the economy hence leading to deterioration of export gains.552 
This state of affairs is common with most African states.553 The inability to seize the 
opportunity to grow could be partly because booms tend to lure African governments into 
unsustainable increases in expenditures and they therefore find themselves locked into 
them when revenue falls again.554 Furthermore, African governments have less technical 
economic expertise to deal with such situations for the benefit of the economy.555 
 
Since unstable markets cannot provide a reliable indication of the relative profitability of 
investments in primary commodities sectors because of high volatility, risk-averse 
investors become hesitant to invest.556Chinese investors are however known to undertake 
investments in countries with macroeconomic instability; political instability; weak 
institutions; high rate of reversibility of policies and; high risk of expropriation by 
state.557 For example, there is a civil and religious war in Sudan between the government 
and its own people in the south of the country.558 Notwithstanding, China is still investing 
heavily in the oil industry through its main state owned company, China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).559 Similarly, it has invested in the mineral rich DR 
Congo despite its current unstable economy.560  
 
In the event that China decides to invest in an African country that has unstable market 
due to dependency on export of primary commodities, their bargaining niche in bilateral 
negotiations rises. Consequently, for African states to improve their bargaining position, 
they need to diversify by commencing trade in services, tourism, low skill manufacturing, 
and production of new types of commodities such as “off-season” and “specialty fresh 
                                                 
552Berthelemy (1999) p 27 and 28 
553South Africa and possibly Tunisia are probably the only African countries not affected by export booms 
and crashes. See Berthelemy (1999) p 28 
554Collier (2002) p3 
555Collier (2002) p 5 
556Parimal (2006) p 19 
557Lonnqvist (2008) p 6. 
N.B Africa was ranked the riskiest continent by the institution investor risk rating. See Berthelemy (1999) p 
27. 
558‘Petrochina,CNPC and Sudan: Perpetuating genocide’, (2008). Report prepared by the Sudan Divestment 
Task Force. 
559Ibid 
560Vandaele J. ‘Development: China outdoes Europeans in Congo’. (2008). IPS News. Available at: 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=41125 (accessed on 5/5/09). 
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vegetables” or cut flowers. Moreover, diversification can be achieved through value 
addition to export commodities in the agricultural, mineral, oil and natural gas sectors 
through resource based manufacturing and commodity processing.561 All the above is 
possible through effectively and efficiently utilising financial resources obtained from 
windfall gains as a consequence of export booms, domestic savings and ODA. This can 
be achieved through investing as well as addressing domestic constraints to export 
development, for example, government policy constraints,562 financial market 
constraints,563poor infrastructure and administrative constraints,564and limited trading 
knowledge565. 
 
This has been successful in some countries, for example Mauritius and Kenya. In the past 
three decades, Mauritius was dependent on export of sugar but has recently managed to 
develop a thriving export oriented manufacturing sector.566 Furthermore, it is investing in 
Madagascar’s clothing sector. Kenya on the other hand diversified away from traditional 
commodities (i.e. tea and coffee) to processed products (such as preserved fruit and fish 
products) and the production of new types of niche products (such as “off-season” and 
“Specialty fresh vegetables” or cut flowers).567 It is now the largest African cut-flower 
grower and one of the biggest exporters of fresh horticultural produce.568 Diversification 
helped the two countries reduce risks associated with price swings and develop new areas 
of competitive advantage hence improving their bargaining power in bilateral 
negotiations.569 
 
 
 
                                                 
561Bonaglia F. and Fukasaku K. ‘Export diversification in low-income countries: An international challenge 
after Doha’. OECD (2003). Working paper No. 209 at p 16. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/28/8322001.PDF (accessed on 12/4/09) 
562For example, the anti-export bias due to exchange rate misalignment and taxes on international trade. See 
Bonaglia (2003) p 20 
563For example, limited provision of export credit and insurance. See Bonaglia (2003) p 20 
564For example, high transport costs. See Bonaglia (2003) p 20 
565For example, lack of information on foreign market structure, contact making and marketing. See 
Bonaglia (2003)  p 20  
566Bonaglia (2003) p 16 
567Bonaglia (2003) p 21 
568Ibid 
569Bonaglia (2003) p 16 
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3.3.3 Negotiating as an economic bloc 
During the struggle for political independence, many African countries acknowledged 
continental unity and regional co-operation as a strategy for combating foreign 
dependence and underdevelopment.570 In post colonial Africa, states participated in 
regional economic groups for political, economic and social interests.571 Most African 
countries are members of at least one of the existing regional integration arrangements on 
the continent. 
 
The major regional integration arrangements in Africa are Central Africa Monetary and 
Economic Community (CEMAC), East Africa Community (EAC), South African 
Customs Union (SACU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
 
The EAC is the regional intergovernmental organisation of the Republics of Kenya, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda.572 There is currently a fully operational customs 
union which incorporates important elements of integration stages, such as, working 
cross-border movement instruments like the East African passport, harmonized 
macroeconomic policies, convertible currencies and a working capital market with cross-
listing of stocks among others.573. The members jointly decided to form a common 
market before 2010 to further their political, economic, social and cultural integration.574 
When fully formed, the EAC common market will be a regional integration bloc with a 
combined population of approximately 90 million people and a total GDP of more than 
USD 30 billion.575 This deeper integration through creation of a single market and 
investment area means a larger domestic market; hence economies of scale, large 
investment area as a result of enlarged market, more attractive investment location for 
                                                 
570Adetula V. ‘Regional integration in Africa: Prospect for closer co-operation between West, East and 
Southern Africa’. (2004). Paper presented at the meeting of IDASA/FREDSKORPSET Research Exchange 
Programme-Governance and Democracy at Johannesburg, South Africa on 2/5/2004. 
571Ibid  
572See the EAC website. http://www.eac.int/ (accessed on 14/4/09) 
573M.A consulting group. ‘ Study of the establishment of an East African Community common market.’ 
Available at: http://www.eac.int/ ( accessed on 14/4/09) 
574Ibid 
575Anonymous ‘The benefits of the East Africa Federation to the youth’. Available at: 
http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=751 (accessed on 14/4/09) 
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both domestic and foreign investors, increased competitiveness, and a market more 
amenable to effective participation in the global economy and diversification. This 
therefore increases their bargaining power in bilateral investment negotiations. Moreover, 
the members will be able to negotiate as a trade bloc and would thus achieve a degree of 
bargaining power in bilateral and multilateral forums.  
 
In light of the foregoing, there is need for African states to deepen regional integration in 
order to improve their bargaining power in bilateral negotiations. 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
The Afro-Chinese BITs are mis-engineered because of bargaining power disparity. 
African states have weak bargaining power and are therefore not able to negotiate BITs 
that meet their development needs. As a result, Africa ends up getting unequal returns on 
the Chinese investments. 
 
Africa needs to improve its bargaining power through proper preparation for the 
negotiations, diversification from export of primary commodities, value addition to its 
products of export and deepening regional integration. This will ensure that the parties 
ratify a balanced BIT; they equally benefit from the relationship; and that Africa fully 
taps the benefits of South-South co-operation hence achieve increased economic growth. 
 
However, even with a balanced BIT, equal return on investment is not guaranteed. This is 
because of the corruptible and elite serving institutions characterising many African 
states.  
 
Chapter four discusses how BITs operating in an environment of rigid and corrupt 
institutions contributes to the unequal returns on investment. 
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CHAPTER 4: UNEQUAL RETURNS ON INVESTMENT IN THE CONTEXT 
OF WEAK STATE INSTITUTIONS AND INSTABILITY IN HOST 
STATES 
 
"I would suggest that the rate at which countries grow is substantially determined by 
three things: their ability to integrate with the global economy through trade and 
investment; their capacity to maintain sustainable government finances and sound 
money; and their ability to put in place an institutional environment in which contracts 
can be enforced and property rights can be established. I would challenge anyone to 
identify a country that has done all three of these things and has not grown at a 
substantial rate." Larry Summers (2003)576 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Institutions and government policies that make up the economic environment within 
which individuals and firms make investments; create and transfer ideas; and produce 
goods and services, are known to determine a country's long-run economic 
performance.577  
 
North defines institutions as a set of formal rules and informal conventions that provide 
the framework for human interaction and shape the incentives of members of society.578 
The World Bank, on the other hand, defines institutions as formal (constitution, laws, 
regulations, contracts, internal procedures of specific organizations) or informal (trust, 
values, customs and norms) rules that shape the behaviour of organizations and 
individuals in a society, including the rule of law.579 
                                                 
576Summer L. ‘Globalisation and American interests’. (2003). Available at: 
http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/04.10/17-godkin.html (accessed on 16/4/09). Delivered during a 
public lecture on April 7th 2003.  Professor Larry Summer is former president of Harvard University, 
former Secretary of the Treasury under the Clinton Administration, former Chief Economist of the World 
Bank, and currently lectures Economics, public policy and international affairs 
577Hall R. and Jones C. “Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?” 
(1999)114. The Quarterly Journal of Economics pp. 83–116. Available at: 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~chad/pon400.pdf (accessed on 16/4/09). 
578North D (1990) Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance at  p 3.  
579Burki S. and Perry G. ‘Beyond the Washington consensus: Institutions matter’. (1998). The World Bank. 
Available at: 
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From North’s perspective, “good” institutions are viewed as establishing an incentive 
structure that reduces uncertainty and promotes efficiency hence contributing to stronger 
sustainable economic performance.580 This is so because they ensure two desirable 
outcomes: that there is relatively equal access to economic opportunity (a “level playing 
field”), and that those who provide labour and capital are appropriately rewarded and 
their property rights are protected.581 Institutional quality is therefore important for a state 
to obtain equal returns on FDI. 
 
This chapter will examine weak institutions characterising most African states and state 
instability and how they have contributed to the unequal returns on the Chinese 
investments. 
 
4.2 AFRICA’S WEAK INSTITUTIONS 
A weak institution is one that, inter alia, does not: observe the rule of law; secure 
property rights; enforce contracts; have an even handed and transparent government; and 
have quality regulations.582 This adversely impacts on a country’s ability to engage in 
mutually beneficial trade and investments.583  
 
For example, institutional weaknesses in Ghana caused severe economic instability to the 
country despite the fact that it is endowed with natural resources (gold and timber) and 
good agricultural land (plants cocoa).584 Ghana was the first British colony in Africa to 
become independent in 1957 and at that time it had the same level of GDP per capita as 
                                                                                                                                                 
www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1998/11/17/000178830_9811170
3552694/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf (accessed on 6/5/09) at  pp 11 and 12 
580North (1990) pp 3 and 4  
581World Economic Outlook, ‘Growth and institutions’. (2003). Available at : 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/pdf/chapter3.pdf (accessed on 16/4/09) at chapter 3 pp 96 
and 97 
582Tiffin A. ‘Ukraine: The cost of weak institutions’. (2006). IMF working paper ref: WP/06/167 at pp 5 
and 6. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=920259 (accessed on 16/4/09). 
583Tiffin (2006) p 6 
584Acemoglu D. et al. ‘Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: Volatility, crises and growth.’ 
(2003)50 Journal of monetary economics at pp 49-123. Available at: 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~jrobins/researchpapers/publishedpapers/jr_JMEpublishedversion.pdf 
(accessed on 16/4/09). 
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South Korea.585 However, in 1998 its GDP per capita had just about recovered to where it 
was at independence.586  
 
This was because the first post-independent government of Ghana headed by Kwame 
Nkurumah introduced a range of distortionary policies.587 For instance, it used the state’s 
cocoa marketing board and exchange rate policy to systematically expropriate the cocoa 
farmers who dominated the economy and exports.588 The rents obtained were 
redistributed to the urban and ethnic interests which supported the then ruling party (the 
Convention People’s Party (CPP)). Moreover, the role of the state was reduced to that of 
dispenser of patronage hence leading to the construction of a non efficient bureaucratic 
government.589 These distortionary policies did not stop when Nkrumah was ousted in 
1966.590  
 
The effects of these policies were severe for the Ghanaian economy more so because the 
institutions did not place constraints over the behaviour of the political elites.591 As a 
result, Nkrumah and the then ruling party were able to build a one-party state, use the 
bureaucracy and economic policies for patronage and engage in mass corruption.592 The 
high political stakes that resulted made it very attractive to be in power and induced 
intense political instability, as evidenced by the very frequent coups the country 
experienced.593 Political instability translated into economic instability. Moreover, 
economic relations could not be sustained and therefore investors preferred to invest in 
sectors or activities where they could withdraw their capital more quickly, thus affecting 
the country’s ability to engage in mutually beneficial investments.594 
                                                 
585Acemoglu (2003) p 62 
586It’s GDP per capita was USD 390 in 1998 compared to that of South Korea which was USD 8600. See 
Johnson S. et a.l ‘An African success story: Botswana’. (2001). Massachusets Institute of Technology, 
department of economics working paper 01-37 at p 41 table 2 
587Acemoglu (2003) p 62 
588Acemoglu (2003) 64 and 64 
589Johnson (2001) pp 31 and 32 
590Acemoglu (2003) p 66 
591Acemoglu (2003) p 63 and 64. See also Johnson(2001) pp 31 and 32 
592Acemoglu (2003) p 63 and 64 
593Ghana experienced military coups in 1966, 1972, 1978, 1979 and 1982 and re-democratisations in 1969, 
1979 and 1996. Ibid p 62 
594Acemoglu (2003) p 64 
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In 1981, Lt. Jerry Rawlings took over power, after several coups, and ruled till the year 
2000. During his regime, the government co-ordinated with the World Bank and 
launched a stringent economic recovery program aimed at re-opening infrastructural 
bottlenecks and reviving productive sectors such as agriculture, mining, and timber.595 
During the reforms, capacity building efforts for management of aid and other 
development matters was concentrated on producing a few trained persons without much 
regard for strong government institutions leading to stagnation on globalisation.596 On 
realising the effect of this move on investments and the economy, a civil service reform 
programme was launched in 1987 by the Provisional National Defence Council as a 
component of the Structural Adjustment Programme.597 However, the programme had 
serious shortcomings, for example, it was crafted as a technical instrument by 
‘consultants’ and mission experts and imposed top-down with little local participation 
and ownership; the office of the head of the civil service was the main focus of the 
reform enterprise rather than the civil service as a whole; the programme lacked an 
effective machinery to ensure evaluation and follow-up actions; and donor deadlines, 
time tables and funding arrangements created imbalances.598 
The Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme (CSPIP) was therefore 
introduced to address the above deficiencies.599 It got technical and financial assistance 
from the World Bank and the United Kingdom Department for International 
Development (DFID).600 Moreover, the government introduced a National Institutional 
                                                 
595This program is what is usually referred to as the Structural Adjustment Program. See Carlsson J. et al. 
(1997) Foreign aid in Africa: learning from country experiences. See also Hustaedt E. and Chau Q. ‘Public 
service human resource development in international cooperation: A general perspective’. (2007). 
Conference paper for the PSC International Human Resource conference of 19-20th April 2007. Available 
at: www.ipma-hr.org/pdf/sa/20GTZ-OPSCconferencepaperdonorsupport.doc  (accessed on 5/5/09). 
596Ibid  
597Adei S. and Danquah Y. ‘The civil service performance improvement programme (CSPIP) in Ghana: 
Lessons of experience’. (2002). Paper presented at the 24th AAPAM annual roundtable conference on the 
African public service in the 21st century-New initiatives in performance management held in Lesotho. 
Available at: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/AAPAM/UNPAN031852.pdf 
(accessed on 5/5/09). 
598Ibid 
599Ibid 
600Analoui K. and Agyekum D. ‘Public sector reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: What can be learnt from the 
Civil Service Performance Improvement Programme in Ghana?’ (2008). Public Administration and 
Development. Available at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/121422256/PDFSTART 
(accessed on 7/5/09). 
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Renewal Programme (NIRP)601 to undertake thorough, deep-seated institutional renewal 
and capacity building throughout the public sector in order to meet its vision 2020.602  
In addition to the above institutional reform efforts, the government of Ghana, in May 
2004, volunteered to be the first country to face scrutiny under the NEPAD Peer Review 
Mechanism.603 Furthermore, it enacted the freedom of information bill and the whistle 
blowers bill. Despite all the above, substantial governance problems remain and 
corruption still exists.604 
As a result of a combination of : institutional reforms, improved economic policy 
environment based on sound fiscal management, aid and rising private investments, 
Ghana’s economy begun to advance.605 Since the 1990s, it has managed to sustain real 
GDP growth of above 4 percent and per capita growth of approximately 2 percent.606 
Economic growth averaged over 5 percent since 2001 and reached 6 percent in 2005-
06.607 In 2008, its GDP per capita was USD 1500 up from USD 390 in 1998.608 
Despite the said economic performance, reports have indicated that Ghana could have 
achieved more accelerated economic growth as a result of the institutional reforms 
programmes.609It did not because the CSPIP was donor driven hence not fully home 
grown. Moreover, it was directly executed by the head of the civil service with a few 
officials.610 Consequently, the public were not adequately sensitised on their rights and on 
what to expect from the civil service as a result of the perceived changes.611 Similarly, a 
number of the junior workers in the civil service were unaware of the programme hence 
                                                 
601CSPIP is a component of the NIRP targeted at the core Civil Service. 
602Ghana government ‘Meeting the challenges of Ghana’s economic growth’. (2009). Available at : 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/ghana/meeting_challenges_ghanas_economic_growth.jsp (accessed on 5/5/09). 
603OECD ‘African Economic Outlook’ (2006). Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/10/36740417.pdf (accessed on 5/5/09 
604Ibid 
605Ibid  
606Ibid 
607Ibid 
608CIA (2008) 
609 Adei (2002). 
610Ibid 
611Ibid 
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continued with their old corrupt practices.612 As a result, the CSPIP failed to fully 
transform the Ghanaian civil service.  
 
The aforesaid shows that the government of Ghana recognises the importance of good 
institutions for economic growth and has therefore made concerted efforts to improve its 
public sector. John Atta Mills, the current president of Ghana, during his presidential 
campaigns, continuously affirmed the importance of strong institutions to investments, 
trade and economic growth and thus pledged to strengthen them by having an open and 
transparent government.613 Because of political will, Ghana’s institutions might 
eventually strengthen thus lead to mutually equal returns on foreign investments hence 
more accelerated economic growth. 
 
Another example is DR Congo. It is rich in copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, petroleum, 
wood, palm oil, rubber, cotton and cocoa but its economy is wanting because of weak 
institutions.614 Just like Ghana, its institutional problems originated from the immediate 
post-independence leadership. DR Congo gained independence in 1960 from Belgium. 
Parliamentary elections were held the same year and Joseph Kasavubu was elected 
president while Patrice Lumumba was elected as prime minister.615 In 1964, the president 
was removed from power by the committee of army commanders and Mobutu Sese Seko 
was pronounced head of state.616 Mobutu ruled DR Congo (which name he later changed 
to Zaire) from November 1964 to May 1997 when Laurent Kabila ( the father of Joseph 
Kabila) assumed command after his army defeated the national army.617 
 
Mobutu had full control of the economy and politics. His government was characterised 
by abuse of the rule of law; inefficiency; corruption and institutionalised theft; and 
                                                 
612Ibid 
613Speech by John Evans Atta Mills at the launch of  his party’s (National Democratic Congress (NDC) 
campaign on Wednesday, May 7, 2008, held at the national theatre, Ghana. Available at: http://www.mills-
mahama-ghana.com/news_list/Speech+By+Prof.+John+Evans+Atta+Mills,+At+National+Theater-t-
NEWS2.htm (accessed on 22/4/09). 
614Gran G. and Hull G. (1979) Zaire, the political economy of underdevelopment. 
615Ibid 
616Ibid 
617Omozuanvbo J. and Mbaku J. (2003) Political liberalization and democratization in Africa: lessons from 
country experiences.  
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overstaffing. He replaced European personnel and managers running the parastatals and 
government ministries with Zairians who did not have expertise.618 Instead of the rule of 
law, Mobutu installed a system of patronage which had at its pinnacle him and his family, 
thus replacing the Zairian judicial system as the true arbiter of disputes.619 In addition, he 
took from foreigners their farms, ranches, plantations, concessions, private businesses, 
real estate agencies and other properties for the benefit of the dominant class,620 who 
bought them from the state at a meagre fee.621 The dominant class did not invest 
resources into the businesses they acquired for fear that Mobutu would likewise 
expropriate them. Moreover, they used their privileged positions to enhance their status 
and wealth.622 Because of all the foregoing, Zaire was unable to benefit from its natural 
resources and investments and as a result the economy of Zaire collapsed.623Joseph 
Kabila, the current president, is attempting to recover the economy by setting up proper 
institutions and improving the country’s security situation.624 His government has 
adopted institutional reform measures such as introduction of an action plan to tackle 
corruption in the public sector and strengthening co-ordination of government actions 
through the inter-ministerial committees.625 
 
Unlike Ghana, DR Congo and most African countries, Botswana has been able to sustain 
economic growth since independence because it possesses strong institutions and has 
good economic policies.626  
 
Botswana’s post-independence government maintained the public service that it inherited 
from the British in 1966 and developed it into a relatively non-corrupt, meritocratic and 
                                                 
618Nzongola G. (2003) The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A people's history. 
619Ibid  
620The dominant class consisted of state officials, parastatal heads, army leaders, political party leaders and 
other bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
621Omozuanvbo (2003). See also Nzongola (2003) and San Jose State University, department of economics 
‘The Congo as a Nation’. Available at: http://www.applet-magic.com/congo.htm (accessed on 23/4/09). 
622Ibid  
623Ibid 
624CIA (2008). See also Naidoo S. ‘DRC: A country re-awakening’. (2002). Africa Business Journal. 
Available at: http://www.tradersafrica.com/articles.asp?articleid={69EE9EDC-E1E0-4F20-8905-
0C7CF9399B52} (accessed on 5/5/09).  
625 Ibid 
626 Johnson (2001) p 33 
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efficient bureaucracy.627 It was able to do this because it did not “indigenise”628the 
bureaucracy (like many post-independence African governments) until suitable qualified 
Batswana were available hence they kept expatriate workers and freely used international 
advisers and consultants. 629  
 
Moreover, Botswana had pre-colonial tribal institutions that encouraged broad based 
participation and placed constraints on political elites. 630British colonisation had limited 
effect on the aforesaid institutions. The tribal institutions ensured that the political elites 
kept their political powers by pursuing good policies. Moreover, it placed restrictions on 
infighting over political rewards.631  As a result,  good strategies were adopted by the 
post- colonial government, for example, it : negotiated a Customs Union with South 
Africa in 1969 and thereby securing a greater share of the revenue; encouraged mining 
companies to explore the country and as a result diamond, copper, nickel and coal were 
discovered; renegotiated the investment agreement with DeBeers632 and consequently 
started receiving 50 per cent share of diamond profits; implemented a consistent series of 
development plans emphasising investments in infrastructure, health and education; did 
not indigenise its public service therefore its bureaucracy to date maintains probity, 
relative autonomy and competence; and  formed the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) 
which purchased cattle from ranchers, set prices and sold the beef to regional and world 
markets as well as negotiated access to the European Economic Commission (EEC) at 
favourable terms. 633 
 
As a result of the said strong institutions and the good government decisions, the basic 
system of law and contract worked well; state and private predation were limited; its 
large diamond resource did not induce domestic political instability or conflict for control 
                                                 
627Johnson (2001) p 2 
628That is, to localise the public service. See Johnson (2001) p 18  
629At independence (in 1966), Botswana was very poor with few assets and infrastructure. It had only two 
secondary schools with 80 Batswana in the final year unlike Zambia that had ten times as many secondary 
school graduates at independence and Uganda seventy times. It hence had very few local qualified 
individuals to efficiently and effectively work in the public service. See Ibid Johnson (2001) p 18 
630Johnson (2001) p 32 
631Johnson (2001) p 24 and 32 
632It is the largest diamond mining company in Botswana. See Johnson (2001) p 17 
633Johnson (2001) p 17 
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of the revenue634; the government invested heavily in infrastructure, education and health; 
its fiscal policy was prudent ; the exchange rate was closely tied to fundamentals; and the 
government had a marketing board635 that was not used to extract resources from the rural 
sector.636 Consequently, the property rights of actual and potential investors were 
protected; there was political stability; and the political elites were constrained by the 
political system and the society from rent seeking.637 Botswana thus was (and still is) able 
to obtain sustainable equal returns on trade and investments in and/or out of its territory, 
since independence. This is evidenced by the fact that in 2008 it was able to obtain a 
GDP per capita of USD 13,300 (up from USD 3070 in 1998) compared to that of Ghana 
which was at only USD 1500(up from USD 390 in 1998). 638 Similarly its investments 
were at 23.9% of GDP, Agriculture was 1.6% of GDP, industry 16.6% of GDP, mining 
36% of GDP and services 45.8% of GDP.639 Moreover, investment in human capital was 
(and still is) significant, its balance of payment in surplus and its domestic reserve 
large.640 
 
From the three country cases, it is clear that high institutional quality and good policies 
can assist African states obtain immense returns from Chinese trade and investments in 
the continent. Three distinct characteristics of high institutional quality can be identified 
from the three cases discussed above that African countries should ensure they possess in 
order to obtain equal returns on Chinese investments: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
634The diamond revenues generated enough rewards for the main political actors hence increasing the 
opportunity cost of (and discouraging) further rent seeking (i.e. pursuit of unearned wealth). See Ibid  p 2 
635It is an institution employed by the urban interests to exploit farmers e.g. the cocoa marketing board of 
Ghana earlier discussed. 
636Johnson (2001) pp 1 and  2 
637Johnson (2001)  p 2 
638Johnson (2001) p 41 table 2 for the 1998 figures. See also CIA (2008) 
639CIA (2008) 
640Johnson (2001)  p 19 
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4.2.1 Observance of the rule of law 
The rule of law requires that the government be bound by the law; there is equality before 
the law; there is law and order; there is predictable and efficient justice and; that the state 
does not violate human rights. 641  
 
4.2.1.1 Government bound by the law 
The government should exercise its powers in accordance with well established and 
adequately publicised rules, regulations and legal principles.642 This is only possible if the 
independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.643 
 
Therefore, the judiciary should be free from extraneous pressures, organised, have self 
confidence and be autonomous of all authority, save that of the law, in order to be able to 
curtail government power. 644 Moreover, it should have powers to review administrative 
actions hence ensure that government officials do not use force, personal will or 
power.645 Consequently, the host state would be in compliance with the provisions of the 
BITs with regard to the obligation to protect the investments of the investor and 
expropriation. This therefore means that property rights will be protected and contracts 
enforced.646  
 
BITs generally adequately protect the investor by prohibiting the host state from 
expropriating foreign investments, either directly or indirectly, through taxation or 
regulatory measures ; setting a standard of compensation in the event of expropriation; 
and providing detailed terms for capital repatriation, National Treatment requirements for 
                                                 
641Belton R. ‘Competing definitions of the rule of law: Implications for practitioners’. (2005) No. 55.  
Carnegie endowment for international peace publication at pp 1-19. Available at: 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP55.Belton.FINAL.pdf ( accessed on 20/4/09). 
642Belton (2005) p 9. 
643Belton (2005). See also Culver K (1999) Readings in the philosophy of law at p 18. 
644Ibid 
645Culver (1999)  p 18 
646Compliance means compliance with the standing substantive rules embodied in treaties. That is the 
degree to which a host state’s treatment of foreign investments is in conformity with the substantive 
provisions of such treaties. See Freeman N. ‘The determinants of investor-state disputes: Institutional 
capacity and compliance with Bilateral Investment Treaties’. (2009). Paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the Southern Political Science Association held at Hotel Intercontinental, New Orleans, LA on Jan 07, 
2009 at p 14.Available at : http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p276486_index.html (accessed on 22/4/09).  
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investors once inside the market and MFN type requirements. The effects of non-
compliance647 are felt immediately by investors.648 As a result, they use their financial 
and legal resources to publicise acts of non-compliance and pursue legal remedies 
through arbitral claims against the host state. Such claims are costly for host African 
states649 and they thus need to ensure that they comply with the provisions of the BITs in 
order to avoid numerous arbitral claims being brought against them.650   
 
When the host state exercises its powers in accordance with well established and 
adequately publicised rules, regulations and legal principles as well as complies with the 
provisions of the BITs, foreign investors are encouraged to deploy more capital or invest 
in long term projects. As a result, African states gain from sufficient transfer of 
technology, knowledge and technical skills as well as increased government revenue and 
employment opportunities.651  
 
If a government is bound by the law, it means that its judiciary is independent.652 
Therefore, foreign investors will have an independent judicial forum, whose rulings they 
will have confidence will be enforced by the state, to which they can either appeal 
arbitrary, capricious or self-serving rulings by the state or forward any investor state 
dispute arising. 653 If foreign investors have confidence in the judiciary, they will not turn 
to external sources of dispute resolution provided for in the BITs as alternatives to the 
domestic courts. This is good for the host state as its judiciary will not loose business to 
international competitors such as arbitral bodies; it is cheaper for the state if a dispute 
between it and the investor is handled domestically; and the local courts and private 
                                                 
647The non-compliance effects include loss of property or decreased profitability. 
648Ibid  p 16. 
649Paying for legal fees as well as paying compensation awarded to the investor. 
650Freeman (2009) pp 5 and 16. 
651Henisz J. and Zelner B. ‘The institutional environment for telecommunications investment’. ( 2001)10. 
Journal of economics and management strategy at pp 123-147. 
652Belton (2005) and Culver (1999).   
653Henisz J. ‘The institutional environment for international business’. (2000)16. Journal of law, economics 
and organization. Available at : http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/papers/wiib.pdf 
(accessed on 20/4/09) at pp 13-14. 
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lawyers would generate precedents through judgments and complaints respectively.654  
This prevents the legal systems from relying solely on public servants to create the law 
hence avoid suboptimal quality of lawsuits and suboptimal development of precedents 
thereby improving the quality of the judicial system of the host state in question.655 
 
4.2.1.2 Equality before the law 
All people in a state are equal hence political elites and the wealthy persons should be 
tried under the same law and in the same courts as ordinary citizens and foreign 
investors.656 The observance of this rule ensures that no government is above the law, and 
no public official acts arbitrarily or unilaterally outside the law. As a result, property 
rights will be respected and contracts enforced. This therefore ensures that only valid 
expropriation occurs as provided for under the BIT and there is National Treatment of 
foreign investors.  
 
Real equality before the law requires courts that are strong and independent hence there 
should be no corruption and bribery in the judiciary to escape justice.657 Moreover, the 
courts should be easily accessible, that is, no long delays or excessive costs. 658 This 
increases the probability that disputes between foreign and domestic partners or the state 
arising from contracts and agreements will be adjudicated fairly under the domestic law 
of the host state. Foreign investors will thereby be encouraged to utilise domestic courts 
instead of turning to international arbitration. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
654Judgments have stare decisis effects. Complaints as contained in the statement of claim can state facts 
that contribute to the creation of precedent (judicial opinions reflect inputs from complaints and other 
pleadings), formulate new common law causes of action and clarify statutes. See Kobayashi H. and 
Ribstein  E. ‘Class action lawyers as lawmakers’. (February 2004). George Mason law and economics 
research paper No. 04-08. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=501548( accessed on 22/4/09) 
655Kobayashi (2004) 
656Belton (2005) p 9 
657Belton (2005)   p 10 
658Culver (1999) p 18 
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4.2.1.3 Law and order 
It means protection from one’s fellow citizens.659 It is essential in protecting the lives and 
property of investors and citizens since natural rights of freedom and property rights are 
constantly exposed to the invasion by others.660 Law and order is reliant on a good 
government system whereby the judiciary is not corrupt; the politicians do not give 
security to enterprises of criminals; the police is reformed and thus do not abuse human 
rights or engage in corruption thereby quell crime; the prisons reform prisoners and 
prevents them from perpetrating crimes from inside, court clerks do not “loose files” and 
law enforcement agencies do not delay investigations for bribes.661 Uncontrolled crime 
like theft and smuggling hurts businesses by increasing the cost of security hence 
reducing the total output. This discourages investors from investing in more technology 
and equipment.662As a result, there will be fewer jobs for the locals, less transfer of 
technology and skills and less monetary returns accruing to the host state. 
 
4.2.1.4 Predictable and efficient justice 
Laws should be adequately publicised and relatively stable so that they are known by 
everyone and settled. This enables courts to rule with predictability.663 Laws and 
government policies should not be changed too often for purposes of long term planning 
and decision making of foreign investors. Knowledge of the general outlines and 
sometimes even of the details of government policies and state laws are often important 
for business strategic planning.664 
 
The judiciary should be efficient and provide impartial justice. The substance of a 
country’s laws matter little if the institutions set up to interpret and enforce those laws are 
                                                 
659Beer C. ‘Judicial performance and the rule of law in Mexican States’. (2006)48. Latin American politics 
and society .Available at : 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/latin_american_politics_and_society/v048/48.3beer.html(accessed on 20/4/09) 
660Belton (2005) pp 10-13 
661Ibid 
662Beer (2006) 
663Belton (2005) p 12 
664Culver (1999) p 16 
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inefficient, arbitrary or corrupt.665 An efficient justice system discourages delaying of 
cases arising out of contravention of host state domestic law, breach of the terms of the 
BIT or any other cases brought before it.  Delays in the judicial system create 
opportunities for corruption as litigants may be tempted to “buy” a speedier resolution to 
a case or to subvert justice666 thereby undermining the integrity of both the decision at 
hand and the court system.667 Excessive delays, corruption, and incompetence in court 
systems increase risks and costs for business as well as freeze up resources.668 This 
prevents growth and thus serves as a disincentive to the investor to make efficient 
adjustments to changes in technology or to production processes (i.e. capital investments) 
that maximise long run profits thereby contributing to economic growth of the host 
state.669. 
 
Further, an independent, efficient and accessible court system provides the essential 
guarantees to foreign investors that any disputes will be resolved through a fair and 
predictable process and that judicial decisions will be delivered quickly.670 This increases 
the investor’s willingness to invest more.671 
 
4.2.1.5 Uphold human rights 
The principles of natural law and justice should be observed by the government for a 
state to obtain equal returns on its investments.  Under the natural law theory, the 
government should not enforce any written law unless it conforms to certain unwritten, 
                                                 
665Sabatini et al. ‘Rule of law, economic growth and prosperity’. (2007). Report of the rule of law working 
group sponsored by the Americas Society and Council of the Americas. Available at: http://www.as-
coa.org/files/PDF/pub_562_363.pdf (accessed on 20/4/09) at p 2. 
666For example in situations where delay favours one party therefore acts as a penalty to another party 
before even judgment is announced. See Belton (2005) at p 12 
667Belton (2005) p 12 
668Ibid 
669Beer ( 2006). See also Sabatini (2007) p 36 as well as Keefer P and Knack S. ‘Why don’t poor countries 
catch up? A cross-national test of an institutional explanation’ (1997)35 Economic inquiry at pp 590-602. 
Available at: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119152657/PDFSTART (accessed on 
20/4/09) at p 591. 
670Sabatini (2007) p 17. See also Belton (2005) p 12. 
671Dam K. ‘The judiciary and economic development’. (2006)2ed. 2 John M. Olin law and economics 
working paper No. 287, the law school, University of Chicago. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=892030 (accessed on 20/4/09). 
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universal principles of fairness, morality, and justice that transcend human legal 
systems.672  
 
In light of all the above, the rule of law captures the extent to which fair and predictable 
rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property 
rights are protected, contracts are enforced and investors are protected. 673 Hence failure 
of a host state to respect the rule of law weakens its domestic property rights regime and 
as a result, arbitral claims against it increase.674 Moreover, it affects foreign investors’ 
incentive to make capital investments.675  
 
African states should thus ensure that their policies and various government bodies ,for 
example, the judiciary, the police force, legal education, the prisons, and others, are 
reformed to achieve the aforesaid rule of law ends thus reap mutually equal returns on 
Chinese investments.676  
 
4.2.2 Corruption 
The World Bank defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gains”.677 
Some common types of government corruption include: bribery, extortion, fraud, 
nepotism, embezzlement, patronage systems and similar activities.678 
 
Bribery is government corruption whereby one party offers something of value to a 
government official in exchange for some favour or immunity from laws or ethics.679 In 
this context, extortion is the use of one's political position to obtain something of 
                                                 
672Tiffin (2006) p 11. 
673Ibid 
674Freeman (2009) p 5. 
675Keefer (1997) p 591 
676Beer (2006)  
677World Bank ‘Helping countries combat corruption: The role of the World Bank’ (1997) The World 
Bank: Washington DC. 
678Center for Democracy (1999) A handbook on fighting corruption. Available at: 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnace070.pdf (accessed on 
22/4/09). 
679Mbaku J.(2007) Corruption in Africa: Causes, consequences, and cleanups at p 2. 
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value.680 Government corruption that involves fraud can include any act that is intended 
to deceive another party (including the public) in order to achieve personal gain.681 
Nepotism is government corruption whereby family and close kin are favoured in some 
political dealing.682 Embezzlement, in this context, is government corruption involving 
taking or using government money for personal use.683 Patronage systems consist of the 
granting of favours, contracts, or appointments to positions by a local public office holder 
or candidate for a political office in return for political support.684 
Corruption thrives where a state fails to control its own bureaucrats, to protect property 
and contract rights, and to provide the institutions that underpin an effective rule of 
law.685A society may also be more vulnerable to government corruption when there is 
little transparency in government transactions, power is relegated to the hands of a few 
decision makers who are not held accountable to the masses, and when there are no 
checks and balances on the political system.686 The majority of African states exist under 
such conditions and this is why corruption is so pervasive in the continent.  
Corruption in Africa is a direct consequence of poorly developed and inappropriate 
institutional arrangements.687 Most of the continent’s immediate independent leaders did 
not take time to engage the public in state reconstruction through democratic constitution 
making so as to compact, by themselves, their own institutional arrangements.688 Instead, 
institution making was top-down, elite driven, opportunistic and reluctant. Hence, the 
outcome was laws and institutions that were not locally focused and did not reflect the 
values of people to be governed by them. The institutions adopted did not promote 
                                                 
680World Bank ‘Introduction to corruption’. Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/35970/mod03.pdf (accessed on 22/4/09) 
681Ibid 
682Ibid 
683Ibid 
684Ibid 
685Ndiva K. ‘Change or the illusion of change: The war against official corruption in Africa’. (2006). 
George Washington International Review. See also Hellman et al. ‘Measuring governance and state 
capture: The role of bureaucrats and firms in shaping the business environment’. (2000). European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development working paper No. 51. Available at: 
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/wp0051.pdf (accessed on 21/4/09) at p 1. 
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687Mbaku (2007) p 2 
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indigenous entrepreneurship nor did they enhance peaceful co-existence of each 
country’s numerous population groups.689 Instead, they provided incentives, which 
encouraged people to invest in rent seeking, corruption and other forms of 
opportunism.690  
 
Ghana and DR Congo are good examples of African states where the institutions adopted 
after independence were not people driven but political elite driven hence encouraging 
corruption.691 This stunted wealth creation in the two countries and significantly damaged 
economic growth and development.  
 
The growth of international trade and business has created many situations where the 
payment of bribes (often euphemistically called "commissions") may be highly beneficial 
to the companies that pay them. For example:  
a) When obtaining general licenses, approvals, and other requirements for 
establishing a firm, including general investment approval, approvals for 
incentives, tax registration, company formation, expatriate work permits, business 
licenses, etc.692 
b) When obtaining specialised approvals required for certain sectors or activities, 
such as are typically required for sectors involving resource utilisation, tourism, 
financial services, transportation, etc.693 
c) When securing land, improving it, getting utilities services, and constructing 
buildings. 694 
                                                 
689Ibid  
690Ibid 
691Acemoglu D. et al.  ‘Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: Volatility, crises and growth’. 
(2003)50. Journal of Monetary Economics at pp 49-123. Available at: 
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~jrobins/researchpapers/publishedpapers/jr_JMEpublishedversion.pdf 
(accessed on 16/4/09) 
692Emery J. ‘Governance, transparency and private investment in Africa’. Paper presented on 17-18 
November 2003 at the OECD Global Forum on International Investment held in Johannesburg, South 
Africa. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/50/19499957.pdf (accessed on 21/4/09) at p 4. 
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d) Operational requirements, which firms encounter once they begin operations. 
These are the result of regulations governing labour, foreign exchange, 
international trade, standards, etc. 695 
e) While tendering for government contracts.696 
 
By paying bribes, the foreign companies obtain: reduction to taxes owed to the host state; 
exceptions from compliance with certain regulations and statutes; reduction in paperwork 
legally required of all investors and; exemptions from payment of certain taxes. 697  As a 
result, public revenue is reduced thus contributing to larger fiscal deficits.698 In such a 
situation, the investor becomes the sole beneficiary in the investment arrangement. 
 
The 2008 Transparency International (TI) bribe payers index ranked Chinese companies 
the second highest likely to engage in bribery when doing business abroad.699 They bribe 
public officials in the public works contracts/construction; real estate and property 
development; oil and gas; and heavy manufacturing and mining sectors, in order to get 
high end contracts. 700 
 
Examples of Chinese companies’ corrupt activities in Africa are numerous. For example, 
in Gabon, it is estimated that taxes are not paid on 60 percent of the areas allocated to 
Chinese Companies as forest concessions.701 Further, the companies neglect production 
ceilings imposed. In addition, they do not live up to the obligation to process a part of 
their exports in the country of origin thus 80 percent of Gabonese forest products arrive 
                                                 
695Ibid  
696Tanzi V. ‘Corruption around the world: Causes, consequences, scope and cures’. (1998). International 
Monetary Fund working paper No. WP/98/63. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=882334andrec=1andsrcabs=882994 (accessed on 
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697Ibid  
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http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/bpi_2008 ( accessed on 21/4/09) at p 5. 
700TI (2008)  p 10. 
701Allan T. ‘Chinese involvement in African illegal logging and timber trade’ (2005) paper prepared by the 
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in China as round woods.702 By exporting raw logs and timber, China is stripping 
Gabon’s natural resources at the absolute lowest cost. Gabon is not benefiting from jobs 
and higher prices that can be achieved from value-added processing.703 Chinese 
companies are able to carry out these illegal activities by bribing government officials, 
from the lowest administrative level to the highest echelon of cabinet ministers.704 
 
Similarly, in Equatorial Guinea, Rimbunan Hijau’s subsidiary Shimmer International705 
(a Chinese company), the dominant player in the logging sector, has ‘close ties’ with the 
Minister of Forests.706 Hence, maximum allowable cut and concession sizes are largely 
ignored. Moreover, it is estimated that up to 90 percent of the total harvest going to China 
is illegal.707 
 
In Mozambique, Chinese companies are engaged in illegal fishing. They are able to do 
this by bribing inspectors and observers.708 Furthermore, the likelihood of a successful 
prosecution of a Chinese company is thought to be extremely low as senior Mozambique 
officials are often complicit in these crimes.709 
 
The public servants are normally tempted to receive the bribes because of personal 
financial needs, health and other personal or family needs.710 Alternatively, it may be the 
pressure of loosing one’s job for failure to co-operate with a "clique" that has so 
perpetuated corruption in the system. 711  
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Professor Lambsdorff,712 in his study on the causes and consequences of corruption, 
found that corruption lowers a country's attractiveness to international and domestic 
investors. This reduces capital accumulation and lowers capital inflows. Also the 
productivity of capital suffers from corruption. Moreover he found out that corruption 
distorts government expenditure and reduces the quality of a wide variety of government 
services, such as, public investment, health care, tax revenue, and environmental control.  
 
In light of the above, in order for African states to obtain equal returns on the Chinese 
investments, they need to tackle corruption so as to avoid loosing income due to the host 
state and deterring foreign investors from investing. Attempts to reduce corruption will 
need action on at least four fronts:   
“(1) honest and visible commitment by the leadership to the fight against 
corruption. The leadership must show zero tolerance for it; 
(2) policy changes that reduce the demand for corruption by scaling down 
regulations and other policies such as tax incentives, and by making those that 
are retained as transparent and as non-discretionary as possible. Discretion must 
be kept to the minimum; 
(3) reducing the supply of corruption by increasing public sector wages, by 
increasing incentives toward honest behaviour, and by instituting effective 
controls and penalties on the public servants; and 
(4) somehow solving the problem of the financing of political parties.”713 
 
Some of these actions require major reforms in economic policies, institutions and 
incentives, aimed at reducing the role of government in economic activities (to limit 
authority), strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanctions (to improve 
accountability) and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve 
                                                 
712Lambsdorff G. ‘Consequences and causes of corruption: Who do we know from a cross-section of 
countries?’ University of Passau. Available at: http://www.wiwi.uni-
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incentives).714 As a complement to these broader reforms, the careful and transparent 
implementation of enforcement measures, such as prosecuting some prominent corrupt 
figures, can also have an impact.715 
  
4.2.3 Bureaucratic quality (Quality of governance) 
Governance has to do with the manner in which responsibility is discharged. Such a 
responsibility may be acquired through election; appointment or delegation in the public 
domain or in the area of commerce, corporate governance.716 Therefore, good governance 
in a state means a condition whereby the government discharges its responsibilities in an 
effective, transparent, and accountable manner. Bad governance, on the other hand,  is 
associated with maladministration in the discharge of responsibility.717 Good governance 
entails the existence of efficient and accountable institutions (political, judicial, 
administrative, economic, corporate) and entrenched rules that promote development, 
protects human rights, respects the rule of law, and ensures that people are free to 
participate in, and be heard on, decisions that affect their lives.718 
 
The African Bureaucratic Structure Survey (ABSS), in a survey of twenty African 
countries, established that the efficiency of public service provision was poor in Kenya, 
Nigeria and Malawi while Mauritius, Eritrea, Botswana, Namibia and Tunisia had an 
efficient public service.719 While, the bureaucratic structure of Botswana, Namibia, 
Mauritius and Tunisia was found to be performing consistently well.720 From this survey, 
it is evident that the countries with an inefficient public services, low reliability of 
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services and,  in general,  low bureaucratic quality have low investments and economic 
growth unlike those with high bureaucratic performance.721  
 
Bureaucratic performance can be improved through having first, certain entry 
requirements to public service jobs and paying reasonable wages thereby attracting a pool 
of talented officials in the bureaucracy.722 Secondly, internal promotion hence 
encouraging career stability and good performance.723 Thirdly, autonomy from political 
pressure. This ensures that laws, policies and regulations are not frequently changed for 
political gain.724 Fourthly, consultations with the private sector before implementation of 
policies. 725The private sector plays a major role in economic growth of a country, thus 
the need for a co-operative relationship between the public and private sector. 
Bureaucrats should discuss major policy changes with the private sector before 
implementation so as to get a clear picture of the effect of the policy on the economy of 
the country.726 
 
By improving bureaucratic quality, investors are guaranteed that public services, for 
example, business licences, approvals and other domestic requirements for establishing 
and running a business in the host state; policies and taxation; as well as public utilities 
like water, electricity, telecommunication services etc. will not be administered and 
provided in a preferential and discretionary manner.727 Moreover, they will not be 
required to bribe the public servants. This increases the investors’ ability to profit by 
decreasing transaction costs hence encouraging them to make efficient adjustments to 
changes in technology or to production processes (i.e. capital investments) which will be 
beneficial to the host state.728Furthermore, there will be efficient collection of revenue 
from the investments and therefore a substantial reduction of loss of government income.  
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4.3 INSTABILITY IN THE HOST STATE 
Instability may include mass violence, civil wars, border wars, ethnic clashes, riots, 
election violence, high propensity of a change of government, strikes, political disorder, 
assassinations, anti governmental demonstrations, revolutions, coup d’etat and attempted 
coup d’etat. 729  
 
Riots, strikes and demonstrations can have direct effects on productivity (e.g. cause 
breaks or disruptions in the production process) and therefore the profits of the investors. 
As a result, they may decide to postpone projects or invest elsewhere (capital 
flight).730Anti governmental demonstrations, on the other hand, threaten government 
stability thus tempting it to use corruption to insure the loyalty of the bodies that might 
help it to remain in power like the police, the army and the administration.731 Corruption 
has a negative effect on return on investments as discussed earlier. 
 
Conversely, occurrence of attempted or successful coups and revolutions indicates a 
propensity of government to abandon the rule of law and therefore a threat to established 
property rights as the probability that returns on investment are expropriated increases.732 
As a result of the aforesaid risk, less investment is undertaken in the host state hence 
minimal transfer of skills and technology; and reduced export markets, employment 
opportunities and government revenue.733 
 
Moreover, a high tendency of a change of government is associated with uncertainty 
about the new policies of a potential new government.734 Foreign investors prefer a stable 
political environment, with less policy uncertainty and less uncertainty about property 
                                                 
729Alesina A. and Perotti R. ‘Income distribution, political instability and investment’ (1993) National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBEC) working paper No. 4486. 
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rights, thus in their absence, risk-averse foreign investors may hesitate to take economic 
initiatives or may “exit” the economy, by investing elsewhere.735 
 
In addition, civil wars, border wars and ethnic clashes cause the governments to make 
concessions they would otherwise not have made in order to finance the wars. For 
example, Sudan is an oil rich state with proven reserves of more than 563 million 
barrels.736 Because of its large debt, it relies heavily on FDI to sustain government 
expenditures.737 
 
China’s main state owned company, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is 
the biggest stakeholder in the Muglad oil-development project, China's largest overseas 
oil project that consists of a 940 mile pipeline that stretches from Heglid in Southern 
Sudan to Port Sudan on the Read Sea.738 The project produces up to 10 million tons of oil 
a year with an estimated $450 million of the oil revenue being received by the Khartoum-
based Sudan government from its 5% stake in the project annually.739Unfortunately, the 
government redirects the overwhelming majority of this FDI to finance the civil and 
religious war against its own people in the predominantly Christian south. 740 
  
Under ordinary circumstances, the oil project would have helped Sudan gain a bargaining 
leverage in the international investment negotiations hence an opportunity for it to obtain 
excellent return on investments thereby increasing economic development.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
735Ibid  
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4.4 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
Institutional quality is important for a state to obtain equal returns on investment hence 
policy makers should emphasise on reforming their institutions.741 
 
A study by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified three catalysts of 
institutional reform.742 They include, first, greater liberalisation. Liberalisation creates a 
bigger role for the export sectors to have good institutional qualities in order to be able to 
comply with international standards and codes743 and therefore easily integrate into the 
global economy.744  
 
Secondly, maintenance of high level of press freedom in order to increase political 
accountability. Greater accountability of political institutions is associated with policies 
and institutional reforms that are beneficial for the broader economy, with the political 
leadership answerable to a broad cross-section of the population. This ensures that it 
favourably aligns the incentives of the leadership with that of the whole economy.745  
 
Thirdly, external anchors. They include organisations and arrangements such as the 
WTO, the America’s Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Millennium 
Development Corporation (MDC).746 They may contribute to institutional quality through 
imposing a criterion for membership or accession. For example, in return for enhanced 
market access, WTO accession may include a conditionality of local institutional 
quality.747 Similarly, AGOA and MDC may link the benefit of trade and investments to 
having good institutions.748 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
Factor accumulation and foreign investments acquired through signing balanced BITs are 
not sufficient to obtain equal returns on the Chinese investments. African countries need 
to reform their institutions so that they protect private property rights; enforce contracts 
and; ensure efficiency in public service provision, low levels of corruption and political 
stability. This will decrease uncertainty thereby reduces both transaction costs and 
product costs for the foreign investors. As a result, they make profits and are hence 
encouraged to make more capital investments. Conversely, the host state benefits from 
transfer of technology and technical skills; a larger export market, employment 
opportunities, increased opportunities for diversification and; reduced arbitral claims. 
Moreover, strong institutions curtail corruption by Chinese MNEs that cause the host 
state to loose a substantial amount of revenue 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 CONCLUSION 
China’s FDI is a great opportunity for African states to achieve sustainable economic 
growth. This is because, first, China is heavily investing in Africa’s infrastructure 
rejuvenation which would help to open up the domestic market thereby contributing to 
economic growth.749 Secondly, it offers African states infrastructure finance and ODA 
without conditionalities.750 This non-interference with the internal affairs of the African 
states enables the latter to “own” their reforms.751 Thirdly, the technology from its MNEs 
is more easily absorbed by many African states than technology imported from developed 
countries.752 Fourthly, it takes a long-term perspective in its relationships with African 
states and its projects are more cost-effective and executed faster than those of the 
developed countries.753 Lastly it offers African states the latitude to learn useful concrete 
lessons (rather than mechanically incorporate the entire alternative ‘models’) from its 
development policies that contributed to its economic growth.754 
 
Despite all the above, it is unlikely that the African countries having BITs with China are 
getting equal returns on investments. This is because the BITs are mis-engineered and 
thus do not offer any flexibility to African governments and policy makers to channel 
foreign investment in a manner that corresponds to their development needs. 
Furthermore, African states often have weak institutions.  
 
In the analysis of China’s BITs with Uganda, Djibouti and Germany, it was established 
that the provisions of the three BITs are almost similar,755  despite the difference in level 
of development existing between the two African states and the one developed state. It 
also demonstrated that, first, the Germany-China BIT is balanced as it protects German 
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foreign investors in China, while at the same time protecting Chinese investors in 
Germany.  
 
Secondly, that the Djibouti and Uganda BITs with China broadly protect Chinese 
investors at the expense of the policy space of the two African states. For example, 
despite the importance of the Preamble in the interpretation of the provisions of the BITs, 
it nevertheless fails to make it clear that the objective of the investment promotion and 
protection must not be pursued at the expense of the public policy goals of the two 
developing states such as the protection of health, safety, the environment and the 
promotion of internationally recognized labour rights. Chinese investors may therefore 
compromise the said standards to satisfy political and economic interests without fear of 
breaching the provisions of the BITs.756 
 
Moreover, the BITs do not contain reservations, exceptions, temporary derogations and 
limitations that help to indirectly address development and policy space concerns in 
BITs. Hence, provisions such as definition of investor, investment and indirect 
expropriation; fair and equitable treatment; MFN; and National treatment are interpreted 
and applied broadly thereby substantially limiting the policy and regulatory flexibility of 
the two developing states.  
 
In addition, there are no obligations on the investors requiring them to ensure that their 
investments are in tandem with host members’ interests, development policies and 
objectives and further that they “…strictly abide by all domestic laws and regulations in 
each and every aspect of the economic and social life of the host members in their 
investment and operational activities…”757 Similarly there are no home state obligations 
requiring the Chinese government to “…ensure that the investors’ behaviour and 
practices are in line with and contribute to the interests, development policies and 
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objectives of the host member.”758 As a result Chinese investors are under no obligation 
not to engage in corrupt activities or to pay due regard to labour law, human rights and 
the environment when carrying out their activities. 
  
The analysis of the BITs, therefore, has evidently confirmed that it is unlikely for Uganda 
and Djibouti to get equal returns on the Chinese investments.  
 
The reason why Uganda and Djibouti concluded mis-engineered BITs with China can be 
explained from the bargaining power disparity. It was established that because of Africa’s 
weak bargaining power, they are unable to negotiate BITs that meet their development 
needs hence end up getting unequal returns on the Chinese investments. Several measures 
that African states could take to increase their bargaining leverage were thereafter 
proposed. They included proper preparations for the negotiations, diversification from 
export of primary commodities, value addition to products of export and deepening 
regional integration. 
 
In the event that the African states manage to negotiate or renegotiate balanced BITs, it is 
unlikely for them to obtain equal returns on investment if their institutions are weak. The 
thesis therefore recognised that the unequal return on the Chinese investments is not 
attributed only to mis-engineered BITs. Weak state institutions and instability in host 
African states play a major role as well. The thesis identified three distinct characteristics 
of high institutional quality that African States should try and adopt to ensure they obtain 
equal returns on the Chinese investments and these included observance of the rule of 
law, eradication of corruption and maintaining good governance. Moreover, the thesis 
emphasised the need for political stability in order to obtain equal returns on the Chinese 
investments. 
 
This thesis has therefore highlighted that for African states to obtain equal returns on the 
Chinese investments, they need to address the issue of mis-engineered BITs, power 
disparity and weak state institutions. 
                                                 
758Ibid 
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5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the above, it is recommended, first, that those African states that have 
concluded BITs with China should evaluate the possibility of renegotiating the BITs in 
order to include reservations, exceptions, temporary derogations and limitations. For 
example:- 
1. The preamble should be amended to include more objectives of the BIT, in particular, 
objectives relating to the promotion of respect for internationally recognised workers’ 
rights; the recognition of international law or principles of international law as a basis for 
economic co-operation; the need to balance the interests of the various stakeholders; the 
promotion of sustainable development; and a commitment to act in conformity with 
existing Human Rights and maintain health, safety and environmental measures. This 
will help elucidate to the Chinese investor that the investments must not be pursued at the 
expense of public policy goals of the host state such as the protection of health, safety, 
the environment and the promotion of internationally recognised labour rights. 
2. The definition of investment should be amended in the BITs to exclude real estate or 
other property that are not acquired for business purposes and/or economic benefit; 
certain financial assets or transactions that do not entail real acquisitions of interests by a 
Chinese investor in the host country; a bank letter of credit; the extension of credit in 
connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade financing; claims to money 
originating exclusively from commercial contracts for the sale of goods and services; 
loans between the parties to the BIT or to the MNE of one of the parties to the BIT and; 
goodwill market share. 
3. The BITs should be amended to limit the application of portfolio investment to only 
investments that have been established for a minimum period of time, such as two years, 
as a way of controlling capital volatility. 
4. The coverage of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) should be limited by requiring that 
it be associated with a business operating in the African host state territory. This ensures 
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that the investment has a significant operational presence in the host African state, not 
simply market share, in order to trigger the rights and obligations of the BIT.  
5. The BITs should be amended to give African states full discretion and control over the 
admission of Chinese investments. This can be done by limiting the scope of the 
definition of investment by including a statement stating that the investment must be in 
accordance with host states’ laws and regulations.  
6. The BITs should be amended to limit the investments that can be covered under the 
BIT to only those that contribute to the economic development of the host state by stating 
that a covered asset should have the characteristics of an investment, such as the 
commitment of capital or other resources; of a certain duration; an expectation of gain or 
profit; the assumption of risk; or the contribution to host state development.759 
7. The definition of the investor should be limited by including a denial of benefit clause. 
This removes from the definition of investment shell companies owned by nationals of a 
third country, whom the host states do not intend to protect under the BIT. 
 
8. The BITs should be amended to expressly provide for the promotion of investments 
through joint ventures; the avoidance of restrictive trade practices such as imposing 
restrictive clauses in technology transfer contracts by Chinese investors; and requiring 
China to refrain from imposing policies and measures that restrict their MNEs to transfer 
or diffuse technologies to their partners in the host countries. This ensures that the host 
African state immensely gains though transfer of technology as well as managerial and 
technical skills thereby contributing to equal returns on investment. 
 
9. The BITs should be amended to provide for the establishment of an institutional 
framework between the parties to be employed to overlook the implementation of the 
agreement, monitor investment relations, forward proposals on how best to promote 
foreign investment between the parties, and organise workshops or fairs on investment 
opportunities with the participation of foreign investors. This would aid in ensuring that 
                                                 
759See Chapter 2.6.2 discussing case laws that established the said characteristics of an investment. 
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the host African state is benefiting from the Chinese investments through abandoning 
unsuccessful practices and adopting proposed new ones.  
 
10. The BITs should be amended to limit fair and equitable treatment to the minimum 
standard under international law. This ensures that numerous governmental regulatory 
actions are not made inconsistent with the obligations of the BIT, regardless of whether 
they were adopted and implemented on a non-discriminatory basis. 
 
11. The BITs should be amended to include the GATS-type exceptions to National 
Treatment and MFN, where the two standards will only be applicable to industries and 
sectors inscribed in a party’s schedule of commitments. Countries can also use the “opt-
out”760 method of exception to the two standards whereby, African states reserve the 
industries which fall out the scope of the two standards by way of an annex to the BIT. 
With regard to National Treatment, the said exceptions would enable the domestic 
industries of the host state to compete with external and foreign investments. With regard 
to MFN, it would enable the host state to steer foreign investors into those activities they 
consider of priority for them to realise sustainable economic development and industrial 
development. 
  
12. The BITs should be amended to limit the scope of National Treatment to like 
circumstances.761 This gives African governments’ policy space to pursue national 
policies through preferential rules and regulations. 
 
13. The BITs should also be amended to define the concept of indirect expropriation and 
allow for exceptions in respect of the same, with regard to acts undertaken to protect 
public morals; human, animal or plant life; health and safety; the environment; and 
national treasures. This limits the application of indirect expropriation and thereby avoids 
a situation whereby host states’ routine regulatory acts as well acts undertaken for 
                                                 
760As discussed in Chapter 2.5.5 of the thesis 
761As per the definition in SD Myers-vs-Canada where the tribunal stated, inter alia, that “like 
circumstances” means same business and economic sector. That is the two companies engage in the same 
business and attract the same customers thus a customer may decide to go to one and not the other because 
of favourable prices and experience. 
 
 
 
 
 139
legitimate public interest, are converted into indirect takings that requires compensation 
to be paid.  
 
14. The BITs should be amended to allow for burdensome compensations for 
expropriations to be paid in instalments as some African states may be unable to pay 
compensation promptly because of financial difficulties. This would reduce the financial 
strain on governments as they would be able to schedule payment according to their 
ability. 
 
15. The provision on repatriation of profits should be amended to include a Balance of 
Payments (BoP) exception. Such an exception would allow host states to manage all 
currency flows in the event of a BoP crisis without being in breach of the BIT. 
 
16. The BITs broadly protect the Chinese investors without giving them any obligations 
to the host sate. Therefore, the BITs should be amended to include obligations of the 
investor and the home state. Such obligations would be with regard to the maintenance of 
the environment and other standards for example labour, public health and safety. 
Similarly, investors should be obliged to refrain from engaging in corrupt activities. This 
would prevent MNEs unsustainable practices such as exploitation of natural resources 
and pollution of the environment. 
 
17. The BITs should be amended to allow for amicus curiae submissions, as well as 
transparency in arbitral proceedings, to enable involvement of the public, who shall act as 
a check and balance to the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. 
 
In addition to the above proposed amendments, African states should look into the 
possibility of coming up with an African Model Investment Agreement to be formulated 
under the auspices of the AU and NEPAD. Most African states’ development goals are 
identical and in line with the aims and objectives of the AU and NEPAD which include, 
inter alia, promotion of sustainable economic growth, eradication of poverty, helping 
Africa to fully integrate into the global economy and promotion of democracy, good 
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political, economic and corporate governance.762 This is logical from both an economic 
perspective as well as a human resource perspective.763   
 
Similarly, African states should come up with a China policy which will assert Africa’s 
expectations from the Afro-China relationship as well as their strategy for obtaining equal 
returns from the Chinese investments. The AU and NEPAD can be used to co-ordinate 
the establishment of the said China policy and ensure that Africa’s interests are 
adequately emphasised upon. 
 
Secondly, to increase their bargaining power in BIT negotiations, African states should 
prepare strategically for the negotiations. Their preparation should entail having a 
negotiation plan. This can be achieved through coming up with a model BIT that 
adequately allows for policy space and flexibilities. The IISD Model Investment 
Agreement and handbook for practitioners and the CCIA are good guides and reference 
points. 
 
Moreover, they can increase their bargaining power through diversification from export 
of primary commodities to trade in services, tourism, low skill manufacturing and 
production of new types of commodities such as bio-fuels, cut flowers etc. This would 
reduce their dependency on primary commodities764 thus increasing their bargaining 
power. 
 
The bargaining power of African states can be further improved by deeper integration 
through development of a single market and investment area in regional arrangements 
like the EAC and SADC. This would therefore mean a larger domestic market and 
therefore, economies of scale, large investment area as a result of enlarged market, more 
attractive investment location for both domestic and foreign investors and increased 
                                                 
762See http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php (accessed on 5/5/09). 
763The AU has the capacity to engage qualified trade and investment experts to come up with the model 
investment treaty. Similarly, from an economic perspective, the states can share the costs of engaging the 
experts as opposed to each individual country engaging trade experts. 
764Examples of these are agricultural products (e.g. coffee, tea, cocoa, fisheries), natural resources 
extraction, oil, gas, coal and timber. 
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competitiveness. This would make them more amenable to effective participation in the 
global economy and the process of diversification.  
 
Thirdly, African states should reform their institutions through greater liberalisation, 
maintaining a high level of press freedom and external anchors, as suggested by the 
IMF.765 In addition, they should commit to the NEPAD peer review mechanism.766 The 
peer review mechanism would help identify institutional weaknesses and give 
recommendations on how to improve the institutions. Through peer pressure and public 
scrutiny, African states with weak institutions may effect change by adopting corrective 
actions.  
 
Furthermore, the civil society and private sector of African states should play an active 
role in advocating and demanding for government accountability. This would help to 
check and balance government power and thereby put pressure on the government to 
improve the state institutions. 
 
In light of all the above, African states need to strategically prepare for BIT negotiations 
so as to ensure they negotiate for inclusion of exceptions, limitations and reservations in 
the BITs, as recommended herein. This will guarantee that the BITs give them policy 
space to pursue their development goals. This would enable them to reap commensurate 
                                                 
765See discussion on institutional reform in chapter 4 
766The NEPAD peer review mechanism is voluntary hence African members of the AU have to accede to it 
by signing the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. By 
signing, it means that the state undertakes to submit to and facilitate periodic peer reviews and generally be 
guided by agreed parameters for good governance at both political and economic levels. The NEPAD peer 
review entails the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of member states by the other 
states (peer) through a review panel consisting of prominent Africans nominated and appointed by their 
respective member state’s head of state. The function of the panel is to promote policies, standards and 
practices in favour of political stability, economic growth, sustainable development, human rights and 
regional integration, amongst the member states. The ultimate goal is to help the reviewed state improve its 
policy-making, adopt best practices and comply with established standards, principles, codes, and other 
agreed commitments. The review is conducted in a non-adversarial manner and it relies heavily on mutual 
trust, understanding between the state being reviewed and the reviewers, as well as their shared confidence 
in the process. See Cilliers J. ‘NEPAD’s peer review mechanism’. (2002). Institute for Security Studies 
occasional paper No. 64. Available at: 
http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=29&slink_id=982&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3 
(accessed on 24/4/09). 
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returns on the Chinese investments. Moreover, they should reform their institutions so 
that the BITs are critically implemented for the economic benefit of the host state. 
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APPENDIX A 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
UGANDA ON THE RECIPROCAL PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF 
INVESTMENTS  
 
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic 
of Uganda hereinafter referred to as the Contracting Parties, Desiring to strengthen their 
economic cooperation by creating favourable conditions for investments by investors of 
one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party; Recognising that the 
encouragement and reciprocal protection of such investments will be conducive to the 
stimulation of business initiative and will increase prosperity of both Contracting States; 
Convinced that the promotion and protection of these investments would succeed in 
stimulating transfers of capital and technology between the two Contracting States in the 
interest of their economic development, Have agreed as follows:  
 
Article 1  
Definitions For the purpose of this Agreement:  
1. The term "investment" means every kind of property, such as goods, rights and 
interests of whatever nature, and in particularly though not exclusively, includes:  
(a) tangible, intangible, movable and immovable properly as well as any other right in 
rem such as mortgages, liens, usufructs, pledges and similar rights;  
(b) shares, debentures, stock and any other kind of participation in companies;  
(c) claims to money or to any other performance having an economic value associated 
with an investment; (d) intellectual and industrial property rights such as copyrights, 
patents, trademarks, industrial models and mockups, technical processes, know-how, 
trade names and goodwill, and any other similar rights;  
(e) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to 
search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources, Any change in the form in 
which properties are invested does not affect their character as investments provided that 
such change is in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party in 
whose territory the investment has been made.  
2. The term "investor" means  
(a) natural persons who have nationality of either Contracting Party in accordance with 
the laws of that Contracting Party;  
(b) legal entities, including company, association, partnership and other organization, 
incorporated or constituted under the laws and regulations of either Contracting Party and 
have their headquarters in that Contracting Party.  
3. The term "return" means the amounts yielded from investments, including profits, 
dividends, interests, capital gains, royalties, fees and other legitimate income.  
4. For the purposes of this Agreement, the term "territory" means respectively: -for the 
People's Republic of China, the territory of the People's Republic of China, including the 
territorial sea and air space above it, as well as any area beyond its territorial sea within 
which the People's Republic of China has sovereign rights of exploration for and 
exploitation of resources of the seabed and its sub-soil and superjacent water resources in 
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accordance with Chinese Law and international law; -for Uganda, the Republic of 
Uganda.  
 
Article 2  
Promotion and protection of investments  
1. Each Contracting Party shall encourage and promote investors of the other Contracting 
Party to make investments in its territory and admit such investments in accordance with 
its laws and regulations.  
2. The investments made by investors of one contracting party shall enjoy full and 
complete protection and safety in the territory of the other Contracting Party. 
3. Without prejudice to its laws and regulations, neither Contracting Party shall take any 
discriminatory measures against the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and 
disposal of the investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party.  
4. Subject to its laws and regulations, one Contracting Party shall provide assistance in 
and facilities for obtaining visas and working permit to nationals of the other Contracting 
Party engaging in activities associated with investments made in the territory of that 
Contracting Party.  
 
Article 3  
Treatment of Investment  
1. Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall all the time be accorded fair 
and equitable treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party.  
2. Without prejudice to its laws and regulations, each Contracting Party shall accord to 
investments and activities associated with such investments by the investors of the other 
Contracting Party treatment not less favorable than that accorded to the investments and 
associated activities by its own investors.  
3. Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities associated with such 
investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favorable 
than that accorded to the investments and associated activities by the investors of any 
third Sate.  
4. This treatment shall not include the privileges granted by one Contracting Party to 
nationals or companies of a third Sate by virtue of its participation or association in a free 
trade zone, customs union, common market or any other form of regional economic 
organization.  
5. The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to matters of taxation in the territory 
of either Contracting Party. Such matters shall be governed by the Double Taxation 
Treaty between the two Contracting Parties and the domestic laws of each Contracting 
Party.  
 
Article 4  
Expropriation  
1. Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures of expropriation or nationalization 
or any other measures having the effect of dispossession, direct or indirect, of investors of 
the other Contracting Party of their investments in territory, except for the public interest, 
without discrimination and against compensation.  
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2. Any measures of dispossession which might be taken shall give rise to prompt 
compensation, the amount of which shall be equivalent to the real value of the 
investments immediately before the expropriation is taken or the impending expropriation 
becomes public knowledge, whichever is earlier.  
3. The said compensation shall be set not later than the date of dispossession. The 
compensation shall include interest at a normal commercial rate from the date of 
expropriation until the date of payment. The compensation shall also be made without 
delay, be effectively realizable and freely transferable.  
Article 5  
Indemnification Investors of one Contracting Party whose investments in the territory of 
the other Contracting Party suffer losses owing to war, a state of national emergency, 
insurrection, riot or other similar events in the territory of the latter Contracting Party, 
shall be accorded by the latter Contracting Party treatment, as regards restitution, 
indemnification, compensation and other settlements, which is no less favorable than that 
granted to its own nationals or companies or to those of the most favored nation.  
 
Article 6 
Subrogation  
If one Contracting Party or its designated agency makes a payment to its investors under 
a guarantee or a contract of insurance against non-commercial risks it has accorded in 
respect of an investment made in the territory of the other Contracting Party, the latter 
Contracting Party shall recognize:  
(a) the assignment, whether under the law or pursuant to a legal transaction in the former 
Contracting Party, of any rights or claims by the investors to the former Contracting Party 
or to its designated agency, as well as,  
(b) that the former Contracting Party or to its designated agency is entitled by virtue of 
subrogation to exercise the rights and enforce the claims of that investor and assume the 
obligations related to the investment to the same extent as the investor.  
 
Article 7  
Transfers  
1. Each Contracting Party shall guarantee to the investors of the other Contracting Party 
the transfer of their investments and returns held in its territory, including:  
(a) profits, dividends, interests and other legitimate income;  
(b) proceeds obtained from the total or partial sale or liquidation of investments;  
(c) payments pursuant to a loan agreement in connection with investments;  
(d) royalties in relation to the matters in Paragraph 1 (d) of Article 1;  
(e) payments of technical assistance or technical service fee, management fee;  
(f) payments in connection with contracting projects;  
(g) earnings of nationals of the other Contracting Party who work in connection with an 
investment in its territory.  
2. Nothing in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall affect the free transfer of compensation 
paid under Article 4 and 5 of this Agreement.  
3. The transfer mentioned above shall be made in a freely convertible currency and at the 
prevailing market rate of exchange applicable within the Contracting Party accepting the 
investments and on the date of transfer.  
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4. In case of a serious balance of payments difficulties and external financial difficulties 
or the threat thereof, each contracting party may temporarily restrict transfers, provided 
that this restriction: i) shall be promptly notified to the other party; ii) shall be consistent 
with the articles of agreement with the International Monetary Fund; iii) shall be within 
an agreed period; iv) would be imposed in an equitable, non discriminatory and in good 
faith basis.  
5. A Contracting Party may require that, prior to the transfer of payments, formalities 
arising from the relevant laws and regulations are fulfilled by the investors, provided that 
those shall not be used to frustrate the purpose of paragraph 1 of this article.  
 
Article 8  
Settlement of disputes between an investor and a Contracting Party  
1. Any legal dispute between an investor of one Contracting Party and the other 
Contracting Party in connection with an investment in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably through negotiations 
between the parties to the dispute.  
2. If the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations within six months from the date it 
has been raised by either party to the dispute, it shall be submitted by the choice of the 
investor:  
(a) to the competent court of the Contracting Party that is a party to the dispute;  
(b) to International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the 
Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
done at Washington on March 18, 1965, provided that the Contracting Party involved in 
the dispute may require the investor concerned to gothrough the domestic administrative 
review procedures specified by the laws and regulations of that Contracting Party before 
the submission to the ICSID. Once the investor has submitted the dispute to the 
competent court of the Contracting Party concerned or to the ICSID, the choice of one of 
the two procedures shall be final.  
3. The arbitration award shall be based on the law of the Contracting Party to the dispute 
including its rules on the conflict of laws the provisions of this Agreement as well as the 
universally accepted principles of international law.  
4. The arbitration award shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute. Both 
Contracting Parties shall commit themselves to the enforcement of the award. Each party 
to the dispute shall bear the costs of its appointed arbitrator and of its representation in 
arbitral proceedings. The relevant costs of the Chairman and tribunal shall be borne in 
equal parts by the parties to the dispute. The tribunal may in its award direct that a higher 
proportion of the costs be borne by one of the parties to the dispute.  
 
Article 9  
Settlement of disputes between Contracting Parties  
1. Any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be 
settled as far as possible through diplomatic channels within three months.  
2. In case of failure of a settlement through diplomatic channels within three months, the 
dispute may be submitted to an ad hoc joint committee consisting of the representatives 
of the two Parties or to ad hoc arbitration.  
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3. The Contracting Parties may set up such joint committee comprising relevant experts 
to resolve the dispute. The procedures of the joint committee shall be decided by both 
parties to the dispute.  
4. If the joint committee cannot settle the dispute within six months, the party to the 
dispute is entitled to submit the dispute to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal. The arbitration 
tribunal shall be set up as follows for each individual case: Each Contracting Party shall 
appoint one arbitrator within a period of two months from the date on which one 
Contracting Party has informed the other Party of its intention to submit the dispute to 
arbitration. Those two arbitrators shall, within further two months, together select a 
national of a third State having diplomatic relations with both Contracting Parties as 
Chairman of the arbitral tribunal. If these time limits have not been complied with either 
Contracting Party shall request the President of the International Court of Justice to make 
the necessary appointment(s). If the President of the International Court of Justice is a 
national of either Contracting Party or of a State with which one of the Contracting 
Parties has no diplomatic relations or if, for any other reason, he cannot exercise this 
function, the Vice-President of the International Court of Justice shall be requested to 
make the appointment(s).  
5. The court thus constituted shall determine its own rules of procedure. Its decisions 
shall be taken by a majority of the votes; they shall be final and binding on the 
Contracting Parties.  
6. Each Contracting Party shall bear the costs resulting from the appointment of its 
arbitrator. The expenses in connection with the appointment of the third arbitrator and the 
administrative costs of the court shall be borne equally by the Contracting Parties.  
 
Article 10  
Other obligations  
If the legislation of either Contracting Party or international obligations existing at 
present or established hereafter between the Contracting Parties result in a position 
entitling investments by investors of the other Contracting Party to a treatment more 
favorable than is provided for by the Agreement, such position shall not be affected by 
this Agreement.  
 
Article 11  
Special Agreements  
1. Investments made pursuant to a specific agreement concluded between one 
Contracting Party and investors of the other Party shall be covered by the provisions of 
this Agreement and by those of the specific agreement.  
2. Each Contracting Party undertakes to ensure at all times that the commitments it has 
entered into vis-à-vis investors of the other Contracting Party shall be observed.  
 
Article 12  
Application  
This Agreement shall apply to investment, which are made prior to or after its entry into 
force by investors of one either Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting 
Party in accordance with the laws and regulations of the other Contracting Party 
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concerned in the territory of the latter, but shall not apply to the dispute that arose before 
the entry into force of this Agreement.  
 
Article 13  
Governing law  
All investments shall, subject to this Agreement, be governed by law in force in the 
territory of the Contracting Party in which such investments are made.  
 
Article 14  
Consultations  
1. The representatives of the Contracting Parties shall hold meetings from time to time 
for the purpose of: (a) reviewing the implementation of this Agreement;  
(b) exchanging legal information and investment opportunities;  
(c) resolving disputes arising out of investments;  
(d) forwarding proposals on promotion of investment;  
(e) studying other issues in connection with investment.  
2. Where either Contracting Party requests consultation on any matter of Paragraph 1 of 
this Article, the other Contracting Party shall give prompt response and the consultation 
be held alternatively in Beijing and Kampala.  
 
Article 15  
Amendments  
The terms of this Agreement may be amended by mutual agreement of both Contracting 
Parties and such amendments shall be effected by exchange of notes between them 
through diplomatic channels.  
 
Article 16  
Entry into force and duration  
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the following month after the 
date on which both Contracting Parties have notified each other in writing that their 
respective internal legal procedures necessary therefore have been fulfilled and remain in 
force for a period of ten years.  
2. This Agreement shall continue to be in force unless if either Contracting Party has fails 
to given a written notice to the other Contracting Party to terminate this Agreement one 
year before the expiration of the initial ten year period specified in Paragraph 1 of this 
Article or at any time thereafter.  
3. With respect to investments made prior to the date of termination of this Agreement, 
the provisions of Article 1 to 15 shall continue to be effective for a further period of ten 
years from such date of termination.  
 
In Witness Whereof the undersigned, duly authorized thereto by respective Governments, 
have signed this Agreement. Done in duplicate in Beijing on May 27, 2004, in the 
Chinese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.  
 
For the Government of Uganda 
For the Government of the People's Republic of China Republic  
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APPENDIX B 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI  
ON THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS  
 
The Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic 
of Djibouti,  
Intending to create favorable conditions for investment by investors of one Contracting 
Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party;  
Recognizing that the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of such 
investment will be conducive to stimulating business initiative of the investors, flow of 
capital and technology, and will increase prosperity and economic development and that 
fair and equitable treatment of investments is desirable in both States;  
Desiring to intensify the cooperation of both States on the basis of equality and mutual 
benefits;  
 
Have agreed as follows:  
 
ARTICLE 1  
DEFINITIONS  
For the purpose of this Agreement,  
1, The term “investment” means every kind of asset invested by investors of one 
Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and regulations of the other Contracting 
Party in the territory of the latter, and in particularly, though not exclusively, includes:  
(a) movable and immovable property and other property rights such as mortgages and 
pledges;  
(b) shares, debentures, stock and any other kind of participation in companies;  
(c) claims to money or to any other performance having an economic value associated 
with an investment;  
(d) intellectual property rights, in particularly copyrights, patents, trade-marks, trade-
names, technical process, know-how and good-will;  
(e) business concessions conferred by law or under contract permitted by law, including 
concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.  
Any change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their character as 
investments.  
2, The term “investor” means,   
(a) natural persons who have nationality of either Contracting Party in accordance with 
the laws of that Contracting Party;  
(b) economic entities, including companies, corporations, associations, partnerships and 
other organizations, incorporated and constituted under the laws and regulations of either 
Contracting Party and have their seats in that Contracting Party.  
3, The term “return” means the amounts yielded from investments, including profits, 
dividends, interests, capital gains, royalties and other legitimate income.  
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ARTICLE 2  
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT  
1, Each Contracting Party shall encourage investors of the other Contracting Party to 
make investments in its territory and admit such investments in accordance with its laws 
and regulations.  
2, Investments of the investors of either Contracting Party shall be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment and shall enjoy the constant protection and security in the territory of 
the other Contracting Party.  
3, Without prejudice to its laws and regulations, neither Contracting Party shall take any 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures against the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment and disposal of the investments by the investors of the other Contracting 
Party.  
4, Subject to its laws and regulations, one Contracting Party shall provide assistance in 
and facilities for obtaining visas and working permit to nationals of the other Contracting 
Party engaging in activities associated with investments made in the territory of that 
Contracting Party.  
  
ARTICLE 3  
TREATMENT OF INVESTMENT  
1, Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall all the time be accorded fair 
and equitable treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party.  
2, Without prejudice to its laws and regulations, each Contracting Party shall accord to 
investments and activities associated with such investments by the investors of the other 
Contracting Party treatment not less favorable than that accorded to the investments and 
associated activities by its own investors.  
3, Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities associated with such 
investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favorable 
than that accorded to the investments and associated activities by the investors of any 
third State.  
4, The provisions of Paragraphs 1 to 3 of this Article shall not be construed so as to 
oblige one Contracting Party to extend to the investors of the other Contracting Party the 
benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege by virtue of:  
(a) any customs union, free trade zone, economic union and any international agreement 
resulting in such customs union, free trade zone, economic union;  
(b) any international agreement or arrangement relating wholly or mainly to taxation;  
(c) any international agreement or arrangement facilitating frontier trade.  
 
ARTICLE 4  
EXPROPRIATION  
1, Neither Contracting Party shall expropriate, nationalize or take other similar measures 
(hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) against the investments of the investors of the 
other Contracting Party in its territory, unless the following conditions are met:  
(a) for the public interests;  
(b) under domestic legal procedure;  
(c) without discrimination;  
(d) against compensation.  
 
 
 
 
 186
2, The compensation mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be equivalent to the 
value of the expropriated investments immediately before the expropriation is taken or 
the impending expropriation becomes public knowledge, which is earlier. The value shall 
be determined in accordance with generally recognized principles of valuation. The 
compensation shall include interest from the date of expropriation until the date of 
payment. The compensation shall also be made without delay, be effectively realizable 
and freely transferable.  
 
ARTICLE 5  
COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES AND LOSSES  
Investors of one Contracting Party whose investments in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party suffer losses owing to war, a state of national emergency, insurrection, 
riot or other similar events in the territory of the latter Contracting Party, shall be 
accorded by the latter Contracting Party, if it takes relevant measures, treatment, as 
regards restitution, indemnification, compensation and other settlements no less favorable 
than that accorded to the investors of its own or any third State.  
 
ARTICLE 6  
REPATRIATION OF INVESTMENTS AND RETURNS  
1, Each Contracting Party shall, subject to its laws and regulations, guarantee to the 
investors of the other Contracting Party the transfer of their investments and returns held 
in its territory, including:  
(a) profits, dividends, interests and other legitimate income;  
(b) proceeds obtained from the total or partial sale or liquidation of investments;  
(c) payments pursuant to a loan agreement in connection with investments;  
(d) royalties in relation to the matters in Paragraph 1 (d) of Article 1;  
(e) payments of technical assistance or technical service fee, management fee;  
(f) payments in connection with contracting projects;  
(g) earnings of nationals of the other Contracting Party who work in connection with an 
investment in its territory.  
2, Nothing in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall affect the free transfer of compensation 
paid under Article 4 of this Agreement.  
3, The transfer mentioned above shall be made in a freely convertible currency and at the 
prevailing market rate of exchange applicable within the Contracting Party accepting the  
investments and on the date of transfer.  
 
ARTICLE 7  
SUBROGATION  
If one contracting Party or its designated agency makes a payment to its investor under an 
indemnity given in respect of an investment made in the territory of the other Contracting 
Party, the latter Contracting Party shall recognize the assignment of all the rights and 
claims of the indemnified investor to the former Contracting Party or its designated 
agency, by law or by legal transactions, and the right of the former Contracting Party or 
its designated agency to exercise by virtue of subrogation any such right to same extent 
as the investor.  
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ARTICLE 8  
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN CONTRACTING PARTIES  
1, Any dispute between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled with consultation 
through diplomatic channel.  
2, If a dispute cannot thus be settled within six months, it shall, upon the request of either 
Contracting Party, be submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal.  
3, Such tribunal comprises of three arbitrators. Within two months of the receipt of the 
written notice requesting arbitration, each Contracting Party shall appoint one arbitrator. 
Those two arbitrators shall, within further two months, together select a national of a 
third State having diplomatic relations with both Contracting Parties as Chairman of the 
arbitral tribunal. 
4, If the arbitral tribunal has not been constituted within four months from the receipt of 
the written notice requesting arbitration, either Contracting Party may, in the absence of 
any other agreement, invite the President of the International Court of Justice to make 
any necessary appointments. If the President is a national of either Contracting Party or is 
otherwise prevented from discharging the said functions, the Member of the International 
Court of Justice next in seniority who is not a national of either Contracting Party or is 
not otherwise prevented from discharging the said functions shall be invited to make such 
necessary appointments.  
5, The arbitral tribunal shall determine its own procedure. The arbitral tribunal shall reach 
its award in accordance the provisions of this Agreement and the principles of 
international law recognized by both Contracting Parties.  
6, The arbitral tribunal shall reach its award by a majority of votes. Such award shall be 
final and binding upon both Contracting Parties. The arbitral tribunal shall, upon the 
request of either Contracting Party, explain the reasons of its award.  
7, Each Contracting Party shall bear the costs of its appointed arbitrator and of its 
representation in arbitral proceedings. The relevant costs of the Chairman and tribunal 
shall be borne in equal parts by the Contracting Parties.  
 
ARTICLE 9  
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN INVESTORS AND ONE CONTRCTING 
PARTY  
1, Any legal dispute between an investor of one Contracting Party and the other 
Contracting Party in connection with an investment in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably through negotiations 
between the parties to the dispute.  
2, If the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations within six months, the investor of 
one Contracting Party may submit the dispute to the competent court of the other 
Contracting Party.  
3, Any dispute, if unable to be settled within six months after resort to negotiations as 
specified in Paragraph 1 of this Article, shall be submitted at the request of either party to  
(a) International center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the 
Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
done at Washington on March 18,1965; or  
(b) an ad hoc arbitral tribunal  
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provided that the Contracting Party involved in the dispute may require the investor 
concerned to exhaust the domestic administrative review procedure specified by the laws 
and regulations of that Contracting Party before submission of the dispute the 
aforementioned arbitration procedure.  
However, if the investor concerned has resorted to the procedure specified in Paragraph 2 
of this Article, the provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply.  
4, Without prejudice to Paragraph 3 of this Article, the ad hoc arbitral tribunal referred to 
in Paragraph 3 (b) shall be constituted for each individual case in the following way: each 
party to the dispute shall appoint one arbitrator, and these two shall select a national of a 
third State which has diplomatic relations with both Contracting Parties as the Chairman. 
The first two arbitrators shall be appointed within two months of the written notice 
requesting for arbitration by either party to the dispute to the other and the Chairman 
shall be selected within four months. If, within the period specified above, the tribunal 
has not been constituted, either party to the dispute may invite the Secretary General of 
the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes to make the necessary 
appointments.  
5, The ad hoc arbitral tribunal shall determine its own procedure. However, the tribunal 
may, in the course of determination of procedure, take as guidance the Arbitration Rules 
of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes.  
6, The tribunal referred to in Paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of this Article shall reach its award 
by a majority of votes. Such award shall be final and binding upon both parties to the 
dispute. Both Contracting Parties shall commit themselves to the enforcement of the 
award.  
7, The tribunal referred to in Paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of this Article shall adjudicate in 
accordance with the law of the Contracting Party to the dispute accepting the investment 
including its rules on the conflict of laws, the provisions of this Agreement as well as the 
applicable principles of international law.  
8, Each party to the dispute shall bear the costs of its appointed arbitrator and of its 
representation in arbitral proceedings. The relevant costs of the Chairman and tribunal 
shall be borne in equal parts by the parties to the dispute. The tribunal may in its award 
direct that a higher proportion of the costs be borne by one of the parties to the dispute.  
 
ARTICLE 10  
OTHER OBLIGATIONS  
1, If the legislation of either Contracting Party or international obligations existing at 
present or established hereafter between the Contracting Parties result in a position 
entitling investments by investors of the other Contracting Party to a treatment more 
favorable than is provided for by the Agreement, such position shall not be affected by 
this Agreement.  
2, Each Contracting Party shall observe any commitments it may have entered into with 
the investors of the other Contracting Party as regards to their investments.  
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ARTICLE 11  
APPLICATION  
This Agreement shall apply to investment, which are made after its entry into force by 
investors of either Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and regulations of the 
other Contracting Party in the territory of the latter.  
 
ARTICLE 12  
CONSULTATIONS  
1, The representatives of the Contracting Parties shall hold meetings from time to time 
for the purpose of:  
(a) reviewing the implementation of this Agreement;  
(b) exchanging legal information and investment opportunities;  
(c) resolving disputes arising out of investments;  
(d) forwarding proposals on promotion of investment;  
(e) studying other issues in connection with investment.  
2, Where either Contracting Party requests consultation on any matter of Paragraph 1 of 
this Article, the other Contracting Party shall give prompt response and the consultation 
be held alternatively in Beijing and Djibouti.  
 
ARTICLE 13  
ENTRY INTO FORCE, DURATION AND TERMINATION  
1, This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the following month after the 
date on which both Contracting Parties have notified each other in writing that their 
respective internal legal procedures necessary therefore have been fulfilled and remain in 
force for a period of ten years.  
2, This Agreement shall continue on force if either Contracting Party fails to give a 
written notice to the other Contracting Party to terminate this Agreement one year before 
the expiration of the period specified in Paragraph 1 of this Article.  
3, After the expiration of initial ten years period, either Contracting Party may at any time 
thereafter terminate this Agreement by giving at least one year’s written notice to the 
other Contracting Party.  
4, With respect to investments made prior to the date of termination of this Agreement, 
the provisions of Article 1 to 12 shall continue to be effective for a further period of ten 
years from such date of termination.  
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized thereto by respective 
Governments, have signed this Agreement.  
Done in duplicate at Beijing, on august 18, 2003, in the Chinese and English languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. In case of divergent interpretation, the English text 
shall prevail.   
 
For the Government of the Republic of Djibouti  
 
For the Government of the People’s Republic of China  
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APPENDIX C 
 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ON 
THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF 
INVESTMENTS 
 
The People's Republic of China and the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Contracting Parties"), Intending to create favourable conditions for 
investment by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting 
Party, Recognizing that the encouragement, promotion and protection of such investment 
will be conducive to stimulating business initiative of the investors and will increase 
prosperity in both States, Desiring to intensify the economic cooperation of both States, 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article 1 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this Agreement 
1. the term "investment" means every kind of asset invested directly or indirectly by 
investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, and in 
particular, though not exclusively, includes: 
(a) movable and immovable property and other property rights such as mortgages and 
pledges; 
(b) shares, debentures, stock and any other kind of interest in companies; 
(c) claims to money or to any other performance having an economic value associated 
with an investment; 
(d) intellectual property rights, in particular copyrights, patents and industrial de-signs, 
trade-marks, trade-names, technical processes, trade and business secrets, know-how and 
good-will; 
(e) business concessions conferred by law or under contract permitted by law, including 
concessions to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources; 
any change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their character as 
investments; 
2. the term "investor" means 
(a) in respect of the Federal Republic of Germany: 
Germans within the meaning of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, any 
juridical person as well as any commercial or other company or association with or 
without legal personality having its seat in the territory of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, irrespective of whether or not its activities are directed at profit; 
(b) in respect of the People’s Republic of China: 
natural persons who have nationality of the People’s Republic of China in accordance 
with its laws, economic entities, including companies, corporations, associations, 
partnerships and other organizations, incorporated and constituted under the laws and 
regulations of and with their seats in the People’s Republic of China, irrespective of 
whether or not for profit and whether their liabilities are limited or not; 
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3. the term "return" means the amounts yielded from investments, including profits, 
dividends, interests, capital gains, royalties, fees and other legitimate income. 
 
Article 2 
Promotion and Protection of Investment 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall encourage investors of the other Contracting Party to 
make investments in its territory and admit such investments in accordance with its laws 
and regulations. 
(2) Investments of the investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy constant pro-
tection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party. 
(3) Neither Contracting Party shall take any arbitrary or discriminatory measures against 
the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and disposal of the investments by the 
investors of the other Contracting Party. 
(4) Subject to its laws and regulations, either Contracting Party shall give sympathetic 
consideration to applications for obtaining visas and working permits to nationals of the 
other Contracting Party engaging in activities associated with investments made in the 
territory of that Contracting Party. 
 
Article 3 
Treatment of Investment 
(1) Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair 
and equitable treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party. 
(2) Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments and activities associated with such 
investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party treatment not less fa-vourable 
than that accorded to the investments and associated activities by its own in-vestors. 
(3) Neither Contracting Party shall subject investments and activities associated with 
such investments by the investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment less fa-
vourable than that accorded to the investments and associated activities by the inves-tors 
of any third State. 
(4) The provisions of Paragraphs 1 to 3 of this Article shall not be construed so as to 
oblige one Contracting Party to extend to the investors of the other Contracting Party the 
benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege by virtue of 
(a) any membership or association with any existing or future customs union, free trade 
zone, economic union, common market; 
(b) any double taxation agreement or other agreement regarding matters of taxation. 
 
Article 4 
Expropriation and Compensation 
(1) Investments by investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy full protection and 
security in the territory of the other Contracting Party. 
(2) Investments by investors of either Contracting Party shall not directly or indirectly be 
expropriated, nationalized or subjected to any other measure the effects of which would 
be tantamount to expropriation or nationalization in the territory of the other Contracting 
Party (hereinafter referred to as expropriation) except for the public benefit and against 
compensation. Such compensation shall be equivalent to the value of the investment 
immediately before the expropriation is taken or the threatening expropriation has 
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become publicly known, whichever is earlier. The compensation shall be paid without 
delay and shall carry interest at the prevailing commercial rate until the time of payment; 
it shall be effectively realizable and freely transferable. Precautions shall have been made 
in an appropriate manner at or prior to the time of expropriation for the determination and 
payment of such compensation. At the request of the investor the legality of any such 
expropriation and the amount of compensation shall be subject to review by national 
courts, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 9. 
(3) Investors of either Contracting Party shall enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party in respect of the matters provided for in this 
Article. 
 
Article 5 
Compensation for Damages and Losses 
Investors of either Contracting Party whose investments suffer losses in the territory of 
the other Contracting Party owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, a state of 
national emergency or revolt, shall be accorded treatment by such other Contracting Party 
not less favourable than that which the latter Contracting Party accords to its own 
investors or to investors of any third State as regards restitution, indemnification, 
compensation or other valuable consideration. 
 
Article 6 
Repatriation of Investments and Returns 
(1) Each Contracting Party shall guarantee to the investors of the other Contracting Party 
the transfer of their investments and returns held in its territory, including: 
(a) the principal and additional amounts to maintain or increase the investment; 
(b) returns; 
(c) proceeds obtained from the total or partial sale or liquidation of investments or 
amounts obtained from the reduction of investment capital; 
(d) payments pursuant to a loan agreement in connection with investments; 
(e) payments in connection with contracting projects; 
(f) earnings of nationals of the other Contracting Party who work in connection with an 
investment in its territory. 
(2) Each Contracting Party shall guarantee to the investors of the other Contracting Party 
the free transfer of compensation and other payments under Article 4 and 5. 
(3) The transfer mentioned above shall be made without delay in a freely convertible 
currency and at the prevailing market rate of exchange applicable within the Contract-ing 
Party accepting the investments and on the date of transfer. In the event that the market 
rate of exchange does not exist, the rate of exchange shall correspond to the cross rate 
obtained from those rates which would be applied by the International Monetary Fund on 
the date of payment for conversions of the currencies concerned into Special Drawing 
Rights. 
 
Article 7 
Subrogation 
If one Contracting Party or its designated agency makes a payment to its investor under a 
guarantee given in respect of an investment made in the territory of the other Contracting 
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Party, the latter Contracting Party shall recognize the assignment of all the rights and 
claims of the indemnified investor to the former Contracting Party or its designated 
agency, by law or by legal transactions, and the right of the former Con-tracting Party or 
its designated agency to exercise by virtue of subrogation any such right to same extent 
as the investor. As regards the transfer of payments made by virtue of such assigned 
claims, Article 6 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
Article 8 
Settlement of Disputes between Contracting Parties 
(1) Any dispute between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Agreement shall, as far as possible, be settled with consultation 
through diplomatic channel. 
(2) If a dispute cannot thus be settled within six months, it shall, upon the request of 
either Contracting Party, be submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. 
(3) Such tribunal comprises of three arbitrators. Within two months of the receipt of the 
written notice requesting arbitration, each Contracting Party shall appoint one arbitrator. 
Those two arbitrators shall, within further two months, together select a national of a 
third State having diplomatic relations with both Contracting Parties as Chairman of the 
arbitral tribunal. 
(4) If the arbitral tribunal has not been constituted within four months from the receipt of 
the written notice requesting arbitration, either Contracting Party may, in the absence of 
any other agreement, invite the President of the International Court of Justice to make 
any necessary appointments. If the President is a national of either Contracting Party or is 
otherwise prevented from discharging the said functions, the Member of the International 
Court of Justice next in seniority who is not a national of either Contracting Party or is 
not otherwise prevented from discharging the said functions shall be invited to make such 
necessary appointments. 
(5) The arbitral tribunal shall determine its own procedure. The arbitral tribunal shall 
reach its award in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the principles of 
international law recognized by both Contracting Parties. 
(6) The arbitral tribunal shall reach its award by a majority of votes. Such award shall be 
final and binding upon both Contracting Parties. The arbitral tribunal shall, upon the 
request of either Contracting Party, explain the reasons of its award. 
(7) Each Contracting Party shall bear the costs of its appointed arbitrator and of its 
representation in arbitral proceedings. The relevant costs of the Chairman and tribunal 
shall be borne in equal parts by the Contracting Parties. 
 
Article 9 
Settlement of Disputes between Investors 
and one Contracting Party 
(1) Any dispute concerning investments between a Contracting Party and an investor of 
the other Contracting Party should as far as possible be settled amicably between the 
parties in dispute. 
(2) If the dispute cannot be settled within six months of the date when it has been raised 
by one of the parties in dispute, it shall, at the request of the investor of the other 
Contracting State, be submitted for arbitration. 
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(3) The dispute shall be submitted for arbitration under the Convention of 18 March 1965 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(ICSID), unless the parties in dispute agree on an ad-hoc arbitral tribunal to be 
established under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on the 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or other arbitration rules. 
(4) Any award by an ad-hoc tribunal shall be final and binding. Any award under the 
procedures of the said Convention shall be binding and subject only to those appeals or 
remedies provided for in this Convention. The awards shall be enforced in accordance 
with domestic law. 
 
Article 10 
Other Obligations 
(1) If the legislation of either Contracting Parties or obligations under international law 
existing at present or established hereafter between the Contracting Parties in ad-dition to 
this Agreement contain a regulation, whether general or specific, entitling investments by 
investors of the other Contracting Party to a treatment more favourable than is provided 
for by this Agreement, such regulation shall to the extent that it is more favourable 
prevail over this Agreement. 
(2) Each Contracting Party shall observe any other obligation it has entered into with 
regard to investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting Party. 
 
Article 11 
Application 
This Agreement shall apply to investment, which are made prior to or after its entry into 
force by investors of either Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and regulations 
of the other Contracting Party in the territory of the latter. 
 
Article 12 
Relations between Contracting Parties 
The provisions of the present Agreement shall apply irrespective of the existence of 
diplomatic or consular relations between the Contracting Parties. 
 
Article 13 
Consultations 
Either Contracting Party may propose to the other Contracting Party that consultations be 
held on any matter concerning interpretation, application and implementation of the 
Agreement. The other Contracting Party shall accord sympathetic consideration to the 
proposal and shall afford adequate opportunity for such consultations. 
 
Article 14 
Protocol 
The attached protocol shall form an integral part of this Agreement. 
 
Article 15 
Entry into Force, Duration and Termination 
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(1) This Agreement shall enter into force one month from the date on which both 
Contracting Parties have notified each other in writing that the national requirements for 
such entry into force have been fulfilled. The relevant date shall be the day on which the 
last notification is received. 
(2) This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of ten years and shall be ex-tended 
thereafter for an unlimited period unless denounced in writing through diplomatic 
channels by either Contracting Party twelve months before its expiration. 
(3) After the expiration of the initial ten years period, either Contracting Party may at any 
time thereafter terminate this Agreement by giving at least twelve month’s written notice 
through diplomatic channels to the other Contracting Party. 
(4) With respect to investments made prior to the date of termination of this Agreement, 
the provisions of Article 1 to 14 shall continue to be effective for a further period of 
twenty years from such date of termination. 
 
Article 16 
Transition 
(1) Upon entry into force of this Agreement the Agreement of 7 October 1983 between 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of China on the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments shall terminate. 
(2) The present Agreement shall apply to all investments made by investors of either 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, whether made before or 
after the entry into force of this Agreement, but shall not apply to any dispute or any 
claim concerning an investment which was already under judicial or arbitral process 
before its entry into force. Such disputes and claims shall continue to be settled ac-
cording to the provisions of the Agreement of 7 October 1983 mentioned in paragraph 1 
of this Article. 
 
Done at Beijing on 1st December, 2003 in duplicate in the German, Chinese and English 
languages, all texts being authentic. In case of divergent interpretation of the German and 
the Chinese text, the English text shall prevail. 
 
For the Federal Republic of Germany 
 
For the People’s Republic of China  
 
PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ON THE 
ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS 
 
On signing the Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
the plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized, have, in addition, agreed on the following 
provisions, which shall be regarded as an integral part of the said Agreement: 
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1. Ad Article 1 
(a) For the avoidance of doubt, the Contracting Parties agree that investments as defined 
in Article 1 are those made for the purpose of establishing lasting economic relations in 
connection with an enterprise, especially those which allow to exercise effective 
influence in its management. 
(b) "Invested indirectly" means invested by an investor of one Contracting Party through 
a company which is fully or partially owned by the investor and having its seat in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party. 
(c) Returns from the investment and from reinvestments shall enjoy the same protection 
as the investment. 
 
2. Ad Article 2 
The Agreement shall apply to the territory of each Contracting Party including the 
territorial sea as well as to the areas of the exclusive economic zone and the continental 
shelf insofar as international law permits the Contracting Party concerned to exercise 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction in these areas. 
 
3. Ad Article 2 and 3 
With regard to the People’s Republic of China paragraph 3 of Article 2 and paragraph 2 
of Article 3 do not apply to 
(a) any existing non-conforming measures maintained within its territory; 
(b) the continuation of any such non-conforming measure; 
(c) any amendment to any such non-conforming measure to the extent that the 
amendment does not increase the non-conformity of these measures. 
The People’s Republic of China will take all appropriate steps in order to progressively 
remove the non-conforming measures. 
 
4. Ad Article 3 
(a) The following shall more particularly, though not exclusively, be deemed "activity" 
within the meaning of Article 3 (2): the management, maintenance, use, enjoy-ment and 
disposal of an investment. The following shall, in particular, be deemed "treatment less 
favourable" within the meaning of Article 3: unequal treatment in the case of restrictions 
on the purchase of raw or auxiliary materials, of energy or fuel or of means of production 
or operation of any kind as well as any other measures having similar effects. Measures 
that have to be taken for reasons of public security and order, public health or morality 
shall not be deemed "treatment less favourable" within the meaning of Article 3. 
(b) The provisions of Article 3 do not oblige a Contracting Party to extend to investors 
resident in the territory of the other Contracting Party tax privileges, tax exemptions and 
tax reductions which according to its tax laws are granted only to investors resident in its 
territory. 
 
5. Ad Article 6 
(a) With regard to the People’s Republic of China: 
- Article 6, paragraph 1 (c) will apply provided that the transfer shall comply with the 
relevant formalities stipulated by the present Chinese laws and regulations relating to 
exchange control. 
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- Article 6, paragraph 1 (d) will apply provided that a loan-agreement has been registered 
with the relevant foreign exchange administration authority. 
To the extent that the formalities mentioned above are no longer required according to the 
relevant provisions of Chinese law, Article 6 shall apply without restrictions. 
(b) A transfer shall be deemed to have been made "without delay" within the meaning of 
Article 6 (3) if effected within such period as is normally required for the completion of 
transfer formalities. The said period shall commence on the day on which the relevant 
request has been submitted to the relevant foreign exchange administration with full and 
authentic documentation and information and may on no account exceed two months. 
 
6. To Article 9 
With respect to investments in the People’s Republic of China an investor of the Federal 
Republic of Germany may submit a dispute for arbitration under the following conditions 
only: 
(a) the investor has referred the issue to an administrative review procedure according to 
Chinese law, 
(b) the dispute still exists three months after he has brought the issue to the review 
procedure, and 
(c) in case the issue has been brought to a Chinese court, it can be withdrawn by the 
investor according to Chinese law. 
7. The investors of either Contracting Party are free to choose international means of 
transport for the transport of persons and/or capital-goods directly connected with an 
investment within the meaning of this Agreement. 
 
For the Federal Republic of German 
 
For the People’s Republic of China 
 
 
 
 
 
